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jbzar's review against another edition
3.0
This book was ok in my mind. A lot of very interesting historical detail that I wasn't familiar with that underpinned a historical story many major points of which I was. I often found myself picturing places around Gettysburg that I've visited in the past and imagining the feelings that the people involved must have experienced. I probably would have enjoyed walking around those places while listening to the book. This said, it was also heavy in the details of various events leading up to and during the battle itself. It was on this front I was left feeling a bit over-whelmed with minutiae.
In short, a good book that would probably be great for someone with the frame of mind for the level of detail the author provided.
In short, a good book that would probably be great for someone with the frame of mind for the level of detail the author provided.
lydiature's review against another edition
This was in no way a bad book, I just couldn’t keep all of it straight. I think I needed a more introductory book.
peterthelibrarian's review against another edition
5.0
Thorough, yet eminently readable account of the iconic battle. Guelzo recounts the battle using, when at all possible, the words and descriptions of the participants, all the while filing in the gaps and proving historical perspective. Very enjoyable accounting of what is, for me, one of the most fascinating chapters in our history.
mark_lm's review against another edition
4.0
An excellent history of the battle of Gettysburg. Does a good job with most necessary background information. Seemed very good on the effect of the various commanders' political associations. Also good on the various arguments in the years after the war and how opinions have changed. Covered some things in welcome detail, e.g. the kidnapping of free Blacks in Pennsylvania by Lee's advancing army and the myth of their restraint from pilferage, that I have seen ignored elsewhere. Had an interesting comment about an impromptu speech that Lincoln gave prior to writing the Gettysburg address that contained several of the same thematic elements. I always have to remind myself about the regimental system of the time, so if they say the 2nd Delaware Cavalry, I know about how big a unit that was and who would have been commanding it - I recommend the Wikipedia page entitled "Infantry in the American Civil War".
rieman_93's review against another edition
informative
slow-paced
5.0
One of the best non fiction books I've ever read.
troy66's review against another edition
5.0
One of the best book about Gettysburg that I've read. I loved the personal touch with first hand accounts . A very readable account.
theeverglow17's review against another edition
5.0
Probably the best single-volume book about Gettysburg that I have read so far. Maybe not as detailed in its tactical descriptions as Sears' book, it had a more compelling narrative of the overall campaign from the views of so many different people. Compared to Trudeau, it is much easier to follow due to its sequencing of events, and is much more detailed than Catton or Foote, and not as singularly focused on the officers as Coddington. All of these factors combined to make it the best one. It is a great book for anyone with a basic understanding of the battle who wants to take the next step further in details. The only flaw was how limited the information of the fighting at Culp's Hill was, and the cavalry actions... though as Guelzo states, those cavalry actions on the 3rd could've had any result and not ended the overall battle 5 minutes sooner.
socraticgadfly's review against another edition
5.0
This isn't a book with one outstanding, over-the-top new idea or thesis because in part the bar is so high on Gettysburg works that it's hard to do that. I was torn between 4- and 5-star ratings, when I eventually realized I'd learned enough new from Guelzo to give it a bump.
That said, I did learn some new things.
First among those main new things is that shifting the blame, on the Confederate side, away from Lee is not something that happened after his death with "the Lost Cause."
No, it happened with Bobby Lee just months after the battle was done! He, unlike Jubal Early and others, didn't blame Longstreet, but he did blame Ewell a lot, Stuart someone, and others. But, as Guelzo points out, the "practicable" in Lee's July 1 orders to Ewell was a head-scratcher, plus he knew what he was dealing with, with Ewell.
Second is just how politicized general-level staff was at the Army of the Potomac nine months after McClellan's being sacked. Arguably, it continued to affect Union performance. And, led to pettiness.
Third, Guelzo detailed how First Corps commander John Reynolds basically forced Meade to fight at Gettysburg. And fortunately. Meade's idea of hiding behind Pipe Creek, 20 miles south in Maryland, wouldn't have worked. Eventually, pressure would have mounted, the longer Lee stayed in Pennsylvania, for Meade to come out. Reynolds forced the issue, and onto a spot that was good for the Union, and in a way that it just barely beat Lee to the site.
Fourth, related to this, Meade was a bad commander. I halfway knew he was "bleah," but things like the failure to pursue Lee, plus more, make this clear.
The "more"? Meade's famous July 2 council of war. Guelzo discusses it in detail and makes clear that Meade called the council to get support for **retreating from Gettyburg.** But, John Griffin, junior general there as a temporary corps commander, spoke first and spoke strongly about staying in place. After that, even most of the more McClellanite generals were at least halfway resolute in making similar statements.
Fifth, Guelzo documents how Longstreet apparently had a statement from Lee, pre-invasion, that he would only fight defensive battles, how the lateness of the day 2 attack wasn't his fault, and just how apprehensive he was about Pickett's charge.
So, Lost Cause enthusiasts, especially Bobby Lee lovers, may not like this book, but it's a good one.
But wait, I've just talked about battle tactics.
Guelzo also says, in his introduction, that the Civil War was not the first modern war. He notes European wars of the same time, such as Crimea and the North Italian War, that also had large masses of troops, and had rifled muskets vs. Napoleonic wars, as well as somewhat better artillery, and says the Civil War deserves lumping with them and the Seven Weeks and Franco-Prussian wars.
He says the value of the rifled musket over the smoothbore is overrated, for one thing. As part of this, he notes that, even with the rifling, this was a gun fired by black powder that quickly started fowling rifling grooves. And, artillery, though advanced over Napoleonic days, had the same limitations. (The Gatling gun was not accepted by the U.S. Army until 1866, in part of its short-sightedness that led it to be slow on the uptake on accepting cartridge rifles, whether repeaters or single-shots. Even US use of a version of the Prussian needle gun might have changed the battlefield more than the rifling of muskets itself.)
That said, the book also involves interpretations, which are also part and parcel of history.
Per the above, it's clear that Guelzo believes Lee lost the battle, not that Meade won it. (I agree.)
Second, he gives comparatively short shrift to Joshua Chamberlain and says that he got lucky in getting the publicity he did. He says, in essence, that if anybody is hero on the Union side, the list should start with Reynolds. Related to that, he also rehabilitates O.O. Howard.
That said, the book isn't perfect. More maps, and better ones, is its biggest need. Also, for a book that focuses this much on details of the battle, a complete battle order of both the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, down to at least regimental order, should have been at the front of the book.
Also, like some others, I found Guezlo's mix of writing styles not my cup of tea.
And, also, if his primary concern was about generalship, maybe taking even less focus on the battle itself, or a different focus, might have led to a different book called "Gettysburg's Generals." Or a bit more detailed focus on the battle might have given us better maps, a more even coverage overall, and 40-50 pages of additional body text.
That said, after starting as a 4-star review, then changing it to 5, I'll stay there. That's because too many other reviewers are critiquing his critique of Meade, his critique of overrating rifled muskets and calling this the "first modern war," or other things, and rating this to 3 stars or less.
For more, here's a good interview with Guelzo about the book: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=H__SkToQ-g0
That said, I did learn some new things.
First among those main new things is that shifting the blame, on the Confederate side, away from Lee is not something that happened after his death with "the Lost Cause."
No, it happened with Bobby Lee just months after the battle was done! He, unlike Jubal Early and others, didn't blame Longstreet, but he did blame Ewell a lot, Stuart someone, and others. But, as Guelzo points out, the "practicable" in Lee's July 1 orders to Ewell was a head-scratcher, plus he knew what he was dealing with, with Ewell.
Second is just how politicized general-level staff was at the Army of the Potomac nine months after McClellan's being sacked. Arguably, it continued to affect Union performance. And, led to pettiness.
Third, Guelzo detailed how First Corps commander John Reynolds basically forced Meade to fight at Gettysburg. And fortunately. Meade's idea of hiding behind Pipe Creek, 20 miles south in Maryland, wouldn't have worked. Eventually, pressure would have mounted, the longer Lee stayed in Pennsylvania, for Meade to come out. Reynolds forced the issue, and onto a spot that was good for the Union, and in a way that it just barely beat Lee to the site.
Fourth, related to this, Meade was a bad commander. I halfway knew he was "bleah," but things like the failure to pursue Lee, plus more, make this clear.
The "more"? Meade's famous July 2 council of war. Guelzo discusses it in detail and makes clear that Meade called the council to get support for **retreating from Gettyburg.** But, John Griffin, junior general there as a temporary corps commander, spoke first and spoke strongly about staying in place. After that, even most of the more McClellanite generals were at least halfway resolute in making similar statements.
Fifth, Guelzo documents how Longstreet apparently had a statement from Lee, pre-invasion, that he would only fight defensive battles, how the lateness of the day 2 attack wasn't his fault, and just how apprehensive he was about Pickett's charge.
So, Lost Cause enthusiasts, especially Bobby Lee lovers, may not like this book, but it's a good one.
But wait, I've just talked about battle tactics.
Guelzo also says, in his introduction, that the Civil War was not the first modern war. He notes European wars of the same time, such as Crimea and the North Italian War, that also had large masses of troops, and had rifled muskets vs. Napoleonic wars, as well as somewhat better artillery, and says the Civil War deserves lumping with them and the Seven Weeks and Franco-Prussian wars.
He says the value of the rifled musket over the smoothbore is overrated, for one thing. As part of this, he notes that, even with the rifling, this was a gun fired by black powder that quickly started fowling rifling grooves. And, artillery, though advanced over Napoleonic days, had the same limitations. (The Gatling gun was not accepted by the U.S. Army until 1866, in part of its short-sightedness that led it to be slow on the uptake on accepting cartridge rifles, whether repeaters or single-shots. Even US use of a version of the Prussian needle gun might have changed the battlefield more than the rifling of muskets itself.)
That said, the book also involves interpretations, which are also part and parcel of history.
Per the above, it's clear that Guelzo believes Lee lost the battle, not that Meade won it. (I agree.)
Second, he gives comparatively short shrift to Joshua Chamberlain and says that he got lucky in getting the publicity he did. He says, in essence, that if anybody is hero on the Union side, the list should start with Reynolds. Related to that, he also rehabilitates O.O. Howard.
That said, the book isn't perfect. More maps, and better ones, is its biggest need. Also, for a book that focuses this much on details of the battle, a complete battle order of both the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, down to at least regimental order, should have been at the front of the book.
Also, like some others, I found Guezlo's mix of writing styles not my cup of tea.
And, also, if his primary concern was about generalship, maybe taking even less focus on the battle itself, or a different focus, might have led to a different book called "Gettysburg's Generals." Or a bit more detailed focus on the battle might have given us better maps, a more even coverage overall, and 40-50 pages of additional body text.
That said, after starting as a 4-star review, then changing it to 5, I'll stay there. That's because too many other reviewers are critiquing his critique of Meade, his critique of overrating rifled muskets and calling this the "first modern war," or other things, and rating this to 3 stars or less.
For more, here's a good interview with Guelzo about the book: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=H__SkToQ-g0