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oneeasyreader's review against another edition
5.0
In theory, the mix was to ‘stiffen’ Indian troops, but in practice the latter often out-performed their European colleagues — in fitness and in valour.
Monte Cassino: Ten Armies in Hell (I never actually counted to check there were ten) is an excellent overview of the difficulties of coalition warfare. Nine of those armies were on the Allied side, making for a potentially muddled narrative if mishandled. Caddick-Adams keeps everything in a clear sequence of events (allowing him to split by nationality), and combines the distinctiveness of each nationality with an overview of how they (with difficulty) worked together.
The below covers some general points that reflects Caddick-Adams’ strengths.
Integration
In terms of their ability to haul everything from food, water and medicine to ammunition, batteries and weapons up — and the dead and wounded down — the phrase ‘stubborn as a mule’ acquired a new, comforting meaning.
I have complimented Caddick-Adams’ humanity in his story telling before and, while it is present here, this book is more of a protean version of it, as the book is mainly focused on the combatants and the operational/tactical dispositions. It’s not an outright criticism, more that Monte Cassino is an earlier stage of Caddick-Adams’ development as a writer. There is still plenty there and he is better at integrating eye-witness accounts than normal World War Two writing– it feels less like a box to be ticked to add validity to the narrative.
Caddick-Adams devotes a significant section to mules. Nothing particularly special there, in that adding colour is pretty common in World War II books. Where Caddick-Adams goes further is that he links into the logistical snarl ups the Allies face. Roads are limited and determine the offensive direction. Access to mules impacts the offensives at Monte Cassino. Logistical issues (along with poor planning) prevent the Allies from fully exploiting their advance up the Liri valley. The sidebars fit smoothly into the theme rather than just slice of life pieces that, while good to know in terms of immersion, do not drive the main story. Caddick-Adams did a similar thing with the Red Ball Express and the Ardennes offensive – he knows how logistics works beyond a remarkable story or two.
Immersion
No other campaign in Europe pulled in the same range of nationalities and cultures as that in Italy. The brutality and nature of the fighting at times reached the worst extremes of the Russian front, while the attrition rates often exceeded those of the Western Front.
I have read some criticisms about accuracy on certain technical aspects, though I do not consider such criticisms unusual of any book. I would say (a), I would probably need to see citations on that before I lend credence to them and (b):
I think that misses the forest for the trees.
The Allies had to cross rivers. They had to climb mountains. They had to do it against heavily engineered defences. They had to do it in winter. They had to compete with the demands of not only the upcoming Normandy landings, but the pending invasion of Southern France. Oh, and they had a coalition of forces that agreed with the end goal but not much else. All those elements are conveyed by Caddick-Adams in a way that is organic to the narrative. That is not to be underestimated for, compared to Divided on D-Day (for example), when Caddick-Adams credits or criticises command decisions, they fit better within the context of the story. You get a better impression of what may have been achievable.
With the failure of his division’s attempt to cross the river, and ease the forthcoming attack of the Texans, Hawkesworth at least had the decency to go over to 36th Division’s HQ and apologise in person for the failure, offering to provide one of his battalions to support the Texans’ attack. Their commander was unmoved: The British are the world’s greatest diplomats, he wrote in his diary; ‘but you can’t count on them for anything but words.'
The Allies “win” at Monte Cassino in an incomplete way that allows us to draw lessons from it. Whether coalition warfare on this scale will ever happen again is unknown, but Monte Cassino provides a few pointers.
Monte Cassino: Ten Armies in Hell (I never actually counted to check there were ten) is an excellent overview of the difficulties of coalition warfare. Nine of those armies were on the Allied side, making for a potentially muddled narrative if mishandled. Caddick-Adams keeps everything in a clear sequence of events (allowing him to split by nationality), and combines the distinctiveness of each nationality with an overview of how they (with difficulty) worked together.
The below covers some general points that reflects Caddick-Adams’ strengths.
Integration
In terms of their ability to haul everything from food, water and medicine to ammunition, batteries and weapons up — and the dead and wounded down — the phrase ‘stubborn as a mule’ acquired a new, comforting meaning.
I have complimented Caddick-Adams’ humanity in his story telling before and, while it is present here, this book is more of a protean version of it, as the book is mainly focused on the combatants and the operational/tactical dispositions. It’s not an outright criticism, more that Monte Cassino is an earlier stage of Caddick-Adams’ development as a writer. There is still plenty there and he is better at integrating eye-witness accounts than normal World War Two writing– it feels less like a box to be ticked to add validity to the narrative.
Caddick-Adams devotes a significant section to mules. Nothing particularly special there, in that adding colour is pretty common in World War II books. Where Caddick-Adams goes further is that he links into the logistical snarl ups the Allies face. Roads are limited and determine the offensive direction. Access to mules impacts the offensives at Monte Cassino. Logistical issues (along with poor planning) prevent the Allies from fully exploiting their advance up the Liri valley. The sidebars fit smoothly into the theme rather than just slice of life pieces that, while good to know in terms of immersion, do not drive the main story. Caddick-Adams did a similar thing with the Red Ball Express and the Ardennes offensive – he knows how logistics works beyond a remarkable story or two.
Immersion
No other campaign in Europe pulled in the same range of nationalities and cultures as that in Italy. The brutality and nature of the fighting at times reached the worst extremes of the Russian front, while the attrition rates often exceeded those of the Western Front.
I have read some criticisms about accuracy on certain technical aspects, though I do not consider such criticisms unusual of any book. I would say (a), I would probably need to see citations on that before I lend credence to them and (b):
I think that misses the forest for the trees.
The Allies had to cross rivers. They had to climb mountains. They had to do it against heavily engineered defences. They had to do it in winter. They had to compete with the demands of not only the upcoming Normandy landings, but the pending invasion of Southern France. Oh, and they had a coalition of forces that agreed with the end goal but not much else. All those elements are conveyed by Caddick-Adams in a way that is organic to the narrative. That is not to be underestimated for, compared to Divided on D-Day (for example), when Caddick-Adams credits or criticises command decisions, they fit better within the context of the story. You get a better impression of what may have been achievable.
With the failure of his division’s attempt to cross the river, and ease the forthcoming attack of the Texans, Hawkesworth at least had the decency to go over to 36th Division’s HQ and apologise in person for the failure, offering to provide one of his battalions to support the Texans’ attack. Their commander was unmoved: The British are the world’s greatest diplomats, he wrote in his diary; ‘but you can’t count on them for anything but words.'
The Allies “win” at Monte Cassino in an incomplete way that allows us to draw lessons from it. Whether coalition warfare on this scale will ever happen again is unknown, but Monte Cassino provides a few pointers.