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jasonfurman's review against another edition
5.0
The opening line of this book sets out its ambition: "This book aims to change the way you think about globalization." And I would say it largely succeeds through a combination of economic history, trade theory, well deployed descriptive statistics, observation, and--in the conclusion--a certain amount of imagination.
eccles's review against another edition
1.0
I don’t know why I have this book. I think I probably bought it in an industrious, optimistic moment after reading some “best book of...” article in some review I respected. What a mistake. General rule to follow: don’t bother with Popular Economics books. Probably true about popular science etc as well, but these are even more annoying than latter-day Pinker efforts. I confess that I found this so annoying after the first few chapters that I’ve skimmed rather than “read” this book - so it’s possible I’ve missed some real gems of insights amid the dross of “innovation” and “leverage the value”.
There’s a pretty simple article-sized idea here, one that might not have made it past the Economist editors but might have got into the FT or Telegraph. Sort of fun to think about, but expanded into a rambling 300+ pages, complete with lots of little “explainer” boxes, and preambles, summing-ups, etc, it’s frankly tedious. I won’t bother to criticise the content, but warn any prospective reader who’s sensitive to the gross oversimplification of vast tracts of history, to the erasure of colonialism and exploitation, the violence visited by the powerful on the weak and the mindless valoration homo economicus, do AVOID.
Couple of areas to think about - provoked by my failed attempt to read this:
Seems like the underlying dynamics of human social change, seen through an economic lens, has something to do with the existence and disposition of a “surplus” within a population/region. Given that co-located production and consumption is by far the most efficient way of spending your time, why, for example, did people (as far back as an archaeological record goes) buy “luxury” goods from other places far away? I’m thinking off the top of my head of the import of Chinese porcelain to England in pre-industrial revolution times - but this kind of activity existed everywhere, and as I understand it, was the principal substance of international trade pre-1500-or-so. How do such surpluses arise, who “owns” (controls) them, and so decides how they’re spent (consumed by having nice tea cups from the other side of the world rather than invested in inventing indoor plumbing)? New technology - the steam engine, etc - increased regional surpluses massively (I think), but the disposition of these surpluses changed (more investment than consumption?) through the 19th century (?)
Why did parts of the non-industrialised world in 1900 miss this “great convergence” - the export of industrialisation to the rest of the world. China in 1820 had 33% of world GDP (2x that of the whole N Atlantic region), was left behind in the industrial revolution, but recently has industrialised on a scale that would have been inconceivable to the original European/American industrialising countries. But not much of the African or S American continent. Why? This book hints that this is the case, but doesn’t ever attempt an explanation.
In works like this, the word “technology” is made synonymous with “knowledge”, “ideas” and “know-how” in a way that I think is importantly wrong and misleading. A key part of the Big Idea here is that there is a “cost of travel of ideas” which has been massively reduced in the 2000’s or so. I get there’s a sense in which he’s got a point, but I think it’s even more important to see that “ideas” have travelled very quickly and with amazing impact for thousands of years. Witness the idea of Christianity from about 300 onwards, the consequent development of the institutions of the Church etc across Europe and Russia. What doesn’t travel so well is production process and actual bits of kit. That’s partly because the physical form of these new and valuable things is easier to control/protect, but also because of IP laws and the cooperation among the powerful Haves of the world to keep these things to themselves.
There’s a pretty simple article-sized idea here, one that might not have made it past the Economist editors but might have got into the FT or Telegraph. Sort of fun to think about, but expanded into a rambling 300+ pages, complete with lots of little “explainer” boxes, and preambles, summing-ups, etc, it’s frankly tedious. I won’t bother to criticise the content, but warn any prospective reader who’s sensitive to the gross oversimplification of vast tracts of history, to the erasure of colonialism and exploitation, the violence visited by the powerful on the weak and the mindless valoration homo economicus, do AVOID.
Couple of areas to think about - provoked by my failed attempt to read this:
Seems like the underlying dynamics of human social change, seen through an economic lens, has something to do with the existence and disposition of a “surplus” within a population/region. Given that co-located production and consumption is by far the most efficient way of spending your time, why, for example, did people (as far back as an archaeological record goes) buy “luxury” goods from other places far away? I’m thinking off the top of my head of the import of Chinese porcelain to England in pre-industrial revolution times - but this kind of activity existed everywhere, and as I understand it, was the principal substance of international trade pre-1500-or-so. How do such surpluses arise, who “owns” (controls) them, and so decides how they’re spent (consumed by having nice tea cups from the other side of the world rather than invested in inventing indoor plumbing)? New technology - the steam engine, etc - increased regional surpluses massively (I think), but the disposition of these surpluses changed (more investment than consumption?) through the 19th century (?)
Why did parts of the non-industrialised world in 1900 miss this “great convergence” - the export of industrialisation to the rest of the world. China in 1820 had 33% of world GDP (2x that of the whole N Atlantic region), was left behind in the industrial revolution, but recently has industrialised on a scale that would have been inconceivable to the original European/American industrialising countries. But not much of the African or S American continent. Why? This book hints that this is the case, but doesn’t ever attempt an explanation.
In works like this, the word “technology” is made synonymous with “knowledge”, “ideas” and “know-how” in a way that I think is importantly wrong and misleading. A key part of the Big Idea here is that there is a “cost of travel of ideas” which has been massively reduced in the 2000’s or so. I get there’s a sense in which he’s got a point, but I think it’s even more important to see that “ideas” have travelled very quickly and with amazing impact for thousands of years. Witness the idea of Christianity from about 300 onwards, the consequent development of the institutions of the Church etc across Europe and Russia. What doesn’t travel so well is production process and actual bits of kit. That’s partly because the physical form of these new and valuable things is easier to control/protect, but also because of IP laws and the cooperation among the powerful Haves of the world to keep these things to themselves.
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