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seano312's review against another edition
4.0
A dense, but interesting, book on the Soviet bio weapons program told by one of their leaders.
It combines two of my favorite academic interests in college: biology and Soviet society.
Recommended to those who want a crash course in biology and bureaucracy.
It combines two of my favorite academic interests in college: biology and Soviet society.
Recommended to those who want a crash course in biology and bureaucracy.
krdegan's review against another edition
4.0
A chilling account of how lucky we were not to have biological catastrophes in the US during the Cold War. The book, written by a Soviet scientist living in exile in the US, was decidedly anti-Soviet and pro-American. But it was still terrifying to see the extent of biological weapons programs and the potential for careless mistakes that would have been extremely costly or the destruction of entire populations from germ warfare.
Note that the author is actually Ken Alibek, not Stephen Handelman (who is listed on GoodReads).
Note that the author is actually Ken Alibek, not Stephen Handelman (who is listed on GoodReads).
wintermute47's review against another edition
2.0
Let's say I'm a bit more skeptical now than I was when I originally read this in college.
There's good reason to conclude the Soviet Union had an industrial-scale biological weapons program during the Cold War. The anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk effectively proves it. And I'm sure the internal justification was the belief of the Soviets that the U.S. had an offensive bioweapon program (which there's absolutely no evidence we did after say, 1972).
But some of the stuff Alibek talks about sounds like sheer nonsense. He describes genetically engineered smallpox with Ebola genes that make it capable of presenting as both illnesses. Aside from the biological implausibility, it sounds like a hat on a hat: if you're going to attack a country with smallpox, regular ol' wild type smallpox works just fine.
Politically, Alibek also clearly knows on which side his bread is buttered: he describes the Soviet Union as a mess of lies, corruption, and political infighting. This is probably at least partially true, but it's presented as being utterly without purpose. This makes Alibek, who decided to defect (though not until his personal position and safety were in doubt) one of the "good ones" who can safely be allowed into the country and given cushy government consulting jobs.
Still interesting, but requiring a whole lot of grains of salt.
There's good reason to conclude the Soviet Union had an industrial-scale biological weapons program during the Cold War. The anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk effectively proves it. And I'm sure the internal justification was the belief of the Soviets that the U.S. had an offensive bioweapon program (which there's absolutely no evidence we did after say, 1972).
But some of the stuff Alibek talks about sounds like sheer nonsense. He describes genetically engineered smallpox with Ebola genes that make it capable of presenting as both illnesses. Aside from the biological implausibility, it sounds like a hat on a hat: if you're going to attack a country with smallpox, regular ol' wild type smallpox works just fine.
Politically, Alibek also clearly knows on which side his bread is buttered: he describes the Soviet Union as a mess of lies, corruption, and political infighting. This is probably at least partially true, but it's presented as being utterly without purpose. This makes Alibek, who decided to defect (though not until his personal position and safety were in doubt) one of the "good ones" who can safely be allowed into the country and given cushy government consulting jobs.
Still interesting, but requiring a whole lot of grains of salt.
physicsphilip's review against another edition
3.0
This is best appreciated as an autobiographical account of Alibek's career in the USSR, particularly his experience of Soviet bureaucracy. It is light on science (and ethics - something I expect many in this line of work simply don't dwell upon), but what he says about the work of Biopreparat seems entirely believable. It is a very well-written piece of work. On that level, I enjoyed it. One highlight was Alibek's experience of the 1991 August coup attempt in Moscow.
However, there was also a lot of sensationalism, mostly towards the end. The book markets Alibek as "THE" man who ran the USSR's biological weapons programme, a clear exaggeration. (He was one of two deputy directors and was clearly kept in the dark about some areas of the programme.) His "defection" is also over-hyped: many ex-Soviet scientists emigrated to the West in the mid-1990s (my PhD supervisor among them), for all kinds of reasons (better job prospects, more money, stability, less politics, better healthcare, etc.). If Alibek really was a high-level target for the KGB/FSB, and he was so valuable to the USA, then he would surely have been assigned some kind of security (as in the case of e.g. Oleg Gordievsky).
In the final chapters Alibek clearly wants the reader to be terrified by the prospect of biological warfare, but he has no real smoking gun to ground his hysteria. The USSR's biological weapons research programme was the largest in the world but certainly not unique. There are a handful of cases where people have speculated that biological weapons have been used, but with the exception of espionage-related assassination attempts (e.g. the Skripals and Kim Jong-nam) it has remained very niche. The final chapter discusses the potential of bioterrorism, something which to my knowledge thankfully hasn't really happened in the last 20 years.
However, there was also a lot of sensationalism, mostly towards the end. The book markets Alibek as "THE" man who ran the USSR's biological weapons programme, a clear exaggeration. (He was one of two deputy directors and was clearly kept in the dark about some areas of the programme.) His "defection" is also over-hyped: many ex-Soviet scientists emigrated to the West in the mid-1990s (my PhD supervisor among them), for all kinds of reasons (better job prospects, more money, stability, less politics, better healthcare, etc.). If Alibek really was a high-level target for the KGB/FSB, and he was so valuable to the USA, then he would surely have been assigned some kind of security (as in the case of e.g. Oleg Gordievsky).
In the final chapters Alibek clearly wants the reader to be terrified by the prospect of biological warfare, but he has no real smoking gun to ground his hysteria. The USSR's biological weapons research programme was the largest in the world but certainly not unique. There are a handful of cases where people have speculated that biological weapons have been used, but with the exception of espionage-related assassination attempts (e.g. the Skripals and Kim Jong-nam) it has remained very niche. The final chapter discusses the potential of bioterrorism, something which to my knowledge thankfully hasn't really happened in the last 20 years.
orangebette's review against another edition
4.0
Super interesting though it starts dragging a bit toward the end.