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alexsintschenko's review against another edition
4.0
Excellent, short read on Russia's geopolitical struggles, starting with the post-soviet downfall, EU appeasement and attempted integration and ending with the latest disasters (Georgian War, Annxeion of Crimea).
Particularly interesting in light of recent events.
Particularly interesting in light of recent events.
cook_memorial_public_library's review against another edition
4.0
Recommended by Rob. Check our catalog: https://encore.cooklib.org/iii/encore/search/C__Srussia%20without%20putin%20wood__Orightresult__U?lang=eng&suite=gold
penpar's review against another edition
5.0
Tony Wood brilliantly poses his arguments against the backdrop of a disintegrating USSR in the late 1980s through 2018, when the book was published, to give an unequivocal view of modern Russian politics.
Wood posits the following arguments:
1) Russia is like many other societies—there is a revolving door system whereby money and political power are exchanged by influential, well-connected members of the Russian society. Together, this forms a system in which Putin and the oligarchs each play an indispensable role in this societal structure.
2) Despite what the media claims, Putin's government and its positions are a continuation of Yeltsin's. Should Putin leave office today, it is likely his successor too will carry on where Putin left off, as there has so far been a natural evolution of Russia's politics since the USSR disintegrated.
3) Russia differs from the West in how its government has been shaped because of their history. Some believe this keeps Russia from embracing a liberal democratic system; Woods argues that it is this Soviet history that has benefited today's Russia and kept it from collapsing entirely in the chaos of the 1990s.
4) Russia wanted very much to be integrated by the West. This never happened because even though Russia today is but a shadow of the USSR's former power and influence, it is still too big, powerful and influential to be allowed into the EU and NATO.
5) Because Russia was secluded from the EU and NATO, Russia feels the West has continued to chip away at its international influence, despite Russia attempting to embrace the West and be a part of it in the 1990s through the mid-2000s. Its only viable course of action: react to what it perceives as threats to its regime in overwhelming force to frighten the West away from what Russia sees as its sphere of influence. (e.g., Syria, as one of its last client-states in the Middle East; Ukraine, Georgia, Chechen Wars, etc., as part of the "colour revolutions".)
6) The political opposition to the existing Russian political system is disunited and scattered across a vast country. Alexei Navalny (is seen as an alienating figure as he has, in the past, expressed views and made comments that not all opposition factions can get behind completely. Furthermore, Russia of the Future, Navalny's party, does not seem to offer a solution that is different to the Russian political system's evolution. Indeed, some of what is being considered, like decentralisation, already exist in name, if not in practice, in Russia. Other suggestions are modelled after the neoliberal capitalist experiments that the West dabbled in until the 2008 economic crisis.
7) Woods (correctly) believed that Russia and the West will in the future (Ukraine, since 24 February 2022) clash directly or indirectly. This clash is necessary for Russia to reconcile its superpower past with its present-day regional-power status. Woods also cautions that Russia might be trapped in a resource curse, whereby its economy is tied to nonrenewable resources, and that it cannot, after losing much of its industry to the economic contractions of the 1990s, breakthrough this trap. It is doomed to a more long-term economic downturn trend.
Wood posits the following arguments:
1) Russia is like many other societies—there is a revolving door system whereby money and political power are exchanged by influential, well-connected members of the Russian society. Together, this forms a system in which Putin and the oligarchs each play an indispensable role in this societal structure.
2) Despite what the media claims, Putin's government and its positions are a continuation of Yeltsin's. Should Putin leave office today, it is likely his successor too will carry on where Putin left off, as there has so far been a natural evolution of Russia's politics since the USSR disintegrated.
3) Russia differs from the West in how its government has been shaped because of their history. Some believe this keeps Russia from embracing a liberal democratic system; Woods argues that it is this Soviet history that has benefited today's Russia and kept it from collapsing entirely in the chaos of the 1990s.
4) Russia wanted very much to be integrated by the West. This never happened because even though Russia today is but a shadow of the USSR's former power and influence, it is still too big, powerful and influential to be allowed into the EU and NATO.
5) Because Russia was secluded from the EU and NATO, Russia feels the West has continued to chip away at its international influence, despite Russia attempting to embrace the West and be a part of it in the 1990s through the mid-2000s. Its only viable course of action: react to what it perceives as threats to its regime in overwhelming force to frighten the West away from what Russia sees as its sphere of influence. (e.g., Syria, as one of its last client-states in the Middle East; Ukraine, Georgia, Chechen Wars, etc., as part of the "colour revolutions".)
6) The political opposition to the existing Russian political system is disunited and scattered across a vast country. Alexei Navalny (is seen as an alienating figure as he has, in the past, expressed views and made comments that not all opposition factions can get behind completely. Furthermore, Russia of the Future, Navalny's party, does not seem to offer a solution that is different to the Russian political system's evolution. Indeed, some of what is being considered, like decentralisation, already exist in name, if not in practice, in Russia. Other suggestions are modelled after the neoliberal capitalist experiments that the West dabbled in until the 2008 economic crisis.
7) Woods (correctly) believed that Russia and the West will in the future (Ukraine, since 24 February 2022) clash directly or indirectly. This clash is necessary for Russia to reconcile its superpower past with its present-day regional-power status. Woods also cautions that Russia might be trapped in a resource curse, whereby its economy is tied to nonrenewable resources, and that it cannot, after losing much of its industry to the economic contractions of the 1990s, breakthrough this trap. It is doomed to a more long-term economic downturn trend.