Scan barcode
maxramsay's review against another edition
5.0
An utterly damming verdict on Johnson and this government. Criminal proceedings for mass gross negligence ought to be brought forward.
katyl's review against another edition
5.0
Failures of State is an excellent overview of the failure of our government, & in particular, Johnson, to practise good political leadership during a national crisis. Much of the material was familiar to me as I had read the excellent Sunday Times Insight reports as the pandemic unfolded. But it was good to revisit the astonishing examples of dither & delay in taking appropriate action resulting in some cases from nothing more than apparent laziness, & to see again the repeated denials from the government of their having mishandled a deadly disease.
I recall being confused in late February & early March 2020 about why we weren't taking the virus more seriously, & why we were ignoring the very clear warnings that were coming from Italy (Sky News were very good in reporting this) telling us to be proactive. I recall our being told from the Downing St briefings to maintain a distance of 2m from non-household members while those instructing us were standing probably within a metre of non-household members themselves (& the media reps were seated elbow to elbow with each other), & the boasting of our perennially boastful PM when he described shaking hands with 'everybody' in a hospital with coronavirus patients. These mixed messages suggested that the virus wasn't really happening here at all. Then of course the horror unfolded & it was clear it was real & people were suffering terribly, many denied necessary treatment. And it was affecting already disadvantaged groups disproportionately. (It became even more real when I learned of people I had known who died from it; unforgivably in the second wave when the lessons of the first should have served as a warning to take prompt action.) Failures of State details some of the suffering without overwhelming the reader with it; it is respectful of the stories of those who died & their bereaved relatives & appropriately angry, but is clear-headed enough to maintain its focus on the political decisions made as the context within which these personal disasters happened.
I understand, therefore, why the authors didn't go into detail about the food stock situation, but as someone who intersected with the reality of the virus in the early stages most often in sourcing food, I would have been glad of a close analysis of food supply & consumer behaviour. Instead a reference was made to 'selfish' buyers stockpiling/panic buying, & to the crying, angry nurse who berated people shortly before lockdown for the empty shelves she was faced with. I would like to know to what extent people did stockpile, or panic buy. (I 'remember' at one of the briefings we were told to get in enough stock in case we were laid low by the virus for a couple of weeks, which, of course, if everyone had done as instructed, would have resulted in a spike in demand for supermarket goods. Two other people I know remember the same instruction, but, frustratingly I haven't been able to find it despite googling.) On 23rd March 2020 in the lockdown announcement, Johnson said people should shop as little as possible. Following that instruction would have led to people buying more in the few shopping trips they made, & thus seem to have been - or maybe actually have been - stockpiling. There were various posts on SM of people buying multiple items of basics, such as pasta, but while there was a great deal of anger at the apparent selfishness of people, it wasn't clear to me whether those people were buying for a typical household of say 3 or 4 people, or for, say, a care home whose suppliers had been unable to provide them with their usual groceries. Or a single person buying for several vulnerable relatives. We simply didn't know, but people were pitted against each other for behaviours that weren't explained, rather than against the policy makers who could have prevented a great deal of the problems in supply. Significantly, there was little mention at the time that many people, probably millions, who had bought their midday food - & often evening meals too - at or near their places of work from sandwich bars, cafes, pubs, from the Boots-type meal deal providers etc, suddenly started working from home & thus their food needs were almost all transferred to their local supermarkets. Thus supply chains needed time to adjust. I don't believe it was as simple as 'selfishness', & if anything I saw a great deal of community spirit & voluntary reaching out during that year, with people putting themselves at risk of the virus to help others without remuneration. An acknowledgement of those types of endeavours would have been appropriate, rather than a mention of 'selfish' behaviours as though it were established that that was the accepted interpretation.
I hope this book will be brought up to date - it ends at the beginning of 2021 & there is great deal more mishandling to document - but in the meantime that it will be widely read, & that those people who think Johnson is a top bloke because of his blond mop, dishevelled appearance & apparent bonhomie will take stock. It is clear from this sobering analysis that the experts advising the prime minister were not heeded in time, & that the consequence was the early deaths of tens of thousands of people during his premiership.
I recall being confused in late February & early March 2020 about why we weren't taking the virus more seriously, & why we were ignoring the very clear warnings that were coming from Italy (Sky News were very good in reporting this) telling us to be proactive. I recall our being told from the Downing St briefings to maintain a distance of 2m from non-household members while those instructing us were standing probably within a metre of non-household members themselves (& the media reps were seated elbow to elbow with each other), & the boasting of our perennially boastful PM when he described shaking hands with 'everybody' in a hospital with coronavirus patients. These mixed messages suggested that the virus wasn't really happening here at all. Then of course the horror unfolded & it was clear it was real & people were suffering terribly, many denied necessary treatment. And it was affecting already disadvantaged groups disproportionately. (It became even more real when I learned of people I had known who died from it; unforgivably in the second wave when the lessons of the first should have served as a warning to take prompt action.) Failures of State details some of the suffering without overwhelming the reader with it; it is respectful of the stories of those who died & their bereaved relatives & appropriately angry, but is clear-headed enough to maintain its focus on the political decisions made as the context within which these personal disasters happened.
I understand, therefore, why the authors didn't go into detail about the food stock situation, but as someone who intersected with the reality of the virus in the early stages most often in sourcing food, I would have been glad of a close analysis of food supply & consumer behaviour. Instead a reference was made to 'selfish' buyers stockpiling/panic buying, & to the crying, angry nurse who berated people shortly before lockdown for the empty shelves she was faced with. I would like to know to what extent people did stockpile, or panic buy. (I 'remember' at one of the briefings we were told to get in enough stock in case we were laid low by the virus for a couple of weeks, which, of course, if everyone had done as instructed, would have resulted in a spike in demand for supermarket goods. Two other people I know remember the same instruction, but, frustratingly I haven't been able to find it despite googling.) On 23rd March 2020 in the lockdown announcement, Johnson said people should shop as little as possible. Following that instruction would have led to people buying more in the few shopping trips they made, & thus seem to have been - or maybe actually have been - stockpiling. There were various posts on SM of people buying multiple items of basics, such as pasta, but while there was a great deal of anger at the apparent selfishness of people, it wasn't clear to me whether those people were buying for a typical household of say 3 or 4 people, or for, say, a care home whose suppliers had been unable to provide them with their usual groceries. Or a single person buying for several vulnerable relatives. We simply didn't know, but people were pitted against each other for behaviours that weren't explained, rather than against the policy makers who could have prevented a great deal of the problems in supply. Significantly, there was little mention at the time that many people, probably millions, who had bought their midday food - & often evening meals too - at or near their places of work from sandwich bars, cafes, pubs, from the Boots-type meal deal providers etc, suddenly started working from home & thus their food needs were almost all transferred to their local supermarkets. Thus supply chains needed time to adjust. I don't believe it was as simple as 'selfishness', & if anything I saw a great deal of community spirit & voluntary reaching out during that year, with people putting themselves at risk of the virus to help others without remuneration. An acknowledgement of those types of endeavours would have been appropriate, rather than a mention of 'selfish' behaviours as though it were established that that was the accepted interpretation.
I hope this book will be brought up to date - it ends at the beginning of 2021 & there is great deal more mishandling to document - but in the meantime that it will be widely read, & that those people who think Johnson is a top bloke because of his blond mop, dishevelled appearance & apparent bonhomie will take stock. It is clear from this sobering analysis that the experts advising the prime minister were not heeded in time, & that the consequence was the early deaths of tens of thousands of people during his premiership.
seddso's review against another edition
5.0
Outraged. Sickened. Saddened. Just three words to describe how I’m feel after reading this book. I felt those emotions within the first chapter. There MUST be an enquiry and heads should roll. From the top.
Our mums, dads, sisters , brothers , sons and daughters have been killed needlessly by a disease that could have been contained. Delay and indecision being the main factors, and a Prime Minister wholly unfit for the job.
And don’t even get me started on Dominic Cummings.
So many needless deaths.
Our mums, dads, sisters , brothers , sons and daughters have been killed needlessly by a disease that could have been contained. Delay and indecision being the main factors, and a Prime Minister wholly unfit for the job.
And don’t even get me started on Dominic Cummings.
So many needless deaths.
adriana69's review
challenging
emotional
sad
tense
fast-paced
5.0
Superb journalism. Shocking exposure of the government's dreadful mishandling of the Covid pandemic. Should be read by all. Devastating but needed.
dear_old_world's review against another edition
dark
emotional
informative
reflective
tense
medium-paced
4.0
A brutal and difficult book to get through.
cjmckeon's review against another edition
4.0
A damning indictment of the British government’s handling of the Covid crisis, based on a year of investigative journalism by the Sunday Times.
Nobody reading this can be in any doubt that the government in general and Boris Johnson in particular failed to take the pandemic seriously at the start, failed three times to respond fast enough and brought about many more infections and deaths than might have happened had they actually been “following the science” while simultaneously causing more economic damage than was necessary.
Much of this will be familiar, but in the chaos of the past year some will have been forgotten or missed and it is worth being reminded.
But perhaps the most shocking of this book’s revelations is not that Johnson made the same mistake three times or failed to give the pandemic his full attention, but that the NHS did not cope with the first wave.
Although the figures suggest ICUs were never overrun, the reality is that this was because many elderly patients or those with underlying conditions were denied treatment that could have saved their lives. Doctors were forced to prioritise the younger and fitter in the belief they had a better chance of survival, and when confronted with this the NHS and the government appear to have either lied about it or simply not known what was going on.
There are some gaps in the story. Although the book claims to be about Britain, it is really about England with little focus on the devolved health services in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and what was different (or the same) about their ha doing of the pandemic. There’s also not much about local efforts and the protracted rows over, in particular, the tier system in Manchester.
Nevertheless, it is vital reading and, as the vaccine casts our memories in a more positive light, a necessary reminder of just how badly the government performed over 2020.
Nobody reading this can be in any doubt that the government in general and Boris Johnson in particular failed to take the pandemic seriously at the start, failed three times to respond fast enough and brought about many more infections and deaths than might have happened had they actually been “following the science” while simultaneously causing more economic damage than was necessary.
Much of this will be familiar, but in the chaos of the past year some will have been forgotten or missed and it is worth being reminded.
But perhaps the most shocking of this book’s revelations is not that Johnson made the same mistake three times or failed to give the pandemic his full attention, but that the NHS did not cope with the first wave.
Although the figures suggest ICUs were never overrun, the reality is that this was because many elderly patients or those with underlying conditions were denied treatment that could have saved their lives. Doctors were forced to prioritise the younger and fitter in the belief they had a better chance of survival, and when confronted with this the NHS and the government appear to have either lied about it or simply not known what was going on.
There are some gaps in the story. Although the book claims to be about Britain, it is really about England with little focus on the devolved health services in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and what was different (or the same) about their ha doing of the pandemic. There’s also not much about local efforts and the protracted rows over, in particular, the tier system in Manchester.
Nevertheless, it is vital reading and, as the vaccine casts our memories in a more positive light, a necessary reminder of just how badly the government performed over 2020.