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ffriasguada's review against another edition
challenging
slow-paced
2.0
q infumables son los empiristas shut upppp 😭
santamaria101's review against another edition
4.75
It was an honour to read A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's simultaneously elucidating, insightful, and problem-laden discourse is a gorgeous treasure trove for the philosophically inclined. Book one, Of the Understanding, is frankly—genius—so much so that it is challenging to comprehend in its entirety—I admit that I often found myself referring to third-party sources and supplementary information to understand Hume's arguments; the book is monumental in scope; its significance so extensive and pertinent. Hume's philosophy and argumentation are so relevant to the human condition. In particular, the discussion and formulation of the problem of induction and its profound implications for how we reason; what reason have we for presuming that preceding relations between objects (i.e., causes and effects) will resemble those of unrelated, future relations between objects? Why might we infer the future to resemble the past? Though I had known of Hume's problem of induction, to read its formulation in his own words was a truly humbling and illuminating experience. I do wish to, in addition, read his formulation in The Enquiry—which, as of writing this review, I am yet to do.
Also worthy of particular mention is Hume's fascinating characterisation, in Book 1, of how we understand and, thereafter, his discussions of impressions and ideas and their relations to memory, belief formation, knowledge, and probability. Although I suspect that Hume's characterisation of ideas exclusively arising as a consequence of impressions may be considered outdated or impoverished by many modern philosophers (particularly rationalists—that school which opposes empiricism), I nevertheless found it an exhilarating mental exercise to dive into Hume's empiricism. I found myself time and time again persuaded by his arguments!
I particularly enjoyed Hume's discussion on cause and effect and how he tied such concepts to probability and necessity. I had never beforehand considered probability's components till I read this book—and to philosophically deconstruct the objects of probability and necessity was both a fascinating intellectual challenge and pleasure. Hume's discussion of efficacy furthermore is intriguing—certainly within the realm of challenging conventional wisdom, or the "vulgar belief", as Hume would say.
Of note, this book is not an easy read, and I do not claim to comprehend every section utterly, nor that various controversies or differences of interpretation, discourse, and debate, though I will certainly return to it once again when I am further versed in philosophy. Also of note, the book is meandering and difficult to follow. As of now, however, these books have been a fascinating endeavour.
Also worthy of particular mention is Hume's fascinating characterisation, in Book 1, of how we understand and, thereafter, his discussions of impressions and ideas and their relations to memory, belief formation, knowledge, and probability. Although I suspect that Hume's characterisation of ideas exclusively arising as a consequence of impressions may be considered outdated or impoverished by many modern philosophers (particularly rationalists—that school which opposes empiricism), I nevertheless found it an exhilarating mental exercise to dive into Hume's empiricism. I found myself time and time again persuaded by his arguments!
I particularly enjoyed Hume's discussion on cause and effect and how he tied such concepts to probability and necessity. I had never beforehand considered probability's components till I read this book—and to philosophically deconstruct the objects of probability and necessity was both a fascinating intellectual challenge and pleasure. Hume's discussion of efficacy furthermore is intriguing—certainly within the realm of challenging conventional wisdom, or the "vulgar belief", as Hume would say.
Of note, this book is not an easy read, and I do not claim to comprehend every section utterly, nor that various controversies or differences of interpretation, discourse, and debate, though I will certainly return to it once again when I am further versed in philosophy. Also of note, the book is meandering and difficult to follow. As of now, however, these books have been a fascinating endeavour.
caris96's review against another edition
4.0
“‘Tis obvious… that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay” (403) [accidental allyship for the win].
This treatise is thick but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding” or how we come to knowledge, I largely agree with. He focusses a significant portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
This treatise is thick but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding” or how we come to knowledge, I largely agree with. He focusses a significant portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
carist's review against another edition
4.0
“‘Tis obvious… that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay” (403).
It sure is, Hume.
This treatise is thick, but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding”, or how we come to knowledge, I have the fewest contentions with. He focusses a large portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct, but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
It sure is, Hume.
This treatise is thick, but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding”, or how we come to knowledge, I have the fewest contentions with. He focusses a large portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct, but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
therealesioan's review against another edition
2.0
Yeah I'm cheating here a bit by just reading the first book, but Hume's smug anglo-ism (despite being Scottish) is too much for me for 4 fucking volumes. Still, his system has some utility is in its empirical and logical rigor. I can certainly see how Hume kind of brought in a much more naturalistic and relatable approach to philosophy - as opposed to the rationalists who came before him - in a similar way that Aristotle and the Peripatetics changed up the more mystical Platonic style which was dominant.
Insights like how Spinoza's monism is the logical conclusion to the Church Father's thought is quite interesting. And similarly the take that Spinoza's philosophy must affirm the position of the immortality of the souls. In general I do support the more analytic, challenging and utilitarian turn Hume took philosophy with his empiricism. You have to remember that without Hume Kant never wakes up from his dogmatic slumber, and then we'd never have the Critiques.
But still, all that being said, Hume's system is disastrous. It's not that the critical phase of his philosophy is flawed, as the problem of induction and necessary connextion are compelling puzzles. Where he falls flat is in building much of an alternative system. And yes I'm aware he does most of that in the following books, but as I understand it there's a reason everyone really remembers Hume for his deconstruction - not his building back up.
By the end of this book he's already setting the tone for a radical skepticism of truth itself - ironic considering he's meant to be rejecting the skepticism of the Cartesians. He discards the concept of the self, the process of induction, much of mathematics, miracles, God, truth really. He himself clearly begins questioning his destructive attitude in the conclusion here: "Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escaped shipwreck in passing a small firth, has yet temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel". That is not the talk of a confident philosophical architect.
Insights like how Spinoza's monism is the logical conclusion to the Church Father's thought is quite interesting. And similarly the take that Spinoza's philosophy must affirm the position of the immortality of the souls. In general I do support the more analytic, challenging and utilitarian turn Hume took philosophy with his empiricism. You have to remember that without Hume Kant never wakes up from his dogmatic slumber, and then we'd never have the Critiques.
But still, all that being said, Hume's system is disastrous. It's not that the critical phase of his philosophy is flawed, as the problem of induction and necessary connextion are compelling puzzles. Where he falls flat is in building much of an alternative system. And yes I'm aware he does most of that in the following books, but as I understand it there's a reason everyone really remembers Hume for his deconstruction - not his building back up.
By the end of this book he's already setting the tone for a radical skepticism of truth itself - ironic considering he's meant to be rejecting the skepticism of the Cartesians. He discards the concept of the self, the process of induction, much of mathematics, miracles, God, truth really. He himself clearly begins questioning his destructive attitude in the conclusion here: "Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escaped shipwreck in passing a small firth, has yet temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel". That is not the talk of a confident philosophical architect.
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