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3.75 AVERAGE
3.75 AVERAGE
This is a fascinating and eye-opening account of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan and America’s response to it. It purportedly, and convincingly, claims to correct many myths about the events. Perhaps most relevant to today is the fact that, contrary to popular wisdom, the US and CIA did not create the conditions for the rise of Al Qaeda. The author argues that the Mujahedin had already set about fighting the communist Afghans and the Soviets; the Pakistani government was already focused on running things and the Saudis were already financing the efforts before the CIA got involved. Islamist and jihadist ideology were already driving the key players and Arab volunteers were already flooding in to fight. The author also establishes Carter’s pivotal role in the US response well before Reagan and Charlie Wilson got involved.
I received this book as part of Good Reads First Reads giveaway.
What We Won is the story of the United States' involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war from 1979-1989. The book is divided into part 1, part 2 and an epilogue discussing lessons learned and the impact of the war. Part 1 goes over the participants such as the Afghans (communists and mujahedin), the Soviets, the Pakistanis and the Saudi's. Part 2 discusses the actual US involvement over the course of the war.
I think the reason so many people find history boring is because it's often presented as, "And then the Americans signed the Declaration of Independence. And then the British attacked Lexington and Concord . . . and then Barack Obama was elected president. This will be on the test." I know I skipped over some stuff but I fell asleep in class around Paul Revere and when I woke up Obama was president. On the other hand, Bruce Riedel presents the context and background of the Afghan war and answers questions like why did the Soviets invade and what were they trying to accomplish? Why did the Pakistanis flip out and what were they concerned about in the bigger scheme? why did the United States get involved?
Ultimately, Mr Reidel presents a coherent narrative about what happened, who did what and why they did it (noting speculation where appropriate). The book focuses on very high level strategy. So decisions at the level of the American or Pakistani presidents, the Soviet premier, etc. I would've liked to see more talk about the situation on the ground (how did the mujahedin actually live and fight?) but that was explicitly outside this book's scope. It's not to the book's detriment at all, I simply came at this expecting more of an on the ground viewpoint.
I'd recommend this book to anyone interested in history, especially the history of the late Cold War. I'd also recommend this book to anyone not interested but open minded enough to try. The story is certainly engrossing enough to get you interested.
What We Won is the story of the United States' involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war from 1979-1989. The book is divided into part 1, part 2 and an epilogue discussing lessons learned and the impact of the war. Part 1 goes over the participants such as the Afghans (communists and mujahedin), the Soviets, the Pakistanis and the Saudi's. Part 2 discusses the actual US involvement over the course of the war.
I think the reason so many people find history boring is because it's often presented as, "And then the Americans signed the Declaration of Independence. And then the British attacked Lexington and Concord . . . and then Barack Obama was elected president. This will be on the test." I know I skipped over some stuff but I fell asleep in class around Paul Revere and when I woke up Obama was president. On the other hand, Bruce Riedel presents the context and background of the Afghan war and answers questions like why did the Soviets invade and what were they trying to accomplish? Why did the Pakistanis flip out and what were they concerned about in the bigger scheme? why did the United States get involved?
Ultimately, Mr Reidel presents a coherent narrative about what happened, who did what and why they did it (noting speculation where appropriate). The book focuses on very high level strategy. So decisions at the level of the American or Pakistani presidents, the Soviet premier, etc. I would've liked to see more talk about the situation on the ground (how did the mujahedin actually live and fight?) but that was explicitly outside this book's scope. It's not to the book's detriment at all, I simply came at this expecting more of an on the ground viewpoint.
I'd recommend this book to anyone interested in history, especially the history of the late Cold War. I'd also recommend this book to anyone not interested but open minded enough to try. The story is certainly engrossing enough to get you interested.
"What We Won" is clear and concise. I appreciate Riedel's disclosure of his professional connections and the experience he brings to documenting the war and America's involvement. This is a great primer to further study of US involvement in the region.
Disclaimer: I received this book as a Goodreads giveaway on the premise that I would review it.
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) was a turning point in history. It was often called the “Russian Vietnam” as the Soviet troops found themselves mired in battle with an enemy that had little structure, struck without warning and enjoyed strong local support. The war drained men and material with little to show for it, and displeasure with the conflict helped bring about changes in the Soviet government that led to the end of the U.S.S.R.
The United States government, working through the CIA, primarily influenced the war by partnering with the Pakistani government to funnel arms and intelligence to the mujahedin who were fighting to free their country from Communism. The author, a former CIA agent, explains who the major players in the war were, what they hoped to accomplish and the outcomes. He shows why this operation worked so well, in contrast to other covert operations such as the infamously botched Iran-Contra deal. In addition, there is some compare and contrast of the Soviet invasion and the current Afghanistan conflict.
There are holes in the story, of course. Several key figures died even before the end of the war, and many others never wrote down their stories. Much of the details of covert actions are still classified by the various governments, and thus off-limits for public consumption. But the author has managed to get quite a bit of new information, including access to Jimmy Carter’s diary of the time. (Since President Carter wrote his memoir while the U.S. aid to the mujahedin was still a secret, his part in setting it up wasn’t in there.)
It begins with a brief history lesson on the many previous foreign invasions of Afghanistan, primarily by the British. Then there’s an examination of the Communist government of Afghanistan, which was fatally divided against itself from the beginning. It introduced much-needed reforms, but, well, Communists, which didn’t sit well with the large groups of strongly religious citizens. When the Communists proved unable to keep from killing each other, let alone control the insurgencies, the Soviets decided to roll in with their tanks, thinking it would be just like Hungary or Czechoslovakia. It wasn’t.
In addition to starting a land war in Asia, the Soviets had three leaders in a row whose health was failing, and a developing problem in Poland that kept them from moving sufficient troops and weapons down into Afghanistan. In addition, it was the first time the U.S.S.R.’s troops had seen serious combat in decades, and they just weren’t up to speed.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani government was rightfully concerned that if the Soviets took over Afghanistan, they might well be next. Especially if Russia could talk their other hostile neighbor India into helping. So they were all too ready to arm the freedom fighters, directly delivering the aid and training provided by funds from America and Saudi Arabia. However, they had very strong ideas about what kind of mujahedin they wanted to support, and their favoritism helped sow the seeds of discord after the war.
Which leads us to the Arab volunteers who came to Afghanistan to fight alongside their Muslim brothers in a jihad against the foreign and officially atheist invaders. At the time, they were only interested in throwing out people who had come uninvited and unwanted. Even Osama bin Laden almost certainly had no clue that in twenty years’ time he’d come to think that crashing airplanes into civilians was a good idea. It’s emphasized that the Arab volunteers had no direct contact with the CIA or other American forces.
The closing section looks at why this particular operation was so successful for the U.S., what happened to the people of Afghanistan after the world turned its eyes away. and how we ended up in the Afghanistan mess we have today.
There are no maps or illustrations, but there are extensive endnotes and an index. The writing is a bit dry but informative, and the writer’s biases don’t get in the way. Recommended for those who wonder what’s up with Afghanistan, and fans of the movie Charlie Wilson’s War
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan (1979-1989) was a turning point in history. It was often called the “Russian Vietnam” as the Soviet troops found themselves mired in battle with an enemy that had little structure, struck without warning and enjoyed strong local support. The war drained men and material with little to show for it, and displeasure with the conflict helped bring about changes in the Soviet government that led to the end of the U.S.S.R.
The United States government, working through the CIA, primarily influenced the war by partnering with the Pakistani government to funnel arms and intelligence to the mujahedin who were fighting to free their country from Communism. The author, a former CIA agent, explains who the major players in the war were, what they hoped to accomplish and the outcomes. He shows why this operation worked so well, in contrast to other covert operations such as the infamously botched Iran-Contra deal. In addition, there is some compare and contrast of the Soviet invasion and the current Afghanistan conflict.
There are holes in the story, of course. Several key figures died even before the end of the war, and many others never wrote down their stories. Much of the details of covert actions are still classified by the various governments, and thus off-limits for public consumption. But the author has managed to get quite a bit of new information, including access to Jimmy Carter’s diary of the time. (Since President Carter wrote his memoir while the U.S. aid to the mujahedin was still a secret, his part in setting it up wasn’t in there.)
It begins with a brief history lesson on the many previous foreign invasions of Afghanistan, primarily by the British. Then there’s an examination of the Communist government of Afghanistan, which was fatally divided against itself from the beginning. It introduced much-needed reforms, but, well, Communists, which didn’t sit well with the large groups of strongly religious citizens. When the Communists proved unable to keep from killing each other, let alone control the insurgencies, the Soviets decided to roll in with their tanks, thinking it would be just like Hungary or Czechoslovakia. It wasn’t.
In addition to starting a land war in Asia, the Soviets had three leaders in a row whose health was failing, and a developing problem in Poland that kept them from moving sufficient troops and weapons down into Afghanistan. In addition, it was the first time the U.S.S.R.’s troops had seen serious combat in decades, and they just weren’t up to speed.
Meanwhile, the Pakistani government was rightfully concerned that if the Soviets took over Afghanistan, they might well be next. Especially if Russia could talk their other hostile neighbor India into helping. So they were all too ready to arm the freedom fighters, directly delivering the aid and training provided by funds from America and Saudi Arabia. However, they had very strong ideas about what kind of mujahedin they wanted to support, and their favoritism helped sow the seeds of discord after the war.
Which leads us to the Arab volunteers who came to Afghanistan to fight alongside their Muslim brothers in a jihad against the foreign and officially atheist invaders. At the time, they were only interested in throwing out people who had come uninvited and unwanted. Even Osama bin Laden almost certainly had no clue that in twenty years’ time he’d come to think that crashing airplanes into civilians was a good idea. It’s emphasized that the Arab volunteers had no direct contact with the CIA or other American forces.
The closing section looks at why this particular operation was so successful for the U.S., what happened to the people of Afghanistan after the world turned its eyes away. and how we ended up in the Afghanistan mess we have today.
There are no maps or illustrations, but there are extensive endnotes and an index. The writing is a bit dry but informative, and the writer’s biases don’t get in the way. Recommended for those who wonder what’s up with Afghanistan, and fans of the movie Charlie Wilson’s War