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28 reviews for:
Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation
Tyler Cowen
3.47 AVERAGE
28 reviews for:
Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation
Tyler Cowen
3.47 AVERAGE
medium-paced
A remarkable book.
Twelve years on, the predictions it makes about AI are prescient to the point of being a fairly banal description of our present reality.
Almost half of the book is about chess.
The last chapter exploring the prospect of an ageing, unequal society is provocative in the best way. I will have to revisit it before I can have a strong sense of how realistic it is.
Twelve years on, the predictions it makes about AI are prescient to the point of being a fairly banal description of our present reality.
Almost half of the book is about chess.
The last chapter exploring the prospect of an ageing, unequal society is provocative in the best way. I will have to revisit it before I can have a strong sense of how realistic it is.
Too many chess analogies. Then we get into weird right-wing predictions about America's future topping it off with we should create cheap second-worldesq living spaces to house the elderly, the argument that Jacksonville is clearly a more desirable place to live than Vancouver because its population is bigger and casually throwing around the term "media elite".
A lot of very interesting material here...
If you didn't know Cowen was widely read or a humanist, you might not at first notice from his books; his writing style is plain and direct. But then every once in awhile, he'll offhandedly suggest something striking. The last chapter, about income inequality, contains a few, including that the idea that income inequality will become a problem--that the poor will rise up--is somehow a transfiguration of the moral sense that inequality is wrong. Or that status competition is local (much less so in the world of TikTok and digital video--in this way, inequality has become more combustible--no longer are we in his 2013 world where we are more concerned with our wife's sister's husband's wealth only). Or what he says about China vs. the US, or comparing now the 19c Jacksonites, or the Middle Ages. (Cowen doesn't flaunt the examples, but neither does he linger to make them accessible; he simply mentions them, and then moves on... He has always seemed ever-so-slightly arrogant: He likes that he knows so much.)
All the discussion of computers and chess is like candy to me....
Also refreshing is his willingess to make lots of predictions--on the basis of relatively simple economic considerations.
There is something sad about the world he predicts--and the one that we seem to be living in: a great gulf between very conscientious people and everyone else. In fact his world is one that I recognize, and which I already dislike, where the explosion of free Internet material advantages those who have the dedication to use it, and in fact those people aren't even the smartest. They have to be smart enough, maybe, but that's a low bar. It's the dogged grinders who win in a world of infinite free information--even those who are maybe a bit boring and uncreative, because they are undistracted from the endless or repetitive tasks at which one can improve.
I feel like this must be a recipe for stagnation at some level--we choke out most of the creative types and replace them with 'machines' who are narrowly capable of completing objectives as they thus-far and contextually present themselves; but of course, the more narrow the ability, the worse the problem when the relevant objectives change....
Interesting that he wrote this book ten years before the LLM explosion; in some ways, it's surprising how little his views have changed, how much was right (or at least applicable--it still remains to be proved) long ago. As with all predictions in education: a similar flop. (How long have people been insisting that education will be revolutionized, without it being?) But maybe he gets credit for calling all of this early, for having his views basically in advance....
If you didn't know Cowen was widely read or a humanist, you might not at first notice from his books; his writing style is plain and direct. But then every once in awhile, he'll offhandedly suggest something striking. The last chapter, about income inequality, contains a few, including that the idea that income inequality will become a problem--that the poor will rise up--is somehow a transfiguration of the moral sense that inequality is wrong. Or that status competition is local (much less so in the world of TikTok and digital video--in this way, inequality has become more combustible--no longer are we in his 2013 world where we are more concerned with our wife's sister's husband's wealth only). Or what he says about China vs. the US, or comparing now the 19c Jacksonites, or the Middle Ages. (Cowen doesn't flaunt the examples, but neither does he linger to make them accessible; he simply mentions them, and then moves on... He has always seemed ever-so-slightly arrogant: He likes that he knows so much.)
All the discussion of computers and chess is like candy to me....
Also refreshing is his willingess to make lots of predictions--on the basis of relatively simple economic considerations.
There is something sad about the world he predicts--and the one that we seem to be living in: a great gulf between very conscientious people and everyone else. In fact his world is one that I recognize, and which I already dislike, where the explosion of free Internet material advantages those who have the dedication to use it, and in fact those people aren't even the smartest. They have to be smart enough, maybe, but that's a low bar. It's the dogged grinders who win in a world of infinite free information--even those who are maybe a bit boring and uncreative, because they are undistracted from the endless or repetitive tasks at which one can improve.
I feel like this must be a recipe for stagnation at some level--we choke out most of the creative types and replace them with 'machines' who are narrowly capable of completing objectives as they thus-far and contextually present themselves; but of course, the more narrow the ability, the worse the problem when the relevant objectives change....
Interesting that he wrote this book ten years before the LLM explosion; in some ways, it's surprising how little his views have changed, how much was right (or at least applicable--it still remains to be proved) long ago. As with all predictions in education: a similar flop. (How long have people been insisting that education will be revolutionized, without it being?) But maybe he gets credit for calling all of this early, for having his views basically in advance....
The internet gremlins seem to have eaten what I typed up the first time for this review. I can't be bothered to re-write it all, so in summary:
some interesting ideas, too much stuff that rang hollow to me, perhaps just privileged posturing on my part but don't agree with the all of the inevitability he seems to assume.
Kind of reads like dystopian sci-fi except that it's claiming to be a vision of the coming decades, and I guess that rubs me a little the wrong way.
some interesting ideas, too much stuff that rang hollow to me, perhaps just privileged posturing on my part but don't agree with the all of the inevitability he seems to assume.
Kind of reads like dystopian sci-fi except that it's claiming to be a vision of the coming decades, and I guess that rubs me a little the wrong way.
Good and thought-provoking, but not a lot of ideas which were new to me. Not enough about the fundamental limitations of machine intelligence - need for lots of data, short feedback loops, clear definition of success, comprehensive identification of decision factors, etc. Way too much about chess.
In Average is Over, Tyler Cowen explains why, in a reversal of developments in the 20th century, the middle class will shrink over time. Economic principles indicate that returns will accrue to the owners of scarce resources such as quality land and natural resources, IP and quality labour with unique skills. The returns to ordinary labour and ordinary savings will decline. The emergence of new technologies, and intelligent machines in particular, will benefit individuals who are adept at working with technology, not necessarily hard core engineers and coders, but those who can "mix technical knowledge with solving real world problems" and who can manage the interface between technology, people, and the issues and problems we face in daily life and society. Cowen cites the top Freestyle chess teams as examples of individuals who have learned how to exploit the potential of technology to up their game. While these Freestyle chess players may not be the best players on their own, they know how to use technology to give them an edge.
Who else might benefit from this brave new world? Cowen argues that "if you have an unusual ability to spot, recruit and direct those who work well with computers, even if you don't work well with computers yourself, the contemporary world will make you rich....'Welcome to the hyper-meritocracy'". Is it fair for there to be such a large (and growing) income gap between C-suite executives at the top and wage earners at the bottom? Cowen suggests that this is inevitable since it is "the manager who is the scarce input...managers play a role of growing importance in coordinating complex, large scale production processes". It's not to say that there is no scope for social mobility in this hyper-meritocracy. Some people at the bottom will have the opportunity to rise up the ranks - but only those who are highly self-motivated, conscientious (i.e. follow instructions and orders with "exactness and without resentment"), and disciplined.
Cowen defends outsourcing, immigration, and foreign competition - all of which have been blamed for causing problems like unemployment and sluggish economic growth. Cowen admits that outsourcing does not raise productivity for American workers (who may lose their jobs), since the outsourcing does not actually provide American workers with better training, machines or higher value added products to manufacture. However, the productivity gains to factory owners and consumers are likely to outweigh the costs to American workers. Moreover, slowdowns in wage growth are more likely to stem from the skills mismatch between American workers and the new demands of the American economy, rather than outsourcing. "Many millions of people can turn a screen on an assembly line, work a lathe, or handle a telephone switchboard. Not so many people can team up fruitfully with Rybka, or, more generally, work with intelligent machines operating, in, say, our finance, service and medical sectors". Meanwhile, immigration probably helps retain jobs locally rather than pose a threat to jobs, since it helps keep the US competitive and keeps other complementary (lower skilled) jobs in place.
Much of Cowen's book is based on standard economic theory and would not be surprising to anyone familiar with economic principles. But there are some thought provoking snippets. He notes that the security of non-tradable sectors like government, healthcare and education don't face so much of a daily market test. Yet, most of the job growth in the US is coming in such "low accountability sectors, [where] people get paid to produce things, or offer services, and we're never quite sure how much value they are putting on the table". This presents several problems. First, upgrading productivity is a challenge if you cannot really measure the value of what you are producing. Second, the job security of such non-tradable sectors, in contrast to the volatility and uncertainty in other parts of the economy would have implications of social cohesion, what with growing inequality. (On a separate note, for much maligned consultants out there, Cowen also offers a defence for the generalist consultant in The Big Earners and The Big Losers).
Overall, a well-written book that has the right blend of stats and data, examples and anecdotes for an engaging and accessible read.
Who else might benefit from this brave new world? Cowen argues that "if you have an unusual ability to spot, recruit and direct those who work well with computers, even if you don't work well with computers yourself, the contemporary world will make you rich....'Welcome to the hyper-meritocracy'". Is it fair for there to be such a large (and growing) income gap between C-suite executives at the top and wage earners at the bottom? Cowen suggests that this is inevitable since it is "the manager who is the scarce input...managers play a role of growing importance in coordinating complex, large scale production processes". It's not to say that there is no scope for social mobility in this hyper-meritocracy. Some people at the bottom will have the opportunity to rise up the ranks - but only those who are highly self-motivated, conscientious (i.e. follow instructions and orders with "exactness and without resentment"), and disciplined.
Cowen defends outsourcing, immigration, and foreign competition - all of which have been blamed for causing problems like unemployment and sluggish economic growth. Cowen admits that outsourcing does not raise productivity for American workers (who may lose their jobs), since the outsourcing does not actually provide American workers with better training, machines or higher value added products to manufacture. However, the productivity gains to factory owners and consumers are likely to outweigh the costs to American workers. Moreover, slowdowns in wage growth are more likely to stem from the skills mismatch between American workers and the new demands of the American economy, rather than outsourcing. "Many millions of people can turn a screen on an assembly line, work a lathe, or handle a telephone switchboard. Not so many people can team up fruitfully with Rybka, or, more generally, work with intelligent machines operating, in, say, our finance, service and medical sectors". Meanwhile, immigration probably helps retain jobs locally rather than pose a threat to jobs, since it helps keep the US competitive and keeps other complementary (lower skilled) jobs in place.
Much of Cowen's book is based on standard economic theory and would not be surprising to anyone familiar with economic principles. But there are some thought provoking snippets. He notes that the security of non-tradable sectors like government, healthcare and education don't face so much of a daily market test. Yet, most of the job growth in the US is coming in such "low accountability sectors, [where] people get paid to produce things, or offer services, and we're never quite sure how much value they are putting on the table". This presents several problems. First, upgrading productivity is a challenge if you cannot really measure the value of what you are producing. Second, the job security of such non-tradable sectors, in contrast to the volatility and uncertainty in other parts of the economy would have implications of social cohesion, what with growing inequality. (On a separate note, for much maligned consultants out there, Cowen also offers a defence for the generalist consultant in The Big Earners and The Big Losers).
Overall, a well-written book that has the right blend of stats and data, examples and anecdotes for an engaging and accessible read.
I'll give the book 4 stars because it made me think. But I'm still trying to formulate my take on what Cowen claims is the future of the American economy. While I don't readily disagree with him, I do wish that he included more empirical evidence and data with his arguments. I was hoping for "Here's what Tyler Cowen's research says to expect in our future economy," but instead I got "Here's what Tyler Cowen expects in our future economy based on watching computers play chess." I suppose I fall into the camp of Cowen's recently graduated economists, in that I want the data to lead the way rather than solely relying on theory, established models, and small scale analogies (chess). I think there's only so much you can extrapolate from chess onto the country as a whole, and I think Cowen passes that threshold.
Overall, I would recommend it. I wasn't thrilled with every point made nor the exact presentation of the material, but I do agree with the gist of his argument. It will be interesting to see how it all unfolds in the nation's next 40-50 years.
Overall, I would recommend it. I wasn't thrilled with every point made nor the exact presentation of the material, but I do agree with the gist of his argument. It will be interesting to see how it all unfolds in the nation's next 40-50 years.
Sobering. Frightening. True? Cowen's book could have had an alternative subtitle "The rise of the American Dystopia"
Only the future will tell if this is a vision of the future or only one of the (hopefully) preventable alternatives.
Only the future will tell if this is a vision of the future or only one of the (hopefully) preventable alternatives.
Read this a few years back but it was transformative to my thinking and presenting.
Hard to argue with the central thesis, though it could have done without the author's libertarian smugness.
Further evidence for the cruelty of a so-called hypermeritocracy.
Further evidence for the cruelty of a so-called hypermeritocracy.