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culkin's review against another edition
2.0
I was really hoping for something more readable, like Hume, especially considering how much of a dude his wikipedia page paints him to be. Alas. The first sentence was comically obtuse - the worst opening I ever remember reading. There was nothing here you can't pick up in a 3-min youtube video; I don't know why this is a widely recommended primary text. Important no doubt historically, but rather too much like the stereotypical inaccessible philosophy we're bored-scared of.
Redeemed somewhat by this small part of the first section: "The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquillity, and excitement. With much tranquillity, many find that they can be content with very little pleasure: with much excitement, many can reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. There is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even the mass of mankind to unite both; since the two are so far from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance, the prolongation of either being a preparation for, and exciting a wish for, the other..."
Redeemed somewhat by this small part of the first section: "The main constituents of a satisfied life appear to be two, either of which by itself is often found sufficient for the purpose: tranquillity, and excitement. With much tranquillity, many find that they can be content with very little pleasure: with much excitement, many can reconcile themselves to a considerable quantity of pain. There is assuredly no inherent impossibility in enabling even the mass of mankind to unite both; since the two are so far from being incompatible that they are in natural alliance, the prolongation of either being a preparation for, and exciting a wish for, the other..."
quijada's review against another edition
3.0
i can not stand consequentualists and utilitarianism. both r unbelievably stupid & excuse so many shitty things (apartheid is maybe ok because everyone living under the apartheid state is *really happy*). but like, this book was written well. mill fails to *really* address objections such as the distribution of good, plurality, regard for truth etc. i also just dont think that happiness is the *only* inherent good and his reasoning to convince me of such is lacking.
beanitocereno's review against another edition
1.0
what generates more pleasure: a hundred people getting sucked off by one partner or one person getting sucked off by a hundred partners?
ariqstotle's review against another edition
5.0
If utilitymaxxing so good, why electricity bill so high
brokensandals's review against another edition
3.0
This is mainly of historical interest, though I found a few bits fascinating. In chapter 3 Mill tries to answer the question:
He says the answer must always come from either “external sanctions” like punishment and social pressure, or “[t]he internal sanction of duty” which is “a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility.” He knows this sense of duty is present in different forms and degrees in different individuals, but interestingly, he thinks there’s a sort of evolutionary pressure on cultures (he doesn’t use those terms) that leads to a utilitarian-esque sense of duty becoming increasingly prevalent over time. The gist is: we naturally see ourselves as members of a society, and
That seems like a rather simplistic (and biased) view of history. But I do like the idea that there may be something inherently unstable in trying to give equal consideration to just some subset of people, an instability that creates continual pressure to expand the
moral circle. My copy of the book includes a speech Mill gave on capital punishment. I was mildly surprised to find he was defending capital punishment. He argues that:
- a quick death is kinder to the criminal than the alternative—Mill assumed the alternative was “imprisonment with hard labor for life”;
- but people perceive the death penalty to be worse, which makes it a more effective deterrent.
Thus, he believes the death penalty reduces the criminal’s suffering and reduces crime in society, making it a double win on utilitarian grounds.
There’s a glaring omission here: he doesn’t consider the suffering caused to anyone who loves the criminal. A parent, for example, might find it much more traumatizing to see their child executed than imprisoned indefinitely.
I also think there’s a paternalistic element in Mill’s argument which should give us pause. If we were really interested in reducing cruelty to the criminal, we could let them choose whether to be executed or imprisoned. If Mill is reluctant to offer such a choice, it suggests that his primary motivation for endorsing capital punishment is the deterrent effect. His claim that execution is also better for the criminal themselves seems more like a cheap attempt to bolster his case than a rigorously-thought-out argument.
The main difference I have with Mill on this, though, is just that I think wrongful convictions are dramatically more common than he assumes. In the Britain of his time, he says:
I lack the historical knowledge to know if this is an accurate representation of his government, or if his position in society gave him a skewed perception (on general principles, I’d guess the latter), but in my own country today it doesn’t seem like “the barest possibility of … innocence” reliably protects people from conviction and harsh punishment. (Also, he’s implying that trying to keep the wrongful conviction rate below 10% is a bit extreme. But when we’re talking about killing innocent people, a 10% error rate would be appalling!)
He does raise an interesting worry: that judges and juries might use a lower standard of evidence for convicting people when they think the punishment is less severe (life imprisonment instead of execution), thus leading to more wrongful convictions. I would suggest this concern is better addressed by trying to educate and persuade people to see imprisonment as the very serious punishment that it is.
(crosspost)
…in regard to any supposed moral standard—What is its sanction? what are the motives to obey? or, more specifically, what is the source of its obligation? whence does it derive its binding force?
He says the answer must always come from either “external sanctions” like punishment and social pressure, or “[t]he internal sanction of duty” which is “a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility.” He knows this sense of duty is present in different forms and degrees in different individuals, but interestingly, he thinks there’s a sort of evolutionary pressure on cultures (he doesn’t use those terms) that leads to a utilitarian-esque sense of duty becoming increasingly prevalent over time. The gist is: we naturally see ourselves as members of a society, and
…society between human beings, except in the relation of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted. Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. And since in all states of civilization, every person, except an absolute monarch, has equals, everyone is obliged to live on these terms with somebody; and in every age some advance is made toward a state in which it will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with anybody
That seems like a rather simplistic (and biased) view of history. But I do like the idea that there may be something inherently unstable in trying to give equal consideration to just some subset of people, an instability that creates continual pressure to expand the
moral circle. My copy of the book includes a speech Mill gave on capital punishment. I was mildly surprised to find he was defending capital punishment. He argues that:
- a quick death is kinder to the criminal than the alternative—Mill assumed the alternative was “imprisonment with hard labor for life”;
- but people perceive the death penalty to be worse, which makes it a more effective deterrent.
Thus, he believes the death penalty reduces the criminal’s suffering and reduces crime in society, making it a double win on utilitarian grounds.
There’s a glaring omission here: he doesn’t consider the suffering caused to anyone who loves the criminal. A parent, for example, might find it much more traumatizing to see their child executed than imprisoned indefinitely.
I also think there’s a paternalistic element in Mill’s argument which should give us pause. If we were really interested in reducing cruelty to the criminal, we could let them choose whether to be executed or imprisoned. If Mill is reluctant to offer such a choice, it suggests that his primary motivation for endorsing capital punishment is the deterrent effect. His claim that execution is also better for the criminal themselves seems more like a cheap attempt to bolster his case than a rigorously-thought-out argument.
The main difference I have with Mill on this, though, is just that I think wrongful convictions are dramatically more common than he assumes. In the Britain of his time, he says:
Our rules of evidence are even too favorable to the prisoner; and juries and Judges carry out the maxim, “It is better that ten guilty should escape than that one innocent person should suffer,” not only to the letter, but beyond the letter. Judges are most anxious to point out, and juries to allow for, the barest possibility of the prisoner’s innocence.
I lack the historical knowledge to know if this is an accurate representation of his government, or if his position in society gave him a skewed perception (on general principles, I’d guess the latter), but in my own country today it doesn’t seem like “the barest possibility of … innocence” reliably protects people from conviction and harsh punishment. (Also, he’s implying that trying to keep the wrongful conviction rate below 10% is a bit extreme. But when we’re talking about killing innocent people, a 10% error rate would be appalling!)
He does raise an interesting worry: that judges and juries might use a lower standard of evidence for convicting people when they think the punishment is less severe (life imprisonment instead of execution), thus leading to more wrongful convictions. I would suggest this concern is better addressed by trying to educate and persuade people to see imprisonment as the very serious punishment that it is.
(crosspost)
gohnar23's review against another edition
4.0
Classic cccccccccc philosophy book, so vintage and full of meaning
bookfiend48's review against another edition
3.0
Well, at least I know a little something about utilitarianism, but not sure if I agree with it solely because of the way human nature is. Promoting happiness for the greatest majority of people may sound good in theory, provided that those in the minority aren't suffering or are not in pain of some sort. Mill doesn't really address the people who suffer other than they just need to deal with it and yield to the majority. I don't know if I buy the notion that happiness should have to come at the expense of anybody.
castorgarden's review against another edition
challenging
informative
reflective
medium-paced
5.0
This is an essential reading in Philosophy as well as Moral Ethics.
Mill speaks on the challenges of gathering the resource of happiness while also creating happiness for others. It's a dense read, but Mill needs to explain each implementation of happiness with all human beings and balancing the justice system with the utilitarian mindset.
Mill speaks on the challenges of gathering the resource of happiness while also creating happiness for others. It's a dense read, but Mill needs to explain each implementation of happiness with all human beings and balancing the justice system with the utilitarian mindset.