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fractal_rabbit's review against another edition
challenging
informative
slow-paced
4.5
David Lindley's The Dream Universe is a good read for those interested in the future of fundamental physics.
The first half focused on the history of science. For those who are already aware of this history, it is still an interesting read. I didn't know that Galileo and Newton's arguments about gravity had to be presented in cumbersome geometrical terms in order to be accepted. During their respective ages, algebra was deemed by scholars to be a lesser math, so they had to resort to geometrical arguments. David Lindley provides this context of not just the scientific discovery and the scientist, but also the limitations of the culture in which they were operating within at the time. For his arguments, he focuses on the difference between Platoist thinking (philosophical, beauty-driven), and Galileon thinking (scientific, observation-driven).
In the second half he describes modern scientific discoveries, highlighting Dirac's mathematical leap with his wave equation, and the subsequent prediction and validation of the antielectron (positron). For most of the history of science, math was a crude tool that followed observation. But when probing into the realm of quantum phenomena, this procedure became subverted. Math first, then observation.
Most of the book is set up for the last few chapters. He makes the argument that most physics research done today is actually more akin to engineering. New fundamental laws are not being discovered or altered, but rather the details operating within this laws are being worked out. He then claims that fundamental physicists of today -- particle physicists and cosmologists -- are more like philosophers of old than like scientists. The questions that are asked regarding the origin of the universe and potential unification of the fundamental forces, stem from a desire to "make the math prettier" rather than to explain observations. He mentions specific examples involving string theory with its required 11 dimensions, and the multiverse theory. Both theories have faced criticisms in that they are unfalsifiable.
Some questions I am left with are:
- What makes a fundamental law? Is it it's simplicity and mathematical beauty? That it is succinct? Is the aesthetic requirement a guiding principle or a distraction?
- Why does math explain the universe so well? You could take this to the extreme that we live in a mathematical universe, or opt for the more conservative route that it is the useful math that survives scrutiny. Math explains the universe so well, because we made it so.
I appreciate David Lindley pointing out the traps of circular thinking prevalent in science today. He mentions Sabine Hossenfelder's Lost in Math multiple times, which makes similar arguments.
The first half focused on the history of science. For those who are already aware of this history, it is still an interesting read. I didn't know that Galileo and Newton's arguments about gravity had to be presented in cumbersome geometrical terms in order to be accepted. During their respective ages, algebra was deemed by scholars to be a lesser math, so they had to resort to geometrical arguments. David Lindley provides this context of not just the scientific discovery and the scientist, but also the limitations of the culture in which they were operating within at the time. For his arguments, he focuses on the difference between Platoist thinking (philosophical, beauty-driven), and Galileon thinking (scientific, observation-driven).
In the second half he describes modern scientific discoveries, highlighting Dirac's mathematical leap with his wave equation, and the subsequent prediction and validation of the antielectron (positron). For most of the history of science, math was a crude tool that followed observation. But when probing into the realm of quantum phenomena, this procedure became subverted. Math first, then observation.
Most of the book is set up for the last few chapters. He makes the argument that most physics research done today is actually more akin to engineering. New fundamental laws are not being discovered or altered, but rather the details operating within this laws are being worked out. He then claims that fundamental physicists of today -- particle physicists and cosmologists -- are more like philosophers of old than like scientists. The questions that are asked regarding the origin of the universe and potential unification of the fundamental forces, stem from a desire to "make the math prettier" rather than to explain observations. He mentions specific examples involving string theory with its required 11 dimensions, and the multiverse theory. Both theories have faced criticisms in that they are unfalsifiable.
Some questions I am left with are:
- What makes a fundamental law? Is it it's simplicity and mathematical beauty? That it is succinct? Is the aesthetic requirement a guiding principle or a distraction?
- Why does math explain the universe so well? You could take this to the extreme that we live in a mathematical universe, or opt for the more conservative route that it is the useful math that survives scrutiny. Math explains the universe so well, because we made it so.
I appreciate David Lindley pointing out the traps of circular thinking prevalent in science today. He mentions Sabine Hossenfelder's Lost in Math multiple times, which makes similar arguments.
oldmansimms's review against another edition
3.0
A well-written and concise history of science and mathematics, but I expected more of a takeaway once it got to talking about modern fundamental physics.
emma_scully's review against another edition
4.0
Good read, I found the start more engaging as this book's second half seemed more of an ode to Sabine Hossenfelder's Lost in Math.
jjweisman's review against another edition
1.0
The bad history (did you know that the Holy Roman Emperor ruled at the pope's behest?) and philosophy (apparently, any time Socrates speaks about the heavens, we can be sure that he truly represents Plato's own thoughts) at the beginning is infuriating. The more so because it is drawn from works (like Russell's History of Philosophy) which aren't merely considered unauthoritative but poor sources. But ultimately, what begins as infuriating proves silly.
Silly because the argument against the approach to physics Lindley advances is not dependent on history. Much less on a history so tortured, he derides philosophers' adherence to reason on one page and exults Galileo's adherence to it on the next. This result obtains frequently, because there is no clarity in the categories he chooses.
He argues, reasonably if thinly, that it is a mistake to build purely from propositions of logic and reason to conclusions about the nature of reality - that these efforts place thought out of sync with reality and ultimately render it impractical or, in the case of his impression of 16th-century "philosophy", authoritarian (here, he seems to be talking variously about Catholic Church official doctrine, lecturers in universities, or something else whenever he says "philosopher"). A physics increasingly built of mathematical propositions is just such a mistake.
What glamour history adds to the argument is hard to divine. The argument does not depend on whether someone else once did a similar thing badly - the badness is in the approach. Let's accept his premise - that Galileo (sorry, Grosseteste, Bacon (I), Bacon (II), Fuchs, Leoniceno, and Descartes) invented the use of practical experimentation in contradiction to a universally- and uncritically-accepted Aristotelianism (pace, Vives, Sanches, Bianchi, and others) which exercised reason only on mental objects and not on empirical knowledge. Why would this prove that mathematically-oriented physicists are not doing science?
Only because the boundaries of science have been set by reference to Lindley's declaration that Galileo was doing science and that only that constitutes science. Circular reasoning? Can't be, that's philosopher-talk.
The pragmatic argument has much to commend it - as does the question of how much attention and energy should be focused on research which lacks evident practical function. Here, Lindley's comparison of "engineering" as the modern practice of science fits in well. But these arguments last about 60 pages of 200, and leave the remainder to suggest that the likes of Archimedes and the architects, craftsmen, and thinkers of the ancient world didn't have a sophisticated understanding of materials science because they were concerned about materials' inner workings and not the mathematical expression of their behavior. Notably, his treatment of Faraday and Maxwell's interplay proves exceptionally slippery, because it would tend to undermine his insistence on mathematics in experimental science.
What a waste of the remaining pages. And what a pity he wasn't able to offer better insight into the pragmatic point. But perhaps there's just not much more to say about that.
Silly because the argument against the approach to physics Lindley advances is not dependent on history. Much less on a history so tortured, he derides philosophers' adherence to reason on one page and exults Galileo's adherence to it on the next. This result obtains frequently, because there is no clarity in the categories he chooses.
He argues, reasonably if thinly, that it is a mistake to build purely from propositions of logic and reason to conclusions about the nature of reality - that these efforts place thought out of sync with reality and ultimately render it impractical or, in the case of his impression of 16th-century "philosophy", authoritarian (here, he seems to be talking variously about Catholic Church official doctrine, lecturers in universities, or something else whenever he says "philosopher"). A physics increasingly built of mathematical propositions is just such a mistake.
What glamour history adds to the argument is hard to divine. The argument does not depend on whether someone else once did a similar thing badly - the badness is in the approach. Let's accept his premise - that Galileo (sorry, Grosseteste, Bacon (I), Bacon (II), Fuchs, Leoniceno, and Descartes) invented the use of practical experimentation in contradiction to a universally- and uncritically-accepted Aristotelianism (pace, Vives, Sanches, Bianchi, and others) which exercised reason only on mental objects and not on empirical knowledge. Why would this prove that mathematically-oriented physicists are not doing science?
Only because the boundaries of science have been set by reference to Lindley's declaration that Galileo was doing science and that only that constitutes science. Circular reasoning? Can't be, that's philosopher-talk.
The pragmatic argument has much to commend it - as does the question of how much attention and energy should be focused on research which lacks evident practical function. Here, Lindley's comparison of "engineering" as the modern practice of science fits in well. But these arguments last about 60 pages of 200, and leave the remainder to suggest that the likes of Archimedes and the architects, craftsmen, and thinkers of the ancient world didn't have a sophisticated understanding of materials science because they were concerned about materials' inner workings and not the mathematical expression of their behavior. Notably, his treatment of Faraday and Maxwell's interplay proves exceptionally slippery, because it would tend to undermine his insistence on mathematics in experimental science.
What a waste of the remaining pages. And what a pity he wasn't able to offer better insight into the pragmatic point. But perhaps there's just not much more to say about that.
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