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No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship by Linda K. Kerber
siria's review against another edition
5.0
A really fascinating look at women's history in the United States from the late eighteenth century through to the nineties, framed not in terms of the struggle to gain equal rights, but in terms of the struggle to gain equal obligations under the law--whether to vote, to serve on juries, to fight on the front lines in combat situations, etc.
Meticulously researched and cogently argued, Kerber looks at how the refusal to legislate for women's obligations within these spheres had a negative impact on their ability to exercise what rights they did have, and on the movement to gain equal rights. It gave me a number of tools with which to re-evaluate the fields of women's history I've already studied, and gave me a basic education in American women's history, which I was only vaguely acquainted with before; not to mention that it made my jaw drop a number of times in sheer disbelief. I found the comparisons between the civil rights movement and the feminist movement to be especially interesting; how advocates from the two separate movements (or both) learned to identify with one another, their points of commonality and their differences with one another.
Highly, highly recommended if you have any interest at all in this area of history. Don't let the fact that it focuses on constitutional law put you off; normally, legal history ranks only slightly above economic history with me for topics to switch me off, and I still sped through this and wished for more.
Meticulously researched and cogently argued, Kerber looks at how the refusal to legislate for women's obligations within these spheres had a negative impact on their ability to exercise what rights they did have, and on the movement to gain equal rights. It gave me a number of tools with which to re-evaluate the fields of women's history I've already studied, and gave me a basic education in American women's history, which I was only vaguely acquainted with before; not to mention that it made my jaw drop a number of times in sheer disbelief. I found the comparisons between the civil rights movement and the feminist movement to be especially interesting; how advocates from the two separate movements (or both) learned to identify with one another, their points of commonality and their differences with one another.
Highly, highly recommended if you have any interest at all in this area of history. Don't let the fact that it focuses on constitutional law put you off; normally, legal history ranks only slightly above economic history with me for topics to switch me off, and I still sped through this and wished for more.
onceandfuturelaura's review against another edition
4.0
When Sarah Jay, John Jay's wife, was drafting the toasts that would celebrate the American Revolution in Paris, one of her toasts was "May all our Citizens be Soldiers, and all our Soldiers Citizens." (236). Given that at the time, women could almost never be soldiers, that seemed to suggest that they could not be citizens either. And later legal development certainly suggested that women's citizenship could be lost by the conduct of their husbands.
Kerber brings out some of the usually-suppressed strains in the Whig myth* of increasing freedom and dignity for all. She explores how women's freedom from obligations, particularly from the military and jury service, was tied up with women's lack of autonomy before the law.
From this book I learned that the constitutions of nine of the original thirteen states articulated the duty of the citizen to serve and the power of the state to compel him to do so. (242). Since women had not duty to serve they were also, in a deep sense, not citizens.
The book takes its title from testimony given by Eagle Forum member Kathleen Teague before the House Armed Services Committee on the subject of whether women would be subject to the draft. Seems she said that "'The right to be treated like ladies' . . . is a right 'which every American woman has enjoyed since our country was born.'" xxiv. This book examines the unspoken premise there, that women do not have direct obligations to the State but merely to their families. A premise that, in 1789, was largely law. The consequence was, in almost every way, that women lacked autonomy and dignity before the law.
*"When I began to write this book, I expected that I would find the succeeding generations brought successive issues to closure; that the fragility of women's independent citizenship in the early republic would be resolved by the married women's property acts of the mid-nineteenth century . . . . The story I have told is not what historians once called 'Whig history': a single narrative of progress from the era of the Revolution to the present. Instead, it is a set of complex accounts, often circling on themselves, in which we are challenged to be attentive to the relationship between obligation and rights, and through which we can understand that women, like men, have always been part of the national political culture. We cannot embrace the rights without acknowledging the obligations, Nor do we have the option of limiting ourselves to the voluntarily embraced duties; there waits a steel hand in a velvet glove to enforce obligations." (308).
Kerber brings out some of the usually-suppressed strains in the Whig myth* of increasing freedom and dignity for all. She explores how women's freedom from obligations, particularly from the military and jury service, was tied up with women's lack of autonomy before the law.
From this book I learned that the constitutions of nine of the original thirteen states articulated the duty of the citizen to serve and the power of the state to compel him to do so. (242). Since women had not duty to serve they were also, in a deep sense, not citizens.
The book takes its title from testimony given by Eagle Forum member Kathleen Teague before the House Armed Services Committee on the subject of whether women would be subject to the draft. Seems she said that "'The right to be treated like ladies' . . . is a right 'which every American woman has enjoyed since our country was born.'" xxiv. This book examines the unspoken premise there, that women do not have direct obligations to the State but merely to their families. A premise that, in 1789, was largely law. The consequence was, in almost every way, that women lacked autonomy and dignity before the law.
*"When I began to write this book, I expected that I would find the succeeding generations brought successive issues to closure; that the fragility of women's independent citizenship in the early republic would be resolved by the married women's property acts of the mid-nineteenth century . . . . The story I have told is not what historians once called 'Whig history': a single narrative of progress from the era of the Revolution to the present. Instead, it is a set of complex accounts, often circling on themselves, in which we are challenged to be attentive to the relationship between obligation and rights, and through which we can understand that women, like men, have always been part of the national political culture. We cannot embrace the rights without acknowledging the obligations, Nor do we have the option of limiting ourselves to the voluntarily embraced duties; there waits a steel hand in a velvet glove to enforce obligations." (308).
lukescalone's review against another edition
4.0
This is a really difficult work to make sense of, and Kerber's argument seems subtle but necessary. While most histories and analyses of the United States (and other countries, like France) have emphasized the nature of rights held by citizens, Kerber pushes back on this and argues that all rights have accompanying obligations. For instance, the right to benefit from civil government is accompanied by the obligation to pay taxes and to maintain loyalty to it. Yet, historically, these obligations have not been held equally by all people in the US.
Kerber makes this point through the case of women. She argues that, when the nature of state and citizenship was redefined in the volatile 1780s and 1790s, English domestic law maintained its full force in the newly independent country. Most importantly to English domestic law was the concept of coverture--the idea that a woman was owned by her husband (in all manners, including physically). As a result of this, women's obligations were instead held by their husbands, while they could continue to benefit from rights. In her analysis, Kerber settles on five distinct obligations that all American citizens have: pay taxes, avoid vagrancy, serve on juries, risk life in military service, and refrain from treason. While women did not have obligations to serve on juries or risk military service (or, case dependent, pay taxes), they did have to avoid vagrancy and refrain from treason.
In Kerber's view, women's liberation in the United States also requires the expansion of the five obligations to be held by women as well. Women have since acquired the obligation (it sounds weird to say) to serve on juries, but women's obligation to register for the draft still has not (and, in my view, will not) been accepted by either state or society. At the same time, the expansion of obligations suggests a whittling away at traditional legal coverture, albeit at a very slow pace. I think that Kerber would make the case that the fact that women can reasonably expect to be safe from physical violence in war without having to participate in war shows that staying power of coverture.
I'm sure that I'm missing tons here, it's been a tough one to dissect, but it has made me think about citizenship differently.
Kerber makes this point through the case of women. She argues that, when the nature of state and citizenship was redefined in the volatile 1780s and 1790s, English domestic law maintained its full force in the newly independent country. Most importantly to English domestic law was the concept of coverture--the idea that a woman was owned by her husband (in all manners, including physically). As a result of this, women's obligations were instead held by their husbands, while they could continue to benefit from rights. In her analysis, Kerber settles on five distinct obligations that all American citizens have: pay taxes, avoid vagrancy, serve on juries, risk life in military service, and refrain from treason. While women did not have obligations to serve on juries or risk military service (or, case dependent, pay taxes), they did have to avoid vagrancy and refrain from treason.
In Kerber's view, women's liberation in the United States also requires the expansion of the five obligations to be held by women as well. Women have since acquired the obligation (it sounds weird to say) to serve on juries, but women's obligation to register for the draft still has not (and, in my view, will not) been accepted by either state or society. At the same time, the expansion of obligations suggests a whittling away at traditional legal coverture, albeit at a very slow pace. I think that Kerber would make the case that the fact that women can reasonably expect to be safe from physical violence in war without having to participate in war shows that staying power of coverture.
I'm sure that I'm missing tons here, it's been a tough one to dissect, but it has made me think about citizenship differently.
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