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haoyang's review against another edition
4.0
As I’m studying Southeast Asian history and the Cold War right now, this book was an excellent supplement to the resources I’ve gotten from school. Most notably, it corrected my misconception, which is also taught by the curriculum, that the hukbalahap uprising was Communist in nature. It goes to show that there’s a lot of simplification involved in education at this level and while it seems insignificant, it does allude to our sometimes-uncritical attitude towards Cold War events which did not see direct superpower confrontation. What I mean is that the ideological clash that so elegantly characterises the Cold War is a convenient excuse, most of the time, to explain the dynamics during that period in time. This necessarily prevents us from appreciating the different forces at play, such as nationalism, anti-imperialism, and capitalism.
The main thesis of this book is that American involvement in Southeast Asia from the Cold War to the War on Terror (as well as the Neo-cold war) was motivated primarily by economic motivations; more often than not, American policymakers acted to preserve their economic hegemony, either by allowing colonial powers to re-colonise SEA states after WWII, or by propping up regimes (often authoritarian ones) that could oppose the spread of Communism in the region. Although cynical, the thesis is not unreasonable. In fact, it makes sense as the United States faced arguably minimal security threat from the Soviet bloc and the only reason they opposed Communism was because it ran counter to its capitalist ideals. If the US were truly fighting for human rights and democracy, Korea would not have been left divided. Neither would Vietnam. Cambodia would not have been bombed in clandestine missions. The people of East Timor would have gained their independence after the Portuguese had left. And so on and so forth.
Interestingly, Tyner asserts that the War on Terror was an opportunistic move to reassert American dominance in Southeast Asia in order to prevent China, its capitalist competitors, from usurping its role in the region. Additionally, he argues that the Neo-cold war is not political or ideological in nature as much as it is economically. And it is something which aligns with the desires of the neoconservative movement in the US. In the final paragraphs of the last chapter, Tynder also extends this to the Middle East by suggesting American policymakers intended to reshape the region in its favour.
However, it sounded to me like an overstatement of US economic motivations and it was also kind of dated as US unilateralism has been waning since Obama’s presidency.
I did thoroughly enjoy reading the country-by-country analysis though!
This was definitely an insightful and academic read. It does not bore you with details and manages to show you clearly how American strategy has remained the same but also evolved over time.
The main thesis of this book is that American involvement in Southeast Asia from the Cold War to the War on Terror (as well as the Neo-cold war) was motivated primarily by economic motivations; more often than not, American policymakers acted to preserve their economic hegemony, either by allowing colonial powers to re-colonise SEA states after WWII, or by propping up regimes (often authoritarian ones) that could oppose the spread of Communism in the region. Although cynical, the thesis is not unreasonable. In fact, it makes sense as the United States faced arguably minimal security threat from the Soviet bloc and the only reason they opposed Communism was because it ran counter to its capitalist ideals. If the US were truly fighting for human rights and democracy, Korea would not have been left divided. Neither would Vietnam. Cambodia would not have been bombed in clandestine missions. The people of East Timor would have gained their independence after the Portuguese had left. And so on and so forth.
Interestingly, Tyner asserts that the War on Terror was an opportunistic move to reassert American dominance in Southeast Asia in order to prevent China, its capitalist competitors, from usurping its role in the region. Additionally, he argues that the Neo-cold war is not political or ideological in nature as much as it is economically. And it is something which aligns with the desires of the neoconservative movement in the US. In the final paragraphs of the last chapter, Tynder also extends this to the Middle East by suggesting American policymakers intended to reshape the region in its favour.
However, it sounded to me like an overstatement of US economic motivations and it was also kind of dated as US unilateralism has been waning since Obama’s presidency.
I did thoroughly enjoy reading the country-by-country analysis though!
This was definitely an insightful and academic read. It does not bore you with details and manages to show you clearly how American strategy has remained the same but also evolved over time.
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