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3.72 AVERAGE
3.72 AVERAGE
Read this if you dare. It takes work, ya gotta pay attention.
While definitely leaning toward economic and financial implications, I appreciated how the author creates a logic of mitigating (not avoiding) Black Swan events in ultimately any aspect of our life, specifically recommending:
****Differentiating between negative and positive contingencies
****Avoiding tunnel vision (using local/familiar/recent past events to predict the future)
****Opening yourself up to opportunities in life
****Understanding the difference between simplified, measured, controlled variables and the minutiae of life which are too complicated to model/predict
****Accepting that living organisms can only thrive in environments of variability and randomness
****Appreciating the lessons Nature can teach us about chaos and randomness (respect for time/redundancy, avoiding metrics based in "Mediocristan", and taking risks when there is minimal to lose)
Overall really fascinating philosophy
****Differentiating between negative and positive contingencies
****Avoiding tunnel vision (using local/familiar/recent past events to predict the future)
****Opening yourself up to opportunities in life
****Understanding the difference between simplified, measured, controlled variables and the minutiae of life which are too complicated to model/predict
****Accepting that living organisms can only thrive in environments of variability and randomness
****Appreciating the lessons Nature can teach us about chaos and randomness (respect for time/redundancy, avoiding metrics based in "Mediocristan", and taking risks when there is minimal to lose)
Overall really fascinating philosophy
I find it difficult to rate this book: the idea and content is amazing. Black swans are surely underrated and mostly ignored. Thus Taleb‘s book is a dearly needed wakeup call; or at least it was for me. I mostly viewed the world through a Gaussian lens and I agree that that is probably short sighted and misses reality; the Extremistan that we are living in. Yet: the book‘s style is hard to follow and too often just rants about other opinions and people. So: check out the idea but don’t necessarily expect a pleasant read.
Interesting ideas, but I feel it didn't develop as far beyond Fooled by Randomness as I had hoped. I also think that Taleb, like with the previous book, could have structured it much better, and in this case could have made it considerably shorter while giving a cogent presentation of his thoughts. The most valuable idea I brought with me from this book is in this passage, which really doesn't need much more explaining:
We, members of the human variety of primates, have a hunger for rules because we need to reduce the dimension of matters so they can get into our heads. The more random the information is, the greater the dimensionality, and thus the more difficult to summarize. The more you summarize, the more order you put in, the less randomness. Hence the same condition that makes us simplify pushes us to think that the world is less random than it is.
And the black swan is what we leave out for simplification.
Though this was a good book, I had just read the author’s newer Antifragile, which I loved, and maybe by comparing both I ended up not enjoying Black Swan as much.
Antifragile was just so much bolder, and also covering the main points of Black Swan, that I could have gone without reading Black Swan.
Antifragile was just so much bolder, and also covering the main points of Black Swan, that I could have gone without reading Black Swan.
This book was very meandering and there was a lot of focus on the author's personal experiences that I don't know if they helped. Also, the author is super condescending to all other people, he thinks he is the lone visionary that can see the world as it is. Maybe it's true, who knows.
I give this some stars because it was very interesting to think about different kinds of events and how we don't have the capacity to reason about the impact or chances of rare but catastrophic things happening.
I give this some stars because it was very interesting to think about different kinds of events and how we don't have the capacity to reason about the impact or chances of rare but catastrophic things happening.
It has been more than two months since I read this book and only now I succeed in writing a review about what this book can mean for a historian. That says something about how difficult it is to separate the problematic aspects of this book (the arrogant and polemical tone) from the real content. Because Taleb does have something to say for those who look at the past.
For the sake of clarity, firstly his definition of Black Swans: these are unexpected events, both negative and positive, with a huge impact, where no prior warnings exist for those who experience the event, but of which we post-factually are able to give explanations and thus have the impression that they were nevertheless predictable. That is already quite something to chew on. What Taleb offers is the paradoxical side of Black Swans: they come unexpectedly, but we can explain them perfectly afterwards. Some examples: the First World War had to break out if you see how recklessly in the decades before an arms race was under way and how the political leaders underestimated the enormous implications of their aggressive behavior; the fall of the Communist bloc in 1989 could have been predicted, because there were many indications that the economies of those countries were broke, that they were military-technological giants on clay feet, and that their populations only confessed to the official ideology for appearances; and so on, and so on.
Taleb sketches nothing less here, than the work historians do (and by extension of course also journalists and other categories): explaining why something happened. You could have the impression that he actually takes this as a child's play: every one could predict the outcome, given the right facts. But of course, Taleb is not that stupid. In his book there is one striking example that, in all its simplicity, explains the core problem of historical observation. Taleb quotes a scientific experiment: suppose you have an ice block of 1 cubic meter, and you put that in a heated room; by applying a number of scientific laws you can almost perfectly predict how quickly this ice block will melt and how large the pool of water eventually will be; but then think about the reverse experiment: you start with a large pool of water in a room; you can formulate dozens or even hundreds of explanations of how that pool came about, of which only one is that of the experiment with the ice block. In other words: it’s nearly impossible to find out exactly what happened.
When I read this, I was initially very impressed: indeed, the dense veil that hangs over the past makes it almost impossible for a historian to reconstruct what really happened. But after some thought, I have to admit that I felt badly deceived, or better, that I was angry with myself that I had not seen it at once. Because the experiment of Taleb is of such simplicity that it is not realistic: from the experience of a historian we know that there have to be a lot more clues in the room than the simple pool of water: maybe there were still people in white lab coats running around indicating a scientific experiment, perhaps there were heat-convectors in the immediate vicinity, maybe in the puddle there still was the wooden pallet on which the ice block was transported, perhaps scientific reports surfaced in which the experiment was literally described, or perhaps there was a cleaning crew present of which some people had seen everything happen, etc. To keep it short: a really perfect reconstruction may not be easy, but there are always enough traces that provide an approximative, plausible explanation. And just that last thing, and the methodology that comes with it, is the work of the historian.
Another interesting aspect in this book is that Taleb gives many explanations why we do not see Black Swans coming, and that is also relevant to the work of the historian, because it shows where the pitfalls lie, the classic "fallacies" of which one half century ago the American historian D.H. Fischer gave an almost exhaustive list in his seminal work [b:Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought|9037|Historians' Fallacies Toward a Logic of Historical Thought|David Hackett Fischer|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1348351606l/9037._SX50_.jpg|11926]. Taleb mainly focusses on psychological-mental aspects: our very human inclination, for example, to always assume that things will continue to go as they go now; we are mentally blind to the factor of change and chance in history. What is especially bad is that now we think we can predict the future better because of the flight science has taken and has brought more knowledge to the foreside. No wonder Taleb has a lot of criticism on econometrists and demographers who make predictions about economic growth, population trends and so on, which in retrospect almost always prove to be incorrect.
Now, Taleb blames this mainly on the use of wrong probability models (and the technicality of this makes the reading of the second half of this book so difficult). And that's where - according to me - he gets trapped in an own kind of contradiction. His book is full of historical examples of predictions and expectations that turned out to be wrong, and at the end of his book he argues for a form of stoicism because we cannot know which unexpected things can happen. But in other places he argues that we are able to demarcate an area (he calls it Mediocristan) where we are fairly safe, and thus also a very small area (Extremistan) where the Black Swans are active; and this knowledge, that demarcation, could protect us to a certain extent against huge mistakes.
I'm afraid that, in all its vagueness, with this Taleb once again opens the door to historians who imagine that, based on facts from the past, they can predict the future to some extent, and we are back to square one. The incomprehensible thing is that Taleb himself warnes against these kind of mistakes, mistakes that are inherent to mankind: "We do not spontaneously learn that we don’t learn that we don’t learn. The problem lies in the structure of our minds: we don’t learn rules, just facts, and only facts. Metarules (such as the rule that we have a tendency to not learn rules) we don’t seem to be good at getting. We scorn the abstract; we scorn it with passion "(pp xxvi). It is a lesson an historian should always remember.
For the sake of clarity, firstly his definition of Black Swans: these are unexpected events, both negative and positive, with a huge impact, where no prior warnings exist for those who experience the event, but of which we post-factually are able to give explanations and thus have the impression that they were nevertheless predictable. That is already quite something to chew on. What Taleb offers is the paradoxical side of Black Swans: they come unexpectedly, but we can explain them perfectly afterwards. Some examples: the First World War had to break out if you see how recklessly in the decades before an arms race was under way and how the political leaders underestimated the enormous implications of their aggressive behavior; the fall of the Communist bloc in 1989 could have been predicted, because there were many indications that the economies of those countries were broke, that they were military-technological giants on clay feet, and that their populations only confessed to the official ideology for appearances; and so on, and so on.
Taleb sketches nothing less here, than the work historians do (and by extension of course also journalists and other categories): explaining why something happened. You could have the impression that he actually takes this as a child's play: every one could predict the outcome, given the right facts. But of course, Taleb is not that stupid. In his book there is one striking example that, in all its simplicity, explains the core problem of historical observation. Taleb quotes a scientific experiment: suppose you have an ice block of 1 cubic meter, and you put that in a heated room; by applying a number of scientific laws you can almost perfectly predict how quickly this ice block will melt and how large the pool of water eventually will be; but then think about the reverse experiment: you start with a large pool of water in a room; you can formulate dozens or even hundreds of explanations of how that pool came about, of which only one is that of the experiment with the ice block. In other words: it’s nearly impossible to find out exactly what happened.
When I read this, I was initially very impressed: indeed, the dense veil that hangs over the past makes it almost impossible for a historian to reconstruct what really happened. But after some thought, I have to admit that I felt badly deceived, or better, that I was angry with myself that I had not seen it at once. Because the experiment of Taleb is of such simplicity that it is not realistic: from the experience of a historian we know that there have to be a lot more clues in the room than the simple pool of water: maybe there were still people in white lab coats running around indicating a scientific experiment, perhaps there were heat-convectors in the immediate vicinity, maybe in the puddle there still was the wooden pallet on which the ice block was transported, perhaps scientific reports surfaced in which the experiment was literally described, or perhaps there was a cleaning crew present of which some people had seen everything happen, etc. To keep it short: a really perfect reconstruction may not be easy, but there are always enough traces that provide an approximative, plausible explanation. And just that last thing, and the methodology that comes with it, is the work of the historian.
Another interesting aspect in this book is that Taleb gives many explanations why we do not see Black Swans coming, and that is also relevant to the work of the historian, because it shows where the pitfalls lie, the classic "fallacies" of which one half century ago the American historian D.H. Fischer gave an almost exhaustive list in his seminal work [b:Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought|9037|Historians' Fallacies Toward a Logic of Historical Thought|David Hackett Fischer|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1348351606l/9037._SX50_.jpg|11926]. Taleb mainly focusses on psychological-mental aspects: our very human inclination, for example, to always assume that things will continue to go as they go now; we are mentally blind to the factor of change and chance in history. What is especially bad is that now we think we can predict the future better because of the flight science has taken and has brought more knowledge to the foreside. No wonder Taleb has a lot of criticism on econometrists and demographers who make predictions about economic growth, population trends and so on, which in retrospect almost always prove to be incorrect.
Now, Taleb blames this mainly on the use of wrong probability models (and the technicality of this makes the reading of the second half of this book so difficult). And that's where - according to me - he gets trapped in an own kind of contradiction. His book is full of historical examples of predictions and expectations that turned out to be wrong, and at the end of his book he argues for a form of stoicism because we cannot know which unexpected things can happen. But in other places he argues that we are able to demarcate an area (he calls it Mediocristan) where we are fairly safe, and thus also a very small area (Extremistan) where the Black Swans are active; and this knowledge, that demarcation, could protect us to a certain extent against huge mistakes.
I'm afraid that, in all its vagueness, with this Taleb once again opens the door to historians who imagine that, based on facts from the past, they can predict the future to some extent, and we are back to square one. The incomprehensible thing is that Taleb himself warnes against these kind of mistakes, mistakes that are inherent to mankind: "We do not spontaneously learn that we don’t learn that we don’t learn. The problem lies in the structure of our minds: we don’t learn rules, just facts, and only facts. Metarules (such as the rule that we have a tendency to not learn rules) we don’t seem to be good at getting. We scorn the abstract; we scorn it with passion "(pp xxvi). It is a lesson an historian should always remember.
Interesting and eye-opening main idea, but I found it pretty difficult to get through.
This book is hyper-interesting, very rich but also super-annoying at the same time. So much has been written about it, that I am going to limit myself to some essentials. This book is about the absolutely unexpected, the black swan you would never suspect if you only saw white swans all your life. Taleb refers to numerous historical examples of things that have come completely out of the blue: the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nine-eleven, major stock market crises and so on. And also things in our ordinary life: when you look back, it is usually a succession of unexpected events that keep stuck in your memory and have shaped your life.
The interesting thing about this book is that Taleb explains in a solid way why we are always surprised by such things. And that is in the first place psychological: we are mentally set up so that we always expect things to go their way as they are now, we assume stability while reality is very complex and almost unpredictable. Our misjudgment is also caused because we expect everything to be very logical and linear, that cause and effect are always very clear, even in advance. Not so. What's more: we usually strongly oppose warnings about what could go wrong, while - if you look at history - uncertainty is the rule and regularity the exception. So the problem mainly is situated between our ears.
But what is worse: scientists, historians and journalists reinforce that tunnel vision by presenting - in retrospect - plausible explanations, which gives us the impression that if we had sufficient knowledge, we would have been able to estimate everything better and therefore in the future will be able to make the correct estimation, because we know so much more. Or they make it clear that the circumstances were very exceptional, and that a repetition is as good as impossible (and of course they're right: there's almost never a real repetition, every Black Swan is different).
I’m just giving a very superficial summary of what Taleb offers, because his book is actually very rich in examples and arguments. But .... as I said, it is also very annoying at the same time. For three, maybe four reasons. The first is that Taleb almost exclusively focuses on the economy, especially the stock market; that makes sense, since he was a stock market trader and therefore gained a lot of experience in that environment, but it narrows the focus substantially. Two: as the book progresses, Taleb dabs his pen more and more in the purest vitriol against all kinds of scientists, stock market gurus, statisticians and the like, whom he names by name (especially Nobel laureates). According to him they have completely missed the point of reality, by using the wrong methods. It may well be that Taleb is right, that is not what matters to me, it is mainly about the way he presents his criticism: with an arrogance that borders on the unlikely and that only increases as the book progresses.
Moreover, he - and this is my third objection to this book - has resorted to a very technical, statistical explanation to reinforce his bold claims: whole chapters are devoted to mathematical models that – according to Taleb – don’t relate to reality. He may also be right there, but as a reader he completely lost me. And then there is a fourth objection against this book, which in retrospect is perhaps more important than seems plausible at first glance: all experts, both the reliable and the untrustworthy to which Taleb refers are .... men; there is only one female character in this book and that is completely fictional; it might be an interesting study to determine the correlation between the Black Swan syndrome and gender issues (not the least those of Taleb himself, I refer to his mysoginist "Twitter-war" with Mary Beard).
In short, if I can give a concise reading warning: read only the first half of this book and make the best of it, but forget the second half (unless you’re a professional economist or statistician). And remember especially: Black Swans do exist, but you can arm yourself against them to a very limited extent, just by using common sense, and knowing that - at any moment in your life or in history in general - shit can happen.
The interesting thing about this book is that Taleb explains in a solid way why we are always surprised by such things. And that is in the first place psychological: we are mentally set up so that we always expect things to go their way as they are now, we assume stability while reality is very complex and almost unpredictable. Our misjudgment is also caused because we expect everything to be very logical and linear, that cause and effect are always very clear, even in advance. Not so. What's more: we usually strongly oppose warnings about what could go wrong, while - if you look at history - uncertainty is the rule and regularity the exception. So the problem mainly is situated between our ears.
But what is worse: scientists, historians and journalists reinforce that tunnel vision by presenting - in retrospect - plausible explanations, which gives us the impression that if we had sufficient knowledge, we would have been able to estimate everything better and therefore in the future will be able to make the correct estimation, because we know so much more. Or they make it clear that the circumstances were very exceptional, and that a repetition is as good as impossible (and of course they're right: there's almost never a real repetition, every Black Swan is different).
I’m just giving a very superficial summary of what Taleb offers, because his book is actually very rich in examples and arguments. But .... as I said, it is also very annoying at the same time. For three, maybe four reasons. The first is that Taleb almost exclusively focuses on the economy, especially the stock market; that makes sense, since he was a stock market trader and therefore gained a lot of experience in that environment, but it narrows the focus substantially. Two: as the book progresses, Taleb dabs his pen more and more in the purest vitriol against all kinds of scientists, stock market gurus, statisticians and the like, whom he names by name (especially Nobel laureates). According to him they have completely missed the point of reality, by using the wrong methods. It may well be that Taleb is right, that is not what matters to me, it is mainly about the way he presents his criticism: with an arrogance that borders on the unlikely and that only increases as the book progresses.
Moreover, he - and this is my third objection to this book - has resorted to a very technical, statistical explanation to reinforce his bold claims: whole chapters are devoted to mathematical models that – according to Taleb – don’t relate to reality. He may also be right there, but as a reader he completely lost me. And then there is a fourth objection against this book, which in retrospect is perhaps more important than seems plausible at first glance: all experts, both the reliable and the untrustworthy to which Taleb refers are .... men; there is only one female character in this book and that is completely fictional; it might be an interesting study to determine the correlation between the Black Swan syndrome and gender issues (not the least those of Taleb himself, I refer to his mysoginist "Twitter-war" with Mary Beard).
In short, if I can give a concise reading warning: read only the first half of this book and make the best of it, but forget the second half (unless you’re a professional economist or statistician). And remember especially: Black Swans do exist, but you can arm yourself against them to a very limited extent, just by using common sense, and knowing that - at any moment in your life or in history in general - shit can happen.
challenging
informative
medium-paced
There is an important idea here, and maybe I needed to read the first book in the series to get it, but alas this was the book given to me. Instead, it felt like a dog with a bone determined to convince you there were right and you just don't see it.
There is way too much dictated content and not enough data here, meaning a lot is thrown at the reader, but not much sticks. It's the baffle them with bullshit theory.
There is way too much dictated content and not enough data here, meaning a lot is thrown at the reader, but not much sticks. It's the baffle them with bullshit theory.