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danielad's review against another edition
4.0
Unlike Specters of Marx and Politics of Friendship, I read Rogues closely . . . . The book contains two sections. The first, longer section, deals with democracy-to-come, moving through such quasi-concepts as sovereignty, rogue states, freedom, auto-immunity, and fraternity. The second begins with a discussion of Husserl's Crisis and ends with a, somewhat repetitive, analysis of sovereignty. In the second essay, Derrida makes a distinction between what is rational and what is reasonable. Whereas the former has to do with calculative justice, the latter has to do with the justice of calculative justice.
One question: why ought we do pursue democracy-to-come? throughout Rogues and other writings/interviews, Derrida insists that we are obligated to pursue justice and democracy. Though 'the pursuit of democracy' may be a quasi-ontological feature, this still puts no obligation on us. If we ought to pursue justice (quasi-ontically) because we are already pursuing justice (quasi-ontologically) we need to see why what is already the case (quasi-ontological) ought to be pursued (quasi-ontically). This, I believe, is a weakness in Derrida's thought, as well as in the thought of many other ethical thinkers.
The ontological makes no demands on what we do ontically . . . .
One question: why ought we do pursue democracy-to-come? throughout Rogues and other writings/interviews, Derrida insists that we are obligated to pursue justice and democracy. Though 'the pursuit of democracy' may be a quasi-ontological feature, this still puts no obligation on us. If we ought to pursue justice (quasi-ontically) because we are already pursuing justice (quasi-ontologically) we need to see why what is already the case (quasi-ontological) ought to be pursued (quasi-ontically). This, I believe, is a weakness in Derrida's thought, as well as in the thought of many other ethical thinkers.
The ontological makes no demands on what we do ontically . . . .
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