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annmeyer's review against another edition
5.0
At this point, I consider myself pretty into history though not particularly a war buff.
However, Fromkin's extremely thorough breakdown of the causes of World War 1 is not only extremely accessible (well-paced, divided and organized into easily digestible parts) but is thoroughly interesting. With such a careful and focused look into the geopolitics of the great European powers in the early 20th century, Fromkin's analysis offers a nuanced look at the pressures and assumptions leading to World War 1 that greatly exceeded the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
For anyone interested in learning more about the political and military leadership that helped to usher in World War 1 or simply to consider how and why wars are fought and started more generally, this is a fantastic book that is engaging and easy to read + follow.
However, Fromkin's extremely thorough breakdown of the causes of World War 1 is not only extremely accessible (well-paced, divided and organized into easily digestible parts) but is thoroughly interesting. With such a careful and focused look into the geopolitics of the great European powers in the early 20th century, Fromkin's analysis offers a nuanced look at the pressures and assumptions leading to World War 1 that greatly exceeded the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
For anyone interested in learning more about the political and military leadership that helped to usher in World War 1 or simply to consider how and why wars are fought and started more generally, this is a fantastic book that is engaging and easy to read + follow.
jdintr's review against another edition
3.0
Fromkin lays out a very strong case, describing the aggressors in the war and taking the instigation northward from the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, to the plottings of the German military staff in Berlin.
Many myths of the wars origins are laid bare. To the very last minute, Czar Nicholas II of Russia corresponded with his cousin, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, pleading with him that Russia's ineffectual partial mobilization did not intend real war. Fromkin also shows that Wilhelm held out hopes for peace too long, well after his general staff had war preparations well underway in which timing (a six-week assault on France, then a full-on invasion of Russia) was essential.
I think that Fromkin takes too easy a line on Britain, though. I was surprised to learn about the Irish troubles, and the civil war which probably would have begun in September, had the world war not superseded it. At one point, days before the beginning of hostilities, the British cabinet discussed war in Ireland in the morning, then pivoted to war on the Continent in the afternoon. It sure seems like the start of the war was timely, considering the domestic fireworks that Britain faced.
A very good, thorough book. Casual readers should skip to the end to read Fromkin's astute conclusions, but the blow-by-blow, day-by-day accounts are also riveting for those with a greater interest in the genesis of the Great War.
Many myths of the wars origins are laid bare. To the very last minute, Czar Nicholas II of Russia corresponded with his cousin, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, pleading with him that Russia's ineffectual partial mobilization did not intend real war. Fromkin also shows that Wilhelm held out hopes for peace too long, well after his general staff had war preparations well underway in which timing (a six-week assault on France, then a full-on invasion of Russia) was essential.
I think that Fromkin takes too easy a line on Britain, though. I was surprised to learn about the Irish troubles, and the civil war which probably would have begun in September, had the world war not superseded it. At one point, days before the beginning of hostilities, the British cabinet discussed war in Ireland in the morning, then pivoted to war on the Continent in the afternoon. It sure seems like the start of the war was timely, considering the domestic fireworks that Britain faced.
A very good, thorough book. Casual readers should skip to the end to read Fromkin's astute conclusions, but the blow-by-blow, day-by-day accounts are also riveting for those with a greater interest in the genesis of the Great War.
socraticgadfly's review against another edition
2.0
This book got worse with more post-reading reflection.
I wanted to give this a fourth star, but just couldn't do it.
Per some other reviewers, Fromkin's conclusions, other than the two-war idea, that Austria wanted war with just Serbia and Germany was willing to use the Austrian casus belli as a pre-emptive war igniter, are too pat.
And, even that is not as proven as he claims. The Kaiser was not the only German, at least on the civilian side, who wanted Berchtold and Hötzendorf to attack Serbia ASAP, first of all; related to that, other civilians, if not the German military, also seemed to have supported the idea of "take Belgrade, then stop." But you won't here this from Fromkin.
Also, if Germany and Austria weren't fully coordinating with each other, then how can both of them be the cause of WWI?
That said, if they WERE coordinating with one another, where's the lead person in that coordination?
In what I can only call shameful, Tschirschky, German's ambassador to Vienna, is mentioned but once in the whole book.
Fromkin also stumbles, it seems, over the connection of Apis and the Black Hand to Princip and co-conspirators. He notes that Apis' lieutenant, Tankosic, provided their training, smuggled them back into Bosnia, etc., yet wants to say that Princip acted on his own. While noting that the Black Hand then voted to call off the assassination, and then saying it voted later to put it back on again (while noting that Princip refused to go along with stopping it), he neglects to report that Tankosic had reported the plan to Serbian Prime Minister Pasic.
Later, Fromkin claims that Apis used relatively inexperienced people like Princip almost as cutouts. He hints that Apis actually wanted them to fail, because this would give him some leverage against Pasic in some way.
Problems abound, though. First, he doesn't say exactly how this would provide leverage, nor, short of a coup, how Apis would use it. Second, he doesn't, through his omission of Tankosic's "ratting" to Pasic even as Apis' lieutenant, take account that Apis didn't control the Black Hand as much as Fromkin implies.
Finally, he gets close to conspiracy theorizing by noting that Austria had developed plans to overrun Serbia two weeks before the assassination.
A book like "July Crisis" is a much better overview.
I wanted to give this a fourth star, but just couldn't do it.
Per some other reviewers, Fromkin's conclusions, other than the two-war idea, that Austria wanted war with just Serbia and Germany was willing to use the Austrian casus belli as a pre-emptive war igniter, are too pat.
And, even that is not as proven as he claims. The Kaiser was not the only German, at least on the civilian side, who wanted Berchtold and Hötzendorf to attack Serbia ASAP, first of all; related to that, other civilians, if not the German military, also seemed to have supported the idea of "take Belgrade, then stop." But you won't here this from Fromkin.
Also, if Germany and Austria weren't fully coordinating with each other, then how can both of them be the cause of WWI?
That said, if they WERE coordinating with one another, where's the lead person in that coordination?
In what I can only call shameful, Tschirschky, German's ambassador to Vienna, is mentioned but once in the whole book.
Fromkin also stumbles, it seems, over the connection of Apis and the Black Hand to Princip and co-conspirators. He notes that Apis' lieutenant, Tankosic, provided their training, smuggled them back into Bosnia, etc., yet wants to say that Princip acted on his own. While noting that the Black Hand then voted to call off the assassination, and then saying it voted later to put it back on again (while noting that Princip refused to go along with stopping it), he neglects to report that Tankosic had reported the plan to Serbian Prime Minister Pasic.
Later, Fromkin claims that Apis used relatively inexperienced people like Princip almost as cutouts. He hints that Apis actually wanted them to fail, because this would give him some leverage against Pasic in some way.
Problems abound, though. First, he doesn't say exactly how this would provide leverage, nor, short of a coup, how Apis would use it. Second, he doesn't, through his omission of Tankosic's "ratting" to Pasic even as Apis' lieutenant, take account that Apis didn't control the Black Hand as much as Fromkin implies.
Finally, he gets close to conspiracy theorizing by noting that Austria had developed plans to overrun Serbia two weeks before the assassination.
A book like "July Crisis" is a much better overview.
piratequeen's review against another edition
3.0
I listened to the audiobook of this, but I should have actually read it. Fromkin covers so much research, and so many theories about how the war started, that it just kinda washed over me after a while, and I missed some details.
writerlibrarian's review against another edition
4.0
Quite good but ends a little short. I would have wanted a little more insight and a little less historians have found this and this, others this and that. He doesn't really take a stand. Which is a little annoying for me.
erinelizabeth's review against another edition
I choose not to rate this title, because although I didn't care for it, it is exactly what it claims to be. Turns out I just find the politics leading up to WWI when spread over 9 audio discs dull. I liked the beginning and the end when points were more concise, but this was very in-depth.
canada_matt's review against another edition
5.0
As the 100th anniversary of the Great War approaches, I thought I would test the waters and see what some recent historians had to say. In his highly informative, historical tome on the lead-up to the Great War, Fromkin not only dispels the simplistic view that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand began a series of events that led to military action, but also seeks to propose that its start was anything but a total surprise to the European powers. Simplistic world history texts still present this as the foundational argument behind the European conflict, Fromkin argues that this is an attempt to gloss over some of the tension and intricate politicking taking place in Europe leading up to the summer of 1914. He proposes that Europe was a powder keg of potential conflicts, some accentuated by regional wars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading up to June 28th, 1914, which made the final result inevitable, leaving the date the only mystery. The assassination was but the final spark, even then possibly a ruse to justify retaliatory action. Fromkin asks readers in the title who was a cause of the Great War, offering at least three plausible answers throughout the text's first seven parts: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia. In this well-structured book, drawing on many sources, both recently and dated, Fromkin leads the reader through the various options, presenting key chronological events of the happenings within the states directly involved in the potential conflicts. By Part Eight, Fromkin offers his own assessment, that the majority of blame did and should lay at Germany's feet. Powerfully presented and easy to follow for the reader well versed in history and those looking to pique their own interests.
By handing blame to Germany, Fromkin details Kaiser Wilhelm II's desire to use his strong military while it remains a threat to other states. Wilhelm sought to use this strength not only to bully his enemies, but also to show how ready Germany might be for any military action, especially against the predominant powers of the time; Russia, England, and France. Deemed crazy by his cousin, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and a completely unstable leader by his grandmother, Queen Victoria, Wilhelm ignored those who sought to criticise him or seek peace and chose strong military men who shared his desire to obliterate any enemy. By aligning Germany with Austria-Hungary, another aggressor in the region, Wilhelm ensured an iron fist over much of the region, and into Africa's imperial lands. Fromkin argues that Germany's blank cheque approach to assisting Austria-Hungary was the predominant reason the conflict escalated from a small regional war into a full-on European aggression. Deceptive actions surrounding Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia help only to vilify them all the more, with the added refusal to engage in any peace conferencing after Austria-Hungary made aggression its only option, added to the argument that without Germany's military might, a conflict on such a large scale could surely have been averted. It can also be argued that Germany pushed Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia to offer a reason to turn around and attack Russia and invade France, its plan all along.
Austria-Hungary's greed and power-hungry nature, fuelled no doubt by Germany and the aforementioned blank cheque, helped catapult the Empire into the role of warmonger no matter the cost. While Emperor Franz Joseph led the Empire and sanctioned expanding its holdings in Europe, the manner was anything but savvy. Looking to the Baltic states, Austria-Hungary felt it best to choose sides in the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 and then play a rousing game of nation-state Jenga, pulling blocks from all sides to realign its allies in order to find the best 'team' for eventual aggression in the region. Fromkin illustrates the infantile swapping of allies the Empire made during and after both Balkan conflicts, issuing strongly worded treaties to those it deemed best to join them as they eyed the spoils of Europe. The Empire could not handle the powerful Serbia, whose victories in the aforementioned conflicts led it to be more powerful and a threat to the Empire's Bosnia-Hertzegovina state. A secret alliance with Germany to crush Serbia remained but an idea before the assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne, Franz Ferdinand. When Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Empire's heir apparent, Austria-Hungary used this as a perfect opportunity to implement its plan to obliterate Serbia, ignoring that he was Bosnian and thereby a citizen of the Empire. Alas, its bungling of the response and eventually delivery of an ultimatum so full of impossible requests paved the way to armed conflict and the inclusion of allies to protect one another made war all but inevitable. There is no doubt that the Empire's single-mindedness about territorial superiority, with a German military at its beck and call, helped bring about a regional war with Serbia, and veiled Germany's larger plan to commence a war with its two great enemies, turning it into a continental war that spilled into the world sphere. It should be noted that Austria-Hungary was crushed both by Serbia and Russia in the War, making its sabre-rattling all the more futile.
While it is easy to vilify the villains of history, one cannot simply leave Serbia off the hook for any responsibility. A regional powerhouse with territorial aspirations, Serbia sought to regain some of the territory it lost in its Balkan conflicts of the 14th and 15th centuries, well before anyone had heard of Germany, Prussia, or even Austria. While one cannot fault the state for this, there is an inherent undertone that outsiders will take notice and perhaps act to stop the ever-expanding aspirations (though England, France, and Russia seem not to have done so when it came to Austria-Hungary). Allying itself with Russia as well could not have hurt Serbia, knowing that having such a power in its corner would help, should the need arise. That said, Fromkin presents documented evidence (and alludes that other historians have found it too) that the Serbian government, headed by Prime Minister Nicola Pasic, not only knew of the Bosnian Princip's plan to assassinate the Archduke, but also was well aware of the Serbian militant group, the Black Hand, and its plans to disrupt the Austro-Hungary leadership. Serbian officials did little to stop the end results, though there is some speculation as to whether Pasic did try to inform border guards. Sitting on the knowledge, knowing full well what would come in retaliation fuels the argument that they permitted an escalation of tension and tossed the match on the pyre to ignite the war. Debating whether responding more favourably to the Austria-Hungary ultimatum is futile, for the document itself was surely a ruse well past any negotiation point. Knowingly sanctioning the Black Hand's actions and relying on Russia to support it when war was declared help to cement blame at the feet of the Serbs.
While a relatively short book, it packs much into its chapters and tells a story as effectively as a drawn-out tome. A great read for history buffs who may have tired of the 'active war' accounts to show how things got so bad. When Fromkin offers his summary and presents his own conclusions, I read ansd absorbed them with much interest. He lays out not only the facts, but supports them with key historical events. As I read, I could not help but think that Margaret MacMillan's Paris 1919 would be an excellent companion to show the before and after effects of the Great War. The two would also help strengthen Fromkin's argument in the introduction that much of the current political and military strife is tied to the outcome of the Great War (discussed at length in MacMillan's tome), including the Middle East's disjointed creation into states based more on geographic convenience than historical and tribal lines.
Kudos, Dr. Fromkin for this fascinating piece of work that not only stuns the reader but opens many new pathways of historical exploration. I'll keep my personal opinion of which of the aforementioned three states are to blame for the Great War to myself, in hopes of letting all who read the book to come up with their own conclusions... or perhaps posit others to add to the mix.
By handing blame to Germany, Fromkin details Kaiser Wilhelm II's desire to use his strong military while it remains a threat to other states. Wilhelm sought to use this strength not only to bully his enemies, but also to show how ready Germany might be for any military action, especially against the predominant powers of the time; Russia, England, and France. Deemed crazy by his cousin, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and a completely unstable leader by his grandmother, Queen Victoria, Wilhelm ignored those who sought to criticise him or seek peace and chose strong military men who shared his desire to obliterate any enemy. By aligning Germany with Austria-Hungary, another aggressor in the region, Wilhelm ensured an iron fist over much of the region, and into Africa's imperial lands. Fromkin argues that Germany's blank cheque approach to assisting Austria-Hungary was the predominant reason the conflict escalated from a small regional war into a full-on European aggression. Deceptive actions surrounding Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia help only to vilify them all the more, with the added refusal to engage in any peace conferencing after Austria-Hungary made aggression its only option, added to the argument that without Germany's military might, a conflict on such a large scale could surely have been averted. It can also be argued that Germany pushed Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia to offer a reason to turn around and attack Russia and invade France, its plan all along.
Austria-Hungary's greed and power-hungry nature, fuelled no doubt by Germany and the aforementioned blank cheque, helped catapult the Empire into the role of warmonger no matter the cost. While Emperor Franz Joseph led the Empire and sanctioned expanding its holdings in Europe, the manner was anything but savvy. Looking to the Baltic states, Austria-Hungary felt it best to choose sides in the two Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 and then play a rousing game of nation-state Jenga, pulling blocks from all sides to realign its allies in order to find the best 'team' for eventual aggression in the region. Fromkin illustrates the infantile swapping of allies the Empire made during and after both Balkan conflicts, issuing strongly worded treaties to those it deemed best to join them as they eyed the spoils of Europe. The Empire could not handle the powerful Serbia, whose victories in the aforementioned conflicts led it to be more powerful and a threat to the Empire's Bosnia-Hertzegovina state. A secret alliance with Germany to crush Serbia remained but an idea before the assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne, Franz Ferdinand. When Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Empire's heir apparent, Austria-Hungary used this as a perfect opportunity to implement its plan to obliterate Serbia, ignoring that he was Bosnian and thereby a citizen of the Empire. Alas, its bungling of the response and eventually delivery of an ultimatum so full of impossible requests paved the way to armed conflict and the inclusion of allies to protect one another made war all but inevitable. There is no doubt that the Empire's single-mindedness about territorial superiority, with a German military at its beck and call, helped bring about a regional war with Serbia, and veiled Germany's larger plan to commence a war with its two great enemies, turning it into a continental war that spilled into the world sphere. It should be noted that Austria-Hungary was crushed both by Serbia and Russia in the War, making its sabre-rattling all the more futile.
While it is easy to vilify the villains of history, one cannot simply leave Serbia off the hook for any responsibility. A regional powerhouse with territorial aspirations, Serbia sought to regain some of the territory it lost in its Balkan conflicts of the 14th and 15th centuries, well before anyone had heard of Germany, Prussia, or even Austria. While one cannot fault the state for this, there is an inherent undertone that outsiders will take notice and perhaps act to stop the ever-expanding aspirations (though England, France, and Russia seem not to have done so when it came to Austria-Hungary). Allying itself with Russia as well could not have hurt Serbia, knowing that having such a power in its corner would help, should the need arise. That said, Fromkin presents documented evidence (and alludes that other historians have found it too) that the Serbian government, headed by Prime Minister Nicola Pasic, not only knew of the Bosnian Princip's plan to assassinate the Archduke, but also was well aware of the Serbian militant group, the Black Hand, and its plans to disrupt the Austro-Hungary leadership. Serbian officials did little to stop the end results, though there is some speculation as to whether Pasic did try to inform border guards. Sitting on the knowledge, knowing full well what would come in retaliation fuels the argument that they permitted an escalation of tension and tossed the match on the pyre to ignite the war. Debating whether responding more favourably to the Austria-Hungary ultimatum is futile, for the document itself was surely a ruse well past any negotiation point. Knowingly sanctioning the Black Hand's actions and relying on Russia to support it when war was declared help to cement blame at the feet of the Serbs.
While a relatively short book, it packs much into its chapters and tells a story as effectively as a drawn-out tome. A great read for history buffs who may have tired of the 'active war' accounts to show how things got so bad. When Fromkin offers his summary and presents his own conclusions, I read ansd absorbed them with much interest. He lays out not only the facts, but supports them with key historical events. As I read, I could not help but think that Margaret MacMillan's Paris 1919 would be an excellent companion to show the before and after effects of the Great War. The two would also help strengthen Fromkin's argument in the introduction that much of the current political and military strife is tied to the outcome of the Great War (discussed at length in MacMillan's tome), including the Middle East's disjointed creation into states based more on geographic convenience than historical and tribal lines.
Kudos, Dr. Fromkin for this fascinating piece of work that not only stuns the reader but opens many new pathways of historical exploration. I'll keep my personal opinion of which of the aforementioned three states are to blame for the Great War to myself, in hopes of letting all who read the book to come up with their own conclusions... or perhaps posit others to add to the mix.
hstone's review
4.0
While slow to begin, and bogged down at times by diplomatic minutiae, Fromkin's narrative still does a very fine job of presenting and, more importantly, making sense of the complex political atmosphere of 1914. At first, I was unclear with regards to his argument, but like a good puzzle, the pieces all come together in the end, giving a complete and convincing portrait of Germany and Austria-Hungary as the parties most responsible for the First World War. For those interested in understanding why the war broke out when it did, and in the manner that it did, would do well to read this book.
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