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aesylvester's review against another edition
4.0
A Problem from Hell is subjective in a subtle, journalistic way but over-saturated with information. Power does an impressive job documenting genocide in the 20th century (though not comprehensive, obviously). Possibly the most interesting aspect is her chronicling of the United States reactions and responses (or lack thereof). She gives the socially aware reader much to think about, particularly in regards to what causes genocide and how the world should (and has failed to) respond.
Power lost one star because somewhere around the time you're reading of Hussein's slaughter of the Kurds in Iraq, you feel like you're reading the same story for the fifth time. This is for good reason - there is a pattern in the occurrence genocide - but at some points it seems like Power gets bogged down in delivering details and fails to acknowledge the reader.
Otherwise, a well-done, informative, and thought-provoking nonfiction.
Power lost one star because somewhere around the time you're reading of Hussein's slaughter of the Kurds in Iraq, you feel like you're reading the same story for the fifth time. This is for good reason - there is a pattern in the occurrence genocide - but at some points it seems like Power gets bogged down in delivering details and fails to acknowledge the reader.
Otherwise, a well-done, informative, and thought-provoking nonfiction.
booksbecreads's review against another edition
I was enjoying this, but kept on putting it aside due to the heavy reading material. At first I wasn't sure of the link between America and genocide alone, because I think all nations have had a role to play over the centuries (even if it was just being aware and not doing anything), but the link was well explained.
I will definately have to re-borrow this and finish it off in the future.
I will definately have to re-borrow this and finish it off in the future.
bravelass85's review against another edition
5.0
A Problem from Hell is a powerful, well-researched and well-written book. Power tracks her argument through the book that in each case, the United States simply lacked the will to act against genocide. In the end, the evidence is damning. Looking at the Jews, Armenians, Tutsis, Bosnians, Kosovars, and Iraqis, she tracks patterns of U.S. officials responding to genocide.
Patterns:
1. The U.S. has enough information to call it genocide, but dithers
2. The U.S. dances around calling it "genocide" because then it has a legal obligation to act (based on the U.N Genocide Convention) and it doesn't want to act, so it doesn't call it genocide. There was actually a few places that were ridiculous, where officials would say things like "well, I think we can
say there were ACTS of genocide, but I'm not sure we're in a place to officially say it IS genocide..."
3. The U.S. claims that atrocities are occurring on both sides (and thus it is a civil war we shouldn't step into) and concurrently, that the region has a long history of violence (and thus it is futile for us to step in). This last part also has the moral tinge of "they don't deserve our help" because they have been killing each other for a long time.
4. The U.S. says that there is no support from other countries, or from the U.N. (even though they are specifically NOT drumming up support, and it the leading member of the U.N....). As Biden said about Bosnia: "As defined by this generation of leaders, collective security means arranging to blame one another for inaction, so that everyone has an excuse. It does not mean standing together; it means hiding together."
5. The U.S. says there is no public support for action. But as Powers writes, "American leaders have both a circular and a deliberate relationship to public opinion. It is circular because their constituencies are rarely if ever aroused by foreign crises, even genocidal ones, in the absence of political leadership and yet at the same time U.S. officials continually cite the absence of political support as grounds for inaction. The relationship is deliberate..." In other words, the U.S. does nothing to inform the public, let alone galvanize the public toward action, and then uses lack of public support to justify not acting. There is not public support because they are not asking for it.
6. When the U.S. does step in, it is because of self-interest. Kosovo was being used by his political opponents to paint Clinton as weak, and in a "wag-the-dog" moment, he stepped in with the full backing of the U.N. into Kosovo. He had done nothing for Bosnia or Rwanda. The U.S. stepped into Kuwait, but less for the Kurds and more for economic reasons.
This book took me over a year to read through - it is dense, and on a basic level it was difficult to keep seeing the same US responses to each case and not find it dulling, tiring, or frustrating. I found the book to be entirely morally damning, but also empowering. I would suggest it to anyone.
Patterns:
1. The U.S. has enough information to call it genocide, but dithers
2. The U.S. dances around calling it "genocide" because then it has a legal obligation to act (based on the U.N Genocide Convention) and it doesn't want to act, so it doesn't call it genocide. There was actually a few places that were ridiculous, where officials would say things like "well, I think we can
say there were ACTS of genocide, but I'm not sure we're in a place to officially say it IS genocide..."
3. The U.S. claims that atrocities are occurring on both sides (and thus it is a civil war we shouldn't step into) and concurrently, that the region has a long history of violence (and thus it is futile for us to step in). This last part also has the moral tinge of "they don't deserve our help" because they have been killing each other for a long time.
4. The U.S. says that there is no support from other countries, or from the U.N. (even though they are specifically NOT drumming up support, and it the leading member of the U.N....). As Biden said about Bosnia: "As defined by this generation of leaders, collective security means arranging to blame one another for inaction, so that everyone has an excuse. It does not mean standing together; it means hiding together."
5. The U.S. says there is no public support for action. But as Powers writes, "American leaders have both a circular and a deliberate relationship to public opinion. It is circular because their constituencies are rarely if ever aroused by foreign crises, even genocidal ones, in the absence of political leadership and yet at the same time U.S. officials continually cite the absence of political support as grounds for inaction. The relationship is deliberate..." In other words, the U.S. does nothing to inform the public, let alone galvanize the public toward action, and then uses lack of public support to justify not acting. There is not public support because they are not asking for it.
6. When the U.S. does step in, it is because of self-interest. Kosovo was being used by his political opponents to paint Clinton as weak, and in a "wag-the-dog" moment, he stepped in with the full backing of the U.N. into Kosovo. He had done nothing for Bosnia or Rwanda. The U.S. stepped into Kuwait, but less for the Kurds and more for economic reasons.
This book took me over a year to read through - it is dense, and on a basic level it was difficult to keep seeing the same US responses to each case and not find it dulling, tiring, or frustrating. I found the book to be entirely morally damning, but also empowering. I would suggest it to anyone.
mrsdarcylynn's review against another edition
challenging
dark
sad
medium-paced
5.0
Challenging material, but laid out in a really compelling way. I know I'm walking away with some thoughts and questions on how Americans and the government handles genocide.
annahimmelrich's review against another edition
5.0
This is a profoundly excellent book. And it made me feel so good about myself as an American! Not! Actually, it caused me to reflect on the fact that every morning of my entire childhood I read the "Today" section of the Baltimore Sun (comics, Dear Abby, Hints from Heloise, trend pieces, movie reviews, etc) (Jacob read the sports) and completely ignored not only the Times, which we usually received, but even the World/National news and Maryland news sections of the Sun, which are pretty much written at the level of the Weekly Reader. So, 1992, mayhem in the Balkans, 1994, Rwanda . . . I'm reading Calvin & Hobbes. Which is certainly fun, but, as the book points out, being clueless does not indemnify one against culpability. I'll have to think about that some more tomorrow when I immediately turn to the crossword puzzle in the NYT, ignoring reportage on every actual human event in the process.
psunyi's review against another edition
4.0
Very informative and important book to read. Not a terribly hard read, although at times it felt very academic. It was also very long and some parts felt repetitive. Still, I would recommend this book to all Americans. America ultimately decides whether or not genocides are stopped or prevented and as this book lays out, too many times (i.e. every time) the government has looked away and tried to maintain a policy of non-involvement.
jcp1009's review against another edition
4.0
This book is really disturbing and also really important. It talks of world genocides and certainly shows that the "never again" attitude taken to the Holocaust has not held up to the test of time. It also shows how often media sources purposely supress the information because they believe people aren't interested. I think it's important to show that people ARE interested.
enklein7's review against another edition
4.0
Certainly a must read- long but worthwhile. I was very familiar with each case study except for Cambodia, but the initial parts about Raphael Lemkin and the origins of the word genocide and the convention were new and fascinating. It’s deeply researched but never reads like a dense academic text because it is basically one big story and many smaller stories/anecdotes. While the middle sections/meat of the book focus on different genocides in different areas of the world, Power really connects them and illustrates how previous events impacted future ones. This isn’t surprising because the book is centered on the U.S. narrative, mostly on the thoughts and actions government officials, so the linking threads are really related to policy decisions. While this is the main narrative, the most gripping and impactful parts are of course those grounded in the experiences of survivors. Still, although there’s certainly adequate context for each section on different genocides, most offer an introduction to the history and provide the information necessary to understand the U.S.’s position and international decision-making. I initially wanted even more space dedicated to the actual genocides and political history surrounding them, but there are whole books written on each, and this book had a different aim, focusing on the role of the U.S. But it definitely motivates further reading.
Interesting to read 2 decades into the 21st century because there is definitely a hawkish vibe for each genocide case, that the U.S. needed to support and participate in multilateral military activities if it were going to really stand up for human rights. And as the NATO bombings show, it’s always been known that military intervention would have risks, but the general takeaway from this book seems to be if military intervention is done wisely (though it often isn’t) the benefits will outweighs the costs. After the invasions of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya (and questions of what to do in Syria), the destabilizing effects of military intervention are even more prominent, with way bigger costs than benefits, which had made the prospect of humanitarian intervention even less appealing nowadays.
Interesting to read 2 decades into the 21st century because there is definitely a hawkish vibe for each genocide case, that the U.S. needed to support and participate in multilateral military activities if it were going to really stand up for human rights. And as the NATO bombings show, it’s always been known that military intervention would have risks, but the general takeaway from this book seems to be if military intervention is done wisely (though it often isn’t) the benefits will outweighs the costs. After the invasions of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya (and questions of what to do in Syria), the destabilizing effects of military intervention are even more prominent, with way bigger costs than benefits, which had made the prospect of humanitarian intervention even less appealing nowadays.