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My Amazon review -
A History of National Socialism by Konrad Heiden
This book was written in 1934; its final chapters bring the reader up to the Rohm purge. I stumbled onto this book via a footnote in another book. I had not heard of Heiden previously. I had never heard of this book. I am, again, surprised, that books like this disappear from sight, while fraudulent polemics like Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope inform the zeitgeist. This review is going to feature what I found interesting or surprising. Since my main interest is the Catholic versus Nazi struggle, that will be a particular focus.
Heiden was born in 1901. He was a Social Democrat journalist. He left Germany in 1932. In short, he was well-situated to watch the rise of Hitler and National Socialism in Germany. Heiden was also an opponent of Hitler, and his dislike for Hitler is apparent, but nonetheless this is an insightful book that provides historical information rather than moralizing, which is a refreshing change from modern books. Because Heiden was on the spot, distance and events have not caused details to blur. Heiden is also an elegant prose stylist; some of his observations are memorable (e.g., “The devil who undoubtedly possessed Pohner was a cold devil.” (p. 25.); Regarding Goebbels - “It has always been his advantageous, if not altogether creditable, fate to be the third person at a fight between two others, and to attach himself timely to the stronger.”)
Heiden begins with Anton Drexler, the locksmith who founded the NSDAP, at that time called the German Workers Party. Drexler hated Marxism and capitalism and founded his party on the idea of German Socialism, what Left Wing Socialists called “Kaiser’s Socialists.” (p. 4.) Drexler was swept away by Hitler in 1921, remained as a Bavarian Parliament until 1928, when he disappeared from politics. (p. 7.) The early party included Ernst Rohm and Dietrich Eckart and Gottfried Feder. Heiden’s position throughout the book is that Rohm was the key to the success of the NSDAP because he brought in manpower and muscle to the NSDAP through his connections with the military and Freikorps. (p. 39.) Feder was an engineer who brought in scientific notions. Eckart was a writer and publisher. The NSDAP started as a “Party of the Left” in 1919, according to Heiden. (p. 10.) Nazi anti-capitalism would remain until the end of the Weimar Republic. (p. 206.)
In 1918, Hitler professed himself to be a “Majority Socialist,” which may have been a Party of the Right. (p. 11.) After hearing Feder lecture, Hitler became interested in the NSDAP and became Party Member Number 7 in the “inner party” but “not in the party itself which was somewhat larger.” (p. 12.) Hitler gave his first speech, which must have contained anti-Semitism, because a warning was issued against “noisy anti-Semitism” since the “youthful Party still felt itself to be a Party of the Left.” (p. 13.) Hitler and the Nazis downplayed their anti-Semitism in their quest for power in the 1930s to such an extent that Heiden could wonder:
“There is reason to believe that Hitler – a great orator now and Chancellor – has not really given up his belief in Judaism as a personification of evil.” (p. 69.)
Heiden points out that “as late as 1925,” Hitler was still vouching for the validity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. (p. 69.) The sense of this sentence – written in 1934 – is that there is some question about how “recently” – 7 years before – Hitler had been an uncouth anti-Semite. From our perspective our reaction is to be surprised at Heiden’s ignorance. Likewise, after a flurry of anti-Semitic shop smashing in 1930, the culprits were expelled from the Party and the Volkischer Beobachter predicted that the shop windows of Jewish business would be better looked after in “the Third Reich.” (p. 155.)
Heiden notes the following:
“Among German Jews there was a widespread belief that influential leaders of the National Socialist Party no longer really took anti-Semitism seriously; or that at all events they would not seek to realize the anti-Semitic demands in their programme. This was one of the numerous mistakes which foreign critics of National Socialism made. With the growth of National Socialism during the last few years an anti-Semitism that was domant in the broad masses of the German people, and that manifested itself very often in a not unfriendly reserve, revived again to strong and aggressive life. As early as the summer of 1932 the life of Jews in the country and smaller towns had in certain districts become unpleasant. Systematic boycotting, social outlawry, and even physical ill-treatment were frequent, especially in eastern Germany and northern Bavaria. Even in the streets of Berlin Jewish passers-by were continually being attacked. From this temper a systematic persecution of Jews arose a few weeks after Hitler’s taking offense.” (p. 336.)
Nonetheless, the Nazis realized that unremittent persecution would endanger their foreign policy; hence the boycott of Jewish stores on April 1, 1933 was a one day affair, mostly to appease his followers. (p. 337.)
Heiden discusses the 25 point program of the NSDAP, which endured through 1934, but points out that it is a product of its time, basically post-World War I, with inclusion of socialist principles that were never implemented, such as the abolition of unearned income, the abolition of interest and the nationalization of large stores. The NSDAP was refounded in 1926, and although the program remained, the later movement had “little connexion with the old lower middle-class programme.” (p. 18.)
The NSDA was anti-Semitic from the beginning. (p. 26.) Heiden argues that Hitler learned from Rudolf Junge that Luther’s reformation was “only superficial, because it did not separate Christianity from the Old Testament ; that the Western cult of Mammon and Eastern Bolshevism were only apparent opposites, but were in reality allies for setting up a Jewish World Empire” and that international democracy was a political outcome of the Jewish spirit. (p. 29.) Jung also pointed to the enemies of the German state in the fact that Germany had the strongest social democratic party and the strongest clerical party. (p. 29.)
Heiden provides a character sketch of Hitler. Hitler was assiduous as an agitator. He did not tire of the adulation of the masses who had failed to achieve recognition and for whom such adulation was an end in itself and not a questionable political expedient. (p. 34.) Heiden believes that Hitler was clever and intelligent. (See p. 37.) Hitler spoke in slogans which delighted the crowd “at hearing the speaker express its own opinions.” (p. 34.) In addition, the Nazis organized their own approach to “public discourse” by having shock troops who would howl down anyone who wanted to start a discussion, which has an eerie resonance to the political climate of 2016. Hitler regarded the gains to his Party as more important than the damage to the community at large; he subordinated the precepts of law and order to the advantage of his party. (p. 37.) By 1920, the Nazis owned a newspaper, The Volkischer Beobachter, and had 3,000 members. (p. 39.)
Ludendorf was in Munich by 1921 where Hitler came to know him personally. (p. 40, 44.) Rosenberg formulated Nazi foreign policy with a plan for a German crusade to Russa. (p. 41.) Heiden observes of Rosenberg: “There are probably few people in Germany to-day who systematize and dogmatize in politics as inexorably as Rosenberg, or who are so capable in an ungovernable fury of construction of basing a detailed fabric of conclusions on nothing at all. Rosenberg’s schemes for foreign policy consist of tremendous compendiums for the archives, and of plans that are not carried out.” (p. 41.) But so it always is with tiny fringe political movement.
Heiden suggests that Rosenberg and other White Russians injected the Russian form of anti-Semitism into the German party:
“The gloomy bloodthirsty Russian anti-Semitism infected the quieter German type. Merejkowski preached horror of the Bolshevist Antichrist; the protocols of the Wise Men of Zion were eagerly read in Germany. The old Russian anti-Semitism was the obvious instrument for the anti-Bolshivism of the White Russian emigres. Now, in an altogether false connexion it came the vehicle for the ideas on foreign policy of the German National Socialists. Regarded from the German point of view, the Jewish question is the same as it always was – the anti-Semitism of Hitler and his Baltic friends is not German. It is the companion piece to Ahasuerus – the eternal anti-Semite roaming the earth in pursuit of the Wandering Jew.” (p. 42.)
Heiden covers the transformation of Hitler into the Leader. He had already been dubbed the Leader, but there were factions in the NSDAP who looked for the opportunity to unseat Hitler. Julius Streicher played a role in the episode which gave Hitler the opportunity to present an ultimatum to the Party and to take total control. (p. 47 – 49.) Heiden points out that member Number 7 managed to make his department – propaganda – into the only department that matter. (p. 50.) The NSDAP was effectively the appendage of a propaganda department.
Heiden provides an extensive section on Hitler’s biography, which ought to be read. Heiden has the advantage of proximity to witnesses and events, albeit this was written during the period of hero-worship. On the other hand, there is this:
“At the time of the German Revolution, Hitler was in hospital at Pasewalk. He was now twenty-nine years old and a man of many talents and many shortcomings. He paid a great price for his advantages; he was less mature than the average man of his age; and while he had perhaps read and pondered more deeply than many, he was seriously lacking in ordinary common sense and in an understanding and sympathy for other people’s points of views. His regimental comrades looked on him as not quite normal and he had no friends.”(p. 58.)
According to Heiden, Hitler was “half-educated” but had an amazing memory sored in his brain culled from reading which had been digested. (p. 60.) Hitler was not “strong” – witnesses testified to his outbursts and stuttering. (p. 62.) “He is not a will-man but a brain man, and, it must be admitted, a notable one.” (p. 62.) “His utterly logical way of thought is Hitler’s strength.” (p. 63.) Heiden surprisingly compliments Hitler’s logic, which enabled him to see the conclusions that followed from his principles sooner and more clearly than others. Equally surprising is that Heiden writes that Hitler was easily cowed by stronger personalities. (p. 70.) (Hitler was also vain: he had a small pointed military beard in the first post-War years. (p. 75.)
The Nazi “struggles with the Church” began early. (p. 99.) Dietrich Eckart wrote in the Volkischer Beobachter in 1921: “Tear in pieces that lascivious bible of Satanism – the Old Testament.” (p. 99.)
Catholicism opposed the NSDAP from the beginning because of its Nationalism:
“For the Nazis, the Cardinal Archbishop of Munich, Dr. von Falhaber, constituted a rock of offence from the very beginning. In appearance and thought the Cardinal is a true Prince of the Church. As an intellect, he may have been inferior to the present Cardinal Secretary of State, Pacelli, who was then Papal Nuncio in Munich. But as a coiner of political phrases Cardinal Faulhaber has no equal in the choice of word, place, and time of delivery. The Cardinal was a convinced monarchist and an enemy of the Revolution. At the same time he was as a Catholic the enemy of Nationalism and a Bavarian wearer of the purple possessed simultaneously of a world-embracing and patriotic ultramontanism. It was not long before the Nazis made this discovery. It was the Cardinal who invented a phrase that is still in current use: The Revolution was perjury and high treason. Ata Catholic Congress in Munich in August 1922, Cardinal Faulhaber attacked the “lies” contained in the “Jewish Press.” While the Bavarian and patriotic Right Wing associations made use of these phrases in their propaganda, the Nazis were troubled in their consciences by other words that the Cardinal let fall on the same occasions. As a defender of the “Roman” peace, the Cardinal protested against military festivals, condemned political murders, and placed the responsibility for their occurrence at the door of the agitatist activity carried on in the radical Right Wing newspapers. This was in effect a direct attack upon the Nazis.” (p. 100.)
Hitler conspired with Ludendorff in the Munich Putsch which failed because of a lack of courage and preparation. After the Putsch, Hitler broke with Ludendorff, and the military broke with party, and, while Hitler was in prison, the Nazis captured 23 seats in the Reichstag. (p. 1016 -108.) The failure of the Putsch was therefore a blessing in disguise.
With the Rohm purge fresh in 1934, Heiden points out that Rohm and Hitler were associated with political murders throughout their career. (p. 110.) Neither placed any value on human life. (Id.) Heiden is prophetic: “Nevertheless nation and State alike can only regain their lost morality when this generation which has been sacrificed in its guilty lays down the leadership.” (p. 111.) In August of 1932, five Nazis were arrested for the murder of a workman named Pietrzuch. (p. 198.) Hitler swore “Niblung loyalty” to the Nazis, who were eventually pardoned after 1933. (p. 199.)
Heiden offers character portraits of Hitler’s lieutenants. Goebbels gets a lengthy treatment and is described as lacking “Hitler’s logical mind.” (p. 118.) Goebbels was a supporter of Ludendorff. (p. 119.) Goebbels “excels Hitler himself in his lack of acquired knowledge. His writings and speeches are the richest in ideas and the poorest in solid thought in the whole literature of National Socialism. At least, Hitler has acquired knowledge of a special subject – foreign policy. There is not a trace of any real and fundamental knowledge to be found in Goebbels.” (p. 120.) Strangely, Heiden views Goebbels as “rather” a philo-Semite gone wrong than a true anti-Semite, which Goebbels compensated for by indulging in overly-extreme anti-Semitism. (p. 265-266.)
Heiden provides a very interesting discussion on the machinations of the SA, which was often close to becoming a power in its right, and Hitler, as well as the political machinations as Hitler collected political power.
Catholic opposition to the NSDAP continued to the end of the Weimar Republic:
“Among all the powers who were at that time occupying commanding positions in German politics, the Catholic Church must receive special mention on account of its curious attitude towards National Socialism. The Church was offended by the dogma and doctrines of the Nazi Party. Its censure was directed at Point 24 of the programme, which contained the religious confession of the Party and introduced mention of the ethics and moral sense of the Teutonic race. The disposition of the Church, however, is to be tolerant in racial questions. Point 24 alone would probably not have proved the occasion for a quarrel had not Alfred Rosenberg, the theorist of the Party, written various articles containing statements that were dogmatically questionable. It is true that Rosenberg’s articles were several times expressly stated not to be semi-official Party utterances, but that did not help matters. In March 1931 all the German Bishops issued strongly worded protests against National Socialism. The Bishops of the Diocese of Paderborn declared expressly that “membership of the National Socialist Party was not permissible for a Catholic Christian for so long and in so far as it propagates political and educational theories that are irreconcilable with the Catholic doctrine. The Bavarian Bishops said that what National Socialism called Christianity was no longer the Christianity of Christ. The Bishop of Mainz in Septmeber 1931 denied Peter Gemeinder, a National Socialist town councilor, Christian burial because “no Catholic may be a professed member of the National Socialist Party.” (p. 152 – 153.)
This Catholic antipathy led Catholics to support Hindenburg against Hitler in the 1932 presidential elections:
“All traditional affinities were torn asunder in this extraordinary contest. Behind the Protestant Hindenburg stood the majority of Catholic voters, whose Ministers had recently been obliged to retire before Protestant suspicions. Behind the Catholic Hitler appeared the upper classes of Protestant Noth Germany. And Hugenberg tried vainly to put a spoke in the Austrian’s wheel by denouncing him publicly as a “Roman Catholic.” In addition to the Centre, the Social Democrat working class supported the imperial Field-Marshal von Hindenberg with tremendous zest, while the Conservative Agrarian Party largely went with the revolutionary Hitler. “ (p. 168.)
Another datum that might surprise modern readers is that Communists were “obeying a strange order that Hitler’s seizure of power must actually be encouraged, because the path to Communism must go by way of the rule of Fascism and its collapse.” (p. 154.) Hence the Communist Party was attacking the Social Democrats, not the National Socialists, right up to the end. (Id.) Another supporter of the Nazis was the Prussian Crown Prince August Wilhelm of Prussia, who appeared in a brown shirt and was attacked by the police with truncheons. (p. 57.)
Heiden provides information about the Stahlhelm. The Stahlhelm was a fighting force of veterans that began to play a political role in the late Weimar Republic. Their leader – Hugenberg – was part of the coalition that put the Nazis into power, then marginalized and the Stalhelm was violently incorporated into the SA. (p. 285.)
Another quasi-military association that we forget is the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold that was pro-Republican and formed in 1934 to as a republican counterpoise to the military associations of the Right. It was large on paper but not very effective. (p. 175.)
The final days of the Weimar Republic were an ineffective mess. Bruning was put in as Chancellor with the permission of Hindenburg to rule through executive decrees. Schleicher undermined Bruning and Papen replaced Bruning. The conniving Papen was ousted by Schleicher, who was no more effective. Papen proposed bringing the Nazis into the coalition. Hitler was not opposed to coalitions: Mussolini had at first ruled as a chief of a collation. But Hitler was not going to be made Vice Chancellor. (p. 195.) Ludwig Muller – future Reichsbishop – induced von Blomberg to bring the army into the coalition. (p. 230.)
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My Amazon review -
A History of National Socialism by Konrad Heiden
This book was written in 1934; its final chapters bring the reader up to the Rohm purge. I stumbled onto this book via a footnote in another book. I had not heard of Heiden previously. I had never heard of this book. I am, again, surprised, that books like this disappear from sight, while fraudulent polemics like Cornwell’s Hitler’s Pope inform the zeitgeist. This review is going to feature what I found interesting or surprising. Since my main interest is the Catholic versus Nazi struggle, that will be a particular focus.
Heiden was born in 1901. He was a Social Democrat journalist. He left Germany in 1932. In short, he was well-situated to watch the rise of Hitler and National Socialism in Germany. Heiden was also an opponent of Hitler, and his dislike for Hitler is apparent, but nonetheless this is an insightful book that provides historical information rather than moralizing, which is a refreshing change from modern books. Because Heiden was on the spot, distance and events have not caused details to blur. Heiden is also an elegant prose stylist; some of his observations are memorable (e.g., “The devil who undoubtedly possessed Pohner was a cold devil.” (p. 25.); Regarding Goebbels - “It has always been his advantageous, if not altogether creditable, fate to be the third person at a fight between two others, and to attach himself timely to the stronger.”)
Heiden begins with Anton Drexler, the locksmith who founded the NSDAP, at that time called the German Workers Party. Drexler hated Marxism and capitalism and founded his party on the idea of German Socialism, what Left Wing Socialists called “Kaiser’s Socialists.” (p. 4.) Drexler was swept away by Hitler in 1921, remained as a Bavarian Parliament until 1928, when he disappeared from politics. (p. 7.) The early party included Ernst Rohm and Dietrich Eckart and Gottfried Feder. Heiden’s position throughout the book is that Rohm was the key to the success of the NSDAP because he brought in manpower and muscle to the NSDAP through his connections with the military and Freikorps. (p. 39.) Feder was an engineer who brought in scientific notions. Eckart was a writer and publisher. The NSDAP started as a “Party of the Left” in 1919, according to Heiden. (p. 10.) Nazi anti-capitalism would remain until the end of the Weimar Republic. (p. 206.)
In 1918, Hitler professed himself to be a “Majority Socialist,” which may have been a Party of the Right. (p. 11.) After hearing Feder lecture, Hitler became interested in the NSDAP and became Party Member Number 7 in the “inner party” but “not in the party itself which was somewhat larger.” (p. 12.) Hitler gave his first speech, which must have contained anti-Semitism, because a warning was issued against “noisy anti-Semitism” since the “youthful Party still felt itself to be a Party of the Left.” (p. 13.) Hitler and the Nazis downplayed their anti-Semitism in their quest for power in the 1930s to such an extent that Heiden could wonder:
“There is reason to believe that Hitler – a great orator now and Chancellor – has not really given up his belief in Judaism as a personification of evil.” (p. 69.)
Heiden points out that “as late as 1925,” Hitler was still vouching for the validity of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. (p. 69.) The sense of this sentence – written in 1934 – is that there is some question about how “recently” – 7 years before – Hitler had been an uncouth anti-Semite. From our perspective our reaction is to be surprised at Heiden’s ignorance. Likewise, after a flurry of anti-Semitic shop smashing in 1930, the culprits were expelled from the Party and the Volkischer Beobachter predicted that the shop windows of Jewish business would be better looked after in “the Third Reich.” (p. 155.)
Heiden notes the following:
“Among German Jews there was a widespread belief that influential leaders of the National Socialist Party no longer really took anti-Semitism seriously; or that at all events they would not seek to realize the anti-Semitic demands in their programme. This was one of the numerous mistakes which foreign critics of National Socialism made. With the growth of National Socialism during the last few years an anti-Semitism that was domant in the broad masses of the German people, and that manifested itself very often in a not unfriendly reserve, revived again to strong and aggressive life. As early as the summer of 1932 the life of Jews in the country and smaller towns had in certain districts become unpleasant. Systematic boycotting, social outlawry, and even physical ill-treatment were frequent, especially in eastern Germany and northern Bavaria. Even in the streets of Berlin Jewish passers-by were continually being attacked. From this temper a systematic persecution of Jews arose a few weeks after Hitler’s taking offense.” (p. 336.)
Nonetheless, the Nazis realized that unremittent persecution would endanger their foreign policy; hence the boycott of Jewish stores on April 1, 1933 was a one day affair, mostly to appease his followers. (p. 337.)
Heiden discusses the 25 point program of the NSDAP, which endured through 1934, but points out that it is a product of its time, basically post-World War I, with inclusion of socialist principles that were never implemented, such as the abolition of unearned income, the abolition of interest and the nationalization of large stores. The NSDAP was refounded in 1926, and although the program remained, the later movement had “little connexion with the old lower middle-class programme.” (p. 18.)
The NSDA was anti-Semitic from the beginning. (p. 26.) Heiden argues that Hitler learned from Rudolf Junge that Luther’s reformation was “only superficial, because it did not separate Christianity from the Old Testament ; that the Western cult of Mammon and Eastern Bolshevism were only apparent opposites, but were in reality allies for setting up a Jewish World Empire” and that international democracy was a political outcome of the Jewish spirit. (p. 29.) Jung also pointed to the enemies of the German state in the fact that Germany had the strongest social democratic party and the strongest clerical party. (p. 29.)
Heiden provides a character sketch of Hitler. Hitler was assiduous as an agitator. He did not tire of the adulation of the masses who had failed to achieve recognition and for whom such adulation was an end in itself and not a questionable political expedient. (p. 34.) Heiden believes that Hitler was clever and intelligent. (See p. 37.) Hitler spoke in slogans which delighted the crowd “at hearing the speaker express its own opinions.” (p. 34.) In addition, the Nazis organized their own approach to “public discourse” by having shock troops who would howl down anyone who wanted to start a discussion, which has an eerie resonance to the political climate of 2016. Hitler regarded the gains to his Party as more important than the damage to the community at large; he subordinated the precepts of law and order to the advantage of his party. (p. 37.) By 1920, the Nazis owned a newspaper, The Volkischer Beobachter, and had 3,000 members. (p. 39.)
Ludendorf was in Munich by 1921 where Hitler came to know him personally. (p. 40, 44.) Rosenberg formulated Nazi foreign policy with a plan for a German crusade to Russa. (p. 41.) Heiden observes of Rosenberg: “There are probably few people in Germany to-day who systematize and dogmatize in politics as inexorably as Rosenberg, or who are so capable in an ungovernable fury of construction of basing a detailed fabric of conclusions on nothing at all. Rosenberg’s schemes for foreign policy consist of tremendous compendiums for the archives, and of plans that are not carried out.” (p. 41.) But so it always is with tiny fringe political movement.
Heiden suggests that Rosenberg and other White Russians injected the Russian form of anti-Semitism into the German party:
“The gloomy bloodthirsty Russian anti-Semitism infected the quieter German type. Merejkowski preached horror of the Bolshevist Antichrist; the protocols of the Wise Men of Zion were eagerly read in Germany. The old Russian anti-Semitism was the obvious instrument for the anti-Bolshivism of the White Russian emigres. Now, in an altogether false connexion it came the vehicle for the ideas on foreign policy of the German National Socialists. Regarded from the German point of view, the Jewish question is the same as it always was – the anti-Semitism of Hitler and his Baltic friends is not German. It is the companion piece to Ahasuerus – the eternal anti-Semite roaming the earth in pursuit of the Wandering Jew.” (p. 42.)
Heiden covers the transformation of Hitler into the Leader. He had already been dubbed the Leader, but there were factions in the NSDAP who looked for the opportunity to unseat Hitler. Julius Streicher played a role in the episode which gave Hitler the opportunity to present an ultimatum to the Party and to take total control. (p. 47 – 49.) Heiden points out that member Number 7 managed to make his department – propaganda – into the only department that matter. (p. 50.) The NSDAP was effectively the appendage of a propaganda department.
Heiden provides an extensive section on Hitler’s biography, which ought to be read. Heiden has the advantage of proximity to witnesses and events, albeit this was written during the period of hero-worship. On the other hand, there is this:
“At the time of the German Revolution, Hitler was in hospital at Pasewalk. He was now twenty-nine years old and a man of many talents and many shortcomings. He paid a great price for his advantages; he was less mature than the average man of his age; and while he had perhaps read and pondered more deeply than many, he was seriously lacking in ordinary common sense and in an understanding and sympathy for other people’s points of views. His regimental comrades looked on him as not quite normal and he had no friends.”(p. 58.)
According to Heiden, Hitler was “half-educated” but had an amazing memory sored in his brain culled from reading which had been digested. (p. 60.) Hitler was not “strong” – witnesses testified to his outbursts and stuttering. (p. 62.) “He is not a will-man but a brain man, and, it must be admitted, a notable one.” (p. 62.) “His utterly logical way of thought is Hitler’s strength.” (p. 63.) Heiden surprisingly compliments Hitler’s logic, which enabled him to see the conclusions that followed from his principles sooner and more clearly than others. Equally surprising is that Heiden writes that Hitler was easily cowed by stronger personalities. (p. 70.) (Hitler was also vain: he had a small pointed military beard in the first post-War years. (p. 75.)
The Nazi “struggles with the Church” began early. (p. 99.) Dietrich Eckart wrote in the Volkischer Beobachter in 1921: “Tear in pieces that lascivious bible of Satanism – the Old Testament.” (p. 99.)
Catholicism opposed the NSDAP from the beginning because of its Nationalism:
“For the Nazis, the Cardinal Archbishop of Munich, Dr. von Falhaber, constituted a rock of offence from the very beginning. In appearance and thought the Cardinal is a true Prince of the Church. As an intellect, he may have been inferior to the present Cardinal Secretary of State, Pacelli, who was then Papal Nuncio in Munich. But as a coiner of political phrases Cardinal Faulhaber has no equal in the choice of word, place, and time of delivery. The Cardinal was a convinced monarchist and an enemy of the Revolution. At the same time he was as a Catholic the enemy of Nationalism and a Bavarian wearer of the purple possessed simultaneously of a world-embracing and patriotic ultramontanism. It was not long before the Nazis made this discovery. It was the Cardinal who invented a phrase that is still in current use: The Revolution was perjury and high treason. Ata Catholic Congress in Munich in August 1922, Cardinal Faulhaber attacked the “lies” contained in the “Jewish Press.” While the Bavarian and patriotic Right Wing associations made use of these phrases in their propaganda, the Nazis were troubled in their consciences by other words that the Cardinal let fall on the same occasions. As a defender of the “Roman” peace, the Cardinal protested against military festivals, condemned political murders, and placed the responsibility for their occurrence at the door of the agitatist activity carried on in the radical Right Wing newspapers. This was in effect a direct attack upon the Nazis.” (p. 100.)
Hitler conspired with Ludendorff in the Munich Putsch which failed because of a lack of courage and preparation. After the Putsch, Hitler broke with Ludendorff, and the military broke with party, and, while Hitler was in prison, the Nazis captured 23 seats in the Reichstag. (p. 1016 -108.) The failure of the Putsch was therefore a blessing in disguise.
With the Rohm purge fresh in 1934, Heiden points out that Rohm and Hitler were associated with political murders throughout their career. (p. 110.) Neither placed any value on human life. (Id.) Heiden is prophetic: “Nevertheless nation and State alike can only regain their lost morality when this generation which has been sacrificed in its guilty lays down the leadership.” (p. 111.) In August of 1932, five Nazis were arrested for the murder of a workman named Pietrzuch. (p. 198.) Hitler swore “Niblung loyalty” to the Nazis, who were eventually pardoned after 1933. (p. 199.)
Heiden offers character portraits of Hitler’s lieutenants. Goebbels gets a lengthy treatment and is described as lacking “Hitler’s logical mind.” (p. 118.) Goebbels was a supporter of Ludendorff. (p. 119.) Goebbels “excels Hitler himself in his lack of acquired knowledge. His writings and speeches are the richest in ideas and the poorest in solid thought in the whole literature of National Socialism. At least, Hitler has acquired knowledge of a special subject – foreign policy. There is not a trace of any real and fundamental knowledge to be found in Goebbels.” (p. 120.) Strangely, Heiden views Goebbels as “rather” a philo-Semite gone wrong than a true anti-Semite, which Goebbels compensated for by indulging in overly-extreme anti-Semitism. (p. 265-266.)
Heiden provides a very interesting discussion on the machinations of the SA, which was often close to becoming a power in its right, and Hitler, as well as the political machinations as Hitler collected political power.
Catholic opposition to the NSDAP continued to the end of the Weimar Republic:
“Among all the powers who were at that time occupying commanding positions in German politics, the Catholic Church must receive special mention on account of its curious attitude towards National Socialism. The Church was offended by the dogma and doctrines of the Nazi Party. Its censure was directed at Point 24 of the programme, which contained the religious confession of the Party and introduced mention of the ethics and moral sense of the Teutonic race. The disposition of the Church, however, is to be tolerant in racial questions. Point 24 alone would probably not have proved the occasion for a quarrel had not Alfred Rosenberg, the theorist of the Party, written various articles containing statements that were dogmatically questionable. It is true that Rosenberg’s articles were several times expressly stated not to be semi-official Party utterances, but that did not help matters. In March 1931 all the German Bishops issued strongly worded protests against National Socialism. The Bishops of the Diocese of Paderborn declared expressly that “membership of the National Socialist Party was not permissible for a Catholic Christian for so long and in so far as it propagates political and educational theories that are irreconcilable with the Catholic doctrine. The Bavarian Bishops said that what National Socialism called Christianity was no longer the Christianity of Christ. The Bishop of Mainz in Septmeber 1931 denied Peter Gemeinder, a National Socialist town councilor, Christian burial because “no Catholic may be a professed member of the National Socialist Party.” (p. 152 – 153.)
This Catholic antipathy led Catholics to support Hindenburg against Hitler in the 1932 presidential elections:
“All traditional affinities were torn asunder in this extraordinary contest. Behind the Protestant Hindenburg stood the majority of Catholic voters, whose Ministers had recently been obliged to retire before Protestant suspicions. Behind the Catholic Hitler appeared the upper classes of Protestant Noth Germany. And Hugenberg tried vainly to put a spoke in the Austrian’s wheel by denouncing him publicly as a “Roman Catholic.” In addition to the Centre, the Social Democrat working class supported the imperial Field-Marshal von Hindenberg with tremendous zest, while the Conservative Agrarian Party largely went with the revolutionary Hitler. “ (p. 168.)
Another datum that might surprise modern readers is that Communists were “obeying a strange order that Hitler’s seizure of power must actually be encouraged, because the path to Communism must go by way of the rule of Fascism and its collapse.” (p. 154.) Hence the Communist Party was attacking the Social Democrats, not the National Socialists, right up to the end. (Id.) Another supporter of the Nazis was the Prussian Crown Prince August Wilhelm of Prussia, who appeared in a brown shirt and was attacked by the police with truncheons. (p. 57.)
Heiden provides information about the Stahlhelm. The Stahlhelm was a fighting force of veterans that began to play a political role in the late Weimar Republic. Their leader – Hugenberg – was part of the coalition that put the Nazis into power, then marginalized and the Stalhelm was violently incorporated into the SA. (p. 285.)
Another quasi-military association that we forget is the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold that was pro-Republican and formed in 1934 to as a republican counterpoise to the military associations of the Right. It was large on paper but not very effective. (p. 175.)
The final days of the Weimar Republic were an ineffective mess. Bruning was put in as Chancellor with the permission of Hindenburg to rule through executive decrees. Schleicher undermined Bruning and Papen replaced Bruning. The conniving Papen was ousted by Schleicher, who was no more effective. Papen proposed bringing the Nazis into the coalition. Hitler was not opposed to coalitions: Mussolini had at first ruled as a chief of a collation. But Hitler was not going to be made Vice Chancellor. (p. 195.) Ludwig Muller – future Reichsbishop – induced von Blomberg to bring the army into the coalition. (p. 230.)
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