Take a photo of a barcode or cover
1.43k reviews for:
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion
Jonathan Haidt
4.06 AVERAGE
1.43k reviews for:
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion
Jonathan Haidt
4.06 AVERAGE
This was one of those books where I knew the author's whole argument--or at least thought I knew it--before I ever picked up the book. Thanks in part my friend Michael Austin (whose latest book is wonderful), and in part to the online arguments I've observed and learned from, I feel like I've been soaking up Haidt's claims regarding the evolutionary sources of morality and religious belief, that most rationality is intuition-justifying strategic reasoning, and the differences between liberal and conservative moral schemes, for years. But it was good to read the book that took Haidt's academic research and first really delivered it to a popular audience. For one thing, he's an excellent writer; his explanatory stories and examples really do explain, clearly and persuasively, the points he wants to make, and the story of his own intellectual journey, which provides a frame for much to the book, is entertainingly and efficient shared. And given how entwined Haidt has become in various arguments over identity politics and the future of liberalism, I appreciated understanding better the intellectual place he's coming from, apart from social media contestations.
Does he convince me of his overall argument? Well, mostly I didn't need to be convinced; the data from experiments and studies which support his observations about our cognitive habits as a species is pretty hard to rebut, and the conclusions he draws from that data align well with pluralist and anti-rationalist sympathies and philosophical positions I already shared. Yes, I think that, to the extent one can accurately breakdown our moral and religious sensibilities into six evolution-derived components, that there really are rival moralities operative in the world of human cognition, and some of those moralities are more broadly based than others. Ultimately, though, I suspect there is a limit to how much that really teaches me. It probably teaches a lot about the short-to-medium term when it comes to political or religious argument and understanding; less so, though, when it comes to the long-to-ultimate term. He freely admits that his theory of morality is entirely descriptive, not normative, and that his normative preference for a kind of pluralized utilitarian measurement is simply an unrelfective adaptation of his descriptive work: since we are cognitively different, it is a good thing to respect cognitive differences, etc. But as anyone who has made it beyond Philosophy 101 can tell you, outside of some pretty sophisticated (dare I, using his own terminology, say "WEIRD"?) conceptual argumentation, that kind of unreflective thinking won't ever give you much new to say about the value of any particular differences; once you're a relativist, even a carefully defined relativist, you're almost certainly going to stay stuck there. And in the end, I think Haidt is stuck, like so many of the great sociologists and psychologists of the human condition are stuck: he thinks the only things that are real are the evolution-derived operations of the brain, including our social instincts; that there might be a natural law, much less a God, behind all such things can't play into his thinking, which means it's always just going to be more description, all the way down. Which, of course, is what exposes his own sociologially informed conservative sensibilities to critique. There's a passage towards the end of the book, where he harrumphs over atheistic Western European societies which, to his mind, are failing to preserve the moral diversity which our evolution-derived concerns over purity, loyalty, and the like previously guaranteed--they are, he writes, "the least efficient societies ever known at turning resources (of which they have many) into offspring (of which they have few)" (pg. 313). Unless he's going to posit some moral good in the human race itself, beyond the evolution-derived functions of its individual members' minds--and he makes it clear that, while he takes very serious the group-function in human evolution, he doesn't, in fact, believe that there is anything biological that actually exists outside of or between particular, utility-seeking human bodies and brains--then that seems like a rather petulant complaint to have. (Actually sounds mostly--on my reading, anyway--like an evolutionary psychologist annoyed that he's going to have fewer people to study.)
Anyway, fascinating book, on a fascinating subject, but one with major philosophical blind spots. But again, I think I kind of knew that going in.
Does he convince me of his overall argument? Well, mostly I didn't need to be convinced; the data from experiments and studies which support his observations about our cognitive habits as a species is pretty hard to rebut, and the conclusions he draws from that data align well with pluralist and anti-rationalist sympathies and philosophical positions I already shared. Yes, I think that, to the extent one can accurately breakdown our moral and religious sensibilities into six evolution-derived components, that there really are rival moralities operative in the world of human cognition, and some of those moralities are more broadly based than others. Ultimately, though, I suspect there is a limit to how much that really teaches me. It probably teaches a lot about the short-to-medium term when it comes to political or religious argument and understanding; less so, though, when it comes to the long-to-ultimate term. He freely admits that his theory of morality is entirely descriptive, not normative, and that his normative preference for a kind of pluralized utilitarian measurement is simply an unrelfective adaptation of his descriptive work: since we are cognitively different, it is a good thing to respect cognitive differences, etc. But as anyone who has made it beyond Philosophy 101 can tell you, outside of some pretty sophisticated (dare I, using his own terminology, say "WEIRD"?) conceptual argumentation, that kind of unreflective thinking won't ever give you much new to say about the value of any particular differences; once you're a relativist, even a carefully defined relativist, you're almost certainly going to stay stuck there. And in the end, I think Haidt is stuck, like so many of the great sociologists and psychologists of the human condition are stuck: he thinks the only things that are real are the evolution-derived operations of the brain, including our social instincts; that there might be a natural law, much less a God, behind all such things can't play into his thinking, which means it's always just going to be more description, all the way down. Which, of course, is what exposes his own sociologially informed conservative sensibilities to critique. There's a passage towards the end of the book, where he harrumphs over atheistic Western European societies which, to his mind, are failing to preserve the moral diversity which our evolution-derived concerns over purity, loyalty, and the like previously guaranteed--they are, he writes, "the least efficient societies ever known at turning resources (of which they have many) into offspring (of which they have few)" (pg. 313). Unless he's going to posit some moral good in the human race itself, beyond the evolution-derived functions of its individual members' minds--and he makes it clear that, while he takes very serious the group-function in human evolution, he doesn't, in fact, believe that there is anything biological that actually exists outside of or between particular, utility-seeking human bodies and brains--then that seems like a rather petulant complaint to have. (Actually sounds mostly--on my reading, anyway--like an evolutionary psychologist annoyed that he's going to have fewer people to study.)
Anyway, fascinating book, on a fascinating subject, but one with major philosophical blind spots. But again, I think I kind of knew that going in.
Simply put, read this book. I cannot recommend it highly enough for everyone to read.
medium-paced
challenging
informative
inspiring
reflective
slow-paced
hopeful
informative
inspiring
reflective
fast-paced
This was a book club pick and not something I would have picked up but I gave it a shot. While there are some interesting ideas, it reads like a textbook and some of his arguments haven't held up over time.
informative
reflective
medium-paced
Fantastically informative book, perfect framework for a modern outlook on modern conflicts. Gives insightful foundations for understanding human morals and ethics, and general intuitive reasoning you face in conflicts of any kind. Definitely a must read for any interesting in better understanding opposing ideologies outside of your own.
Convoluted at times, but overall I think it had some solid points. My takeaway: listen more, talk less, empathize as much as you can.
hopeful
informative
reflective
fast-paced