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cronosmu's review against another edition
4.0
Con la muerte del sentido común, que nos fue conferido por la tradición occidental, «ha iniciado el movimiento progresivo e imparable de superficialidad que cubre con un velo de sinsentido todas las esferas de la vida moderna.»
Arendt entiende que el final de la tradición está en el cuestionamiento de su autoridad y es esta crisis la que, en última instancia, ha dado pie al surgimiento del relativismo como piedra de toque de la modernidad: «todo lo que previamente era tenido por cierto asume ahora el aspecto de una perspectiva, frente a la cual debe existir la posibilidad de una multiplicidad de perspectivas igualmente legítimas». Claramente, ya en la década de los cincuenta Arendt no solo anticipaba la dialéctica del posmodernismo sino que la desnudaba por lo que realmente era, una aportación de la visión marxista no tanto a la economía política como a todos los dominios del pensamiento filosófico occidental: «Y es este pensamiento perspectivista el que de hecho el marxismo ha introducido en todos los campos del estudio humanístico».
Pero, contrario a lo que postulan muchos críticos de ese neblinoso y mal entendido término del marxismo cultural, el marxismo es menos la negación de la occidentalidad que un producto inevitable de su sistema de pensamiento, inaugurado este por el platonismo y que con Hegel llegara a la cumbre. Una vez que Marx invierte la dialéctica hegeliana, convencido de que el filósofo ha de representar una fuerza transformadora de la historia y no un mero observador de los fenómenos, el Occidente tradicional entra en crisis sin que por ello su andamiaje se derrumbe del todo: «Lo que ha ocurrido en el pensamiento moderno, a través de Marx por un lado y de Nietzche por otro, es la adopción del marco de la tradición junto con un rechazo simultáneo de autoridad».
Arendt entiende que el final de la tradición está en el cuestionamiento de su autoridad y es esta crisis la que, en última instancia, ha dado pie al surgimiento del relativismo como piedra de toque de la modernidad: «todo lo que previamente era tenido por cierto asume ahora el aspecto de una perspectiva, frente a la cual debe existir la posibilidad de una multiplicidad de perspectivas igualmente legítimas». Claramente, ya en la década de los cincuenta Arendt no solo anticipaba la dialéctica del posmodernismo sino que la desnudaba por lo que realmente era, una aportación de la visión marxista no tanto a la economía política como a todos los dominios del pensamiento filosófico occidental: «Y es este pensamiento perspectivista el que de hecho el marxismo ha introducido en todos los campos del estudio humanístico».
Pero, contrario a lo que postulan muchos críticos de ese neblinoso y mal entendido término del marxismo cultural, el marxismo es menos la negación de la occidentalidad que un producto inevitable de su sistema de pensamiento, inaugurado este por el platonismo y que con Hegel llegara a la cumbre. Una vez que Marx invierte la dialéctica hegeliana, convencido de que el filósofo ha de representar una fuerza transformadora de la historia y no un mero observador de los fenómenos, el Occidente tradicional entra en crisis sin que por ello su andamiaje se derrumbe del todo: «Lo que ha ocurrido en el pensamiento moderno, a través de Marx por un lado y de Nietzche por otro, es la adopción del marco de la tradición junto con un rechazo simultáneo de autoridad».
maryska's review
Granted, I've read only one essay, that is "Socrates" ("Philosophy & Politics"), but there are no doubts Arendt would ever disappoint me. I need to finish the whole book at some point.
lenriquegheredia's review against another edition
3.0
Hannah hace un recorrido histórico de la política desde una perspectiva filosófica en la búsqueda del sentido de la política. Desde la muerte de Sócrates hasta la segunda guerra mundial, la naturaleza humana va cambiando los sistemas de gobierno y las motivaciones sociales dentro de los mismos.
oisin175's review against another edition
3.0
An interesting perspective on the divide between philosophy and politics, as well as on the meaning of politics in general. The language could have been simplified. In certain points the use of compound clauses and lengthy sentences distracted from the main point. Overall, Arendt provides a great idea with a solid explanation that would have been better with added clarity.
epictetsocrate's review against another edition
4.0
Ceea ce Hegel spune despre filosofie în general, anume că „bufniţa Minervei nu-şi începe zborul decât în căderea serii”, este valabil doar pentru filosofia istoriei, adică este adevărat pentru istorie şi corespunde viziunii istoricilor. Hegel a fost, desigur, încurajat să adopte acest punct de vedere ca urmare a încredinţării sale că filosofia a început cu adevărat în Grecia abia cu Platon şi Aristotel, care au scris când polisul şi gloria istoriei greceşti se aflau la sfârşitul lor. Astăzi ştim că Platon şi Aristotel au reprezentat mai degrabă apogeul decât începutul gândirii filosofice greceşti, care şi-a început zborul atunci când Grecia şi-a atins sau aproape şi-a atins punctul culminant. Ceea ce rămâne totuşi valabil este că Platon, ca şi Aristotel au devenit începutul tradiţiei filosofice occidentale şi că acest început, diferit de începutul gândirii filosofice greceşti, a avut loc când viaţa politică din Grecia era, într-adevăr, aproape de sfârşitul său. În întreaga tradiţie a gândirii filosofice şi, în particular, a celei politice, n-a existat, probabil, niciun factor de o asemenea covârşitoare importanţă, şi cu o asemenea influenţă asupra a tot ce avea să urmeze, precum faptul că Platon şi Aristotel au scris în secolul al IV-lea, sub impactul unei societăţi aflate în plină decădere politică.
dngoldman's review against another edition
3.0
The Promise of Politics
This is two part series of essays - with a related theme. How philosophy became became a bystander in politics and how the western tradition valued thought over action. I found the first part of a fascinating take on the greek tradition. The second part, which attempts to build a case for action in philosophy was honestly beyond me. While I found some interesting points, I really could not follow the argument.
* Socrates. Arendt focuses the initial chapter on Socrates to explain how philosophy became divorced from politics and how Plato came to contract his politics with the polis (democracy).
* Socrates refused to engage in persuasion (mass public dialogue) vs dialect which is one on one. Socrates wanted each person to come to his how sense of being (Doxa) and used personal dialectic to ensure that their own doxa is the truth. When the public turned on this approach, as indicated in Socrates arrest and execution, Socrates refused to flee (like Aristotle later) but submitted to pubic will. Thus, Socrates is the model of a democratic philosophy of the polis. And Socrates defended this to the death.
* Plato draws the opposite conclusion. Recognizing that truth cannot be obtained by the polis (as it will always change), Plato requires the philosopher king to promote unchanging truth - the idea of good” vs human needs. But the philosopher king is not looking for the common good as meeting tangible good but the pure unchanging good.
* Plato - persuasion is the art of forcing your views on others. It’s not the opposite of violence but another form of it.
* Aristotle - society is not a community of equals. It is community that comes into being by allowing people to be equal in exchanges with others.
* Socrates- when men act they must live with person they are and impact they have with others. Thus, all men must not be conflict with themselves. His role was not to rule but “art of midwifery: he wanted to help others give birth what they themselves thought .. their true selves.” 15
* The cave. Arendt focuses on the political implications of this allegory. Humans chained only see the shadows are the every day human, trapped by their limited knowledge. The philosopher is in a state of wonder - an inarticulate yearning for the roots of where the world comes from (science). Then he turns to see the true forms. When the philosopher goes back, he is met with skepticism. This tragic results requires the philosopher to either remove himself from politics or to rule in accordance with the true forms not human desires.
* Arendt v Popper. Arendt sees this beginning as philosophy retreat from politics; Popper sees the same tradition as setting the foundation for totalitarianism. I think Arendt’s reading would support Popper’s conclusion. She hints at this but doesn’t emphasize it.
The tradition of political thought.
* Traces how the tradition of withdrawal of philosophy from politics from greeks, romans and middle ages
* Roman rules trinity “religion, authority, tradition” (e.g. foundation)
* End of history. Marx ends the political tradition of thought/philosophy being a private matter. Action became the the legitimate end of thought
* Marx no state power can be legitimate. Only a proxy of rulers. Only when there no rulers (proletariat state)
This is two part series of essays - with a related theme. How philosophy became became a bystander in politics and how the western tradition valued thought over action. I found the first part of a fascinating take on the greek tradition. The second part, which attempts to build a case for action in philosophy was honestly beyond me. While I found some interesting points, I really could not follow the argument.
* Socrates. Arendt focuses the initial chapter on Socrates to explain how philosophy became divorced from politics and how Plato came to contract his politics with the polis (democracy).
* Socrates refused to engage in persuasion (mass public dialogue) vs dialect which is one on one. Socrates wanted each person to come to his how sense of being (Doxa) and used personal dialectic to ensure that their own doxa is the truth. When the public turned on this approach, as indicated in Socrates arrest and execution, Socrates refused to flee (like Aristotle later) but submitted to pubic will. Thus, Socrates is the model of a democratic philosophy of the polis. And Socrates defended this to the death.
* Plato draws the opposite conclusion. Recognizing that truth cannot be obtained by the polis (as it will always change), Plato requires the philosopher king to promote unchanging truth - the idea of good” vs human needs. But the philosopher king is not looking for the common good as meeting tangible good but the pure unchanging good.
* Plato - persuasion is the art of forcing your views on others. It’s not the opposite of violence but another form of it.
* Aristotle - society is not a community of equals. It is community that comes into being by allowing people to be equal in exchanges with others.
* Socrates- when men act they must live with person they are and impact they have with others. Thus, all men must not be conflict with themselves. His role was not to rule but “art of midwifery: he wanted to help others give birth what they themselves thought .. their true selves.” 15
* The cave. Arendt focuses on the political implications of this allegory. Humans chained only see the shadows are the every day human, trapped by their limited knowledge. The philosopher is in a state of wonder - an inarticulate yearning for the roots of where the world comes from (science). Then he turns to see the true forms. When the philosopher goes back, he is met with skepticism. This tragic results requires the philosopher to either remove himself from politics or to rule in accordance with the true forms not human desires.
* Arendt v Popper. Arendt sees this beginning as philosophy retreat from politics; Popper sees the same tradition as setting the foundation for totalitarianism. I think Arendt’s reading would support Popper’s conclusion. She hints at this but doesn’t emphasize it.
The tradition of political thought.
* Traces how the tradition of withdrawal of philosophy from politics from greeks, romans and middle ages
* Roman rules trinity “religion, authority, tradition” (e.g. foundation)
* End of history. Marx ends the political tradition of thought/philosophy being a private matter. Action became the the legitimate end of thought
* Marx no state power can be legitimate. Only a proxy of rulers. Only when there no rulers (proletariat state)
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