Scan barcode
aerithb's review against another edition
challenging
slow-paced
2.25
This was my first Freud book and I really didn’t enjoy it. I found his writing style to be overly complicated like he was trying to sound intelligent and complex. It made this 75 page book feel like 300 pages. I also didn’t enjoy the content itself. Everyone he discusses in this book is not revolutionary. It’s really just an extremely boring book about the most basic opinions on religion.
zachbrumaire's review against another edition
2.0
At times interesting, but not the best articulation of Freud's methodology, leaving much to be interested from the reader--which works alright for the psychoanalytic elements of the book, but deeply suffers in it's historiography and sociology.
Note: An interesting example of how close Freud (unwittingly) comes to embracing certain Marxian frameworks.
Note: An interesting example of how close Freud (unwittingly) comes to embracing certain Marxian frameworks.
izarravarela's review against another edition
4.0
As an exhaustive discussion of the limits of this book are beyond the scope of this review, I will focus broadly on three categories: (1) Freud’s subjectivity and cognitive dissonance with respect to his own beliefs; (2) post hoc fallacies evident throughout the work; and (3) the presumption that a future without religion would give rise to greater rationality in general. Ready? Here we go.
1. Subjectivity and cognitive dissonance
It would be hard not to notice a strange dissonance that threads its way through Freud’s arguments: religion hedges itself against intellectual scrutiny in the same way that Freud stands firm against scientific critique of his own dogmatic convictions. Freud’s theories are practically impossible to test empirically, and thus violate an important underlying assumption put forth in Future: the notion that absurd beliefs should be challenged and expunged. Freud believed strongly in some absurd, unprovable ideas—the Oedipus complex being but one example—while railing against belief in other absurdities. Religion defends itself against scientific inquiry via “credo quia absurdum”—“I believe because it is absurd”—and cannot be accepted on the basis of rationality. Freud’s theories may sound less absurd than, for instance, the immaculate conception or the resurrection of Christ; for the purposes of scientific inquiry, however, they are identically untestable.
It has been argued that psychoanalysis is too crude a tool to explain the “higher” cultural functions of our species; as such, psychoanalysis is rightly viewed as a ineffectual means of such enquiry. Religion is necessarily subjective; no two people’s psychological motivations are exactly identical. (This is perhaps akin to Jung’s model of archetypes versus complexes; Freud sees all religion as operating from the same basic archetype—the Father—while ignoring the diversity of psychological motives that give rise to purported belief.) Friedman explains it thusly: “Freud’s understanding of religion’s defense of itself is revealing. It reveals, I think, how little he knew about religion and how unwilling he was to deal with it on its own terms. Perhaps,” Friedman continues, “Freud fails to consider the notion that religion arose from a perspective that is inherently different form modern science, and which thus requires a different system of interpretation”. Kronmeyer echoes this thought: “By suggesting a scientific critique of religious belief is appropriate, Freud…(implies) a religious critique of science also might be appropriate, when fundamentally they are two different realms of discourse”.
Intellectual distinctions are not limited to science and religion, however; every religion is also distinctly different from other religions. Freud’s use of “religion” as a catch-all for all modes of faith lumps religions without archetypical father figures—notably Hinduism—into a strictly monotheistic ones. Freud’s broader critiques still apply, as Hinduism centers around karmic reward—but the notion of a single, omnipotent father figure is inapplicable. Similarly, one struggles to reconcile the image of the Oedipal father with religions like Unitarianism or Buddhism, which center around principles of personal understanding and acceptance. Perhaps Freud meant to limit his critique to the Abrahamic religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam; it is possible that his biased worldview (recall that he treated Jewish clients, predominantly) led to this over-extrapolation.
2. Post hoc fallacies
In Future, as in his other works, Freud reveals himself to be a master of the post hoc fallacy. His ideas about human religion—to say nothing of his understanding of human sexuality—operate self-referentially: “It is because you have Oedipal issues that you struggle maintaining a healthy relationship with your father”; conversely: “It is because of your resolved Oedipal issues that you have a healthy relationship with your father.” Freudian tautologies abound in Future, as well: if one ascribes to a religious belief, for instance, then one must have infantile yearnings to preserve a sense of security and social belonging. (And what if one does not ascribe to belief, one wonders? Then one does not require security and social belonging?) Freud tacitly asserts that, because religion was borne of humans’ most infantile cravings—security, consolation, a general sense of moral order—these must be the only reasons for religion. This does not “explain” religion any more than any statement of infantile need—for example, “babies need milk”—explains the appeal of milk that extends beyond infancy. The universal truth of the infant’s relationship with milk cannot fully explain what “milk” is, the nature of that relationship, or (—an apt analogy, indeed—) why adults still drink it by the quart.
Another post hoc fallacy further corrodes Freud’s thesis: religion is founded on irrational beliefs; thus, ipso facto, it is irrational to hold religious beliefs. His conclusion may not be false, but his deductive process fails this simple logical test. Another example will illustrate this point: Christopher Columbus died believing he had discovered a new trade route to India. His presumption was wrong, of course, but his discovery was, nonetheless, massively important in its own right. (In a similar vein: “religious geniuses have often shown symptoms of nervous instability” [James 29], but this instability does not, of course, discredit their genius.) The objective “truth” of religious belief is dubious at best—but there may yet be inherent value to religious belief.
3. False dichotomy
Freud embeds a false presumption within his prescription for a faithless future: the notion that the absence of religion would necessarily create a world of rational thinkers. As if civilization’s other supporting pillars—politics, government bureaucracy, professional sports, social psychology—are bastions of rational behavior! No where in the annals of human history is this notion supported. Freud’s own work on the human psyche—which renders us unchangably irrational (Hjelle and Ziegler)—would likewise seem to be at odds with his objective; as mentioned in this paper’s introduction, Freud held a famously unflattering view of human beings. The mere absence of religion would not change our most basic human nature; we would remain just as hostile and antisocial as ever before, and every bit as neurotic—just with one fewer outlet for that neuroticism.
The premise that early civilization was ushered in through mass coercion implies that our ancestors were somehow incapable of following the social order found among all other social species. This is a baseless premise, as it presumes that our venerable, god-fearing ancestors—among them Copernicus, Bacon, Keppler, Descartes, and so on—were cognitively deficient. This strikes me as reductive, considering all the phenomenal advancements made not just by religious philosophers, but also within highly faith-based cultures (notably amongst the ancient Greeks, Romans and Egyptians). This creates a false dichotomy between our “ignorant” ancestors and their rational, futuristic, atheistic counterparts. This also would seem to ignore the irrational behavior evident in most “modern” societies, including our own. Hong Kong is among the most atheistic cities in the world, and yet we still observe rash, erratic, illogical behavior. Observe: a shopaholic in the IFC mall; a banker on a drinking bender; any student putting off a term assignment until the evening before it is due. Would that atheism could save us from our human foibles! Unfortunately for us, embracing rationality is not as simple as renouncing faith.
1. Subjectivity and cognitive dissonance
It would be hard not to notice a strange dissonance that threads its way through Freud’s arguments: religion hedges itself against intellectual scrutiny in the same way that Freud stands firm against scientific critique of his own dogmatic convictions. Freud’s theories are practically impossible to test empirically, and thus violate an important underlying assumption put forth in Future: the notion that absurd beliefs should be challenged and expunged. Freud believed strongly in some absurd, unprovable ideas—the Oedipus complex being but one example—while railing against belief in other absurdities. Religion defends itself against scientific inquiry via “credo quia absurdum”—“I believe because it is absurd”—and cannot be accepted on the basis of rationality. Freud’s theories may sound less absurd than, for instance, the immaculate conception or the resurrection of Christ; for the purposes of scientific inquiry, however, they are identically untestable.
It has been argued that psychoanalysis is too crude a tool to explain the “higher” cultural functions of our species; as such, psychoanalysis is rightly viewed as a ineffectual means of such enquiry. Religion is necessarily subjective; no two people’s psychological motivations are exactly identical. (This is perhaps akin to Jung’s model of archetypes versus complexes; Freud sees all religion as operating from the same basic archetype—the Father—while ignoring the diversity of psychological motives that give rise to purported belief.) Friedman explains it thusly: “Freud’s understanding of religion’s defense of itself is revealing. It reveals, I think, how little he knew about religion and how unwilling he was to deal with it on its own terms. Perhaps,” Friedman continues, “Freud fails to consider the notion that religion arose from a perspective that is inherently different form modern science, and which thus requires a different system of interpretation”. Kronmeyer echoes this thought: “By suggesting a scientific critique of religious belief is appropriate, Freud…(implies) a religious critique of science also might be appropriate, when fundamentally they are two different realms of discourse”.
Intellectual distinctions are not limited to science and religion, however; every religion is also distinctly different from other religions. Freud’s use of “religion” as a catch-all for all modes of faith lumps religions without archetypical father figures—notably Hinduism—into a strictly monotheistic ones. Freud’s broader critiques still apply, as Hinduism centers around karmic reward—but the notion of a single, omnipotent father figure is inapplicable. Similarly, one struggles to reconcile the image of the Oedipal father with religions like Unitarianism or Buddhism, which center around principles of personal understanding and acceptance. Perhaps Freud meant to limit his critique to the Abrahamic religions of Christianity, Judaism and Islam; it is possible that his biased worldview (recall that he treated Jewish clients, predominantly) led to this over-extrapolation.
2. Post hoc fallacies
In Future, as in his other works, Freud reveals himself to be a master of the post hoc fallacy. His ideas about human religion—to say nothing of his understanding of human sexuality—operate self-referentially: “It is because you have Oedipal issues that you struggle maintaining a healthy relationship with your father”; conversely: “It is because of your resolved Oedipal issues that you have a healthy relationship with your father.” Freudian tautologies abound in Future, as well: if one ascribes to a religious belief, for instance, then one must have infantile yearnings to preserve a sense of security and social belonging. (And what if one does not ascribe to belief, one wonders? Then one does not require security and social belonging?) Freud tacitly asserts that, because religion was borne of humans’ most infantile cravings—security, consolation, a general sense of moral order—these must be the only reasons for religion. This does not “explain” religion any more than any statement of infantile need—for example, “babies need milk”—explains the appeal of milk that extends beyond infancy. The universal truth of the infant’s relationship with milk cannot fully explain what “milk” is, the nature of that relationship, or (—an apt analogy, indeed—) why adults still drink it by the quart.
Another post hoc fallacy further corrodes Freud’s thesis: religion is founded on irrational beliefs; thus, ipso facto, it is irrational to hold religious beliefs. His conclusion may not be false, but his deductive process fails this simple logical test. Another example will illustrate this point: Christopher Columbus died believing he had discovered a new trade route to India. His presumption was wrong, of course, but his discovery was, nonetheless, massively important in its own right. (In a similar vein: “religious geniuses have often shown symptoms of nervous instability” [James 29], but this instability does not, of course, discredit their genius.) The objective “truth” of religious belief is dubious at best—but there may yet be inherent value to religious belief.
3. False dichotomy
Freud embeds a false presumption within his prescription for a faithless future: the notion that the absence of religion would necessarily create a world of rational thinkers. As if civilization’s other supporting pillars—politics, government bureaucracy, professional sports, social psychology—are bastions of rational behavior! No where in the annals of human history is this notion supported. Freud’s own work on the human psyche—which renders us unchangably irrational (Hjelle and Ziegler)—would likewise seem to be at odds with his objective; as mentioned in this paper’s introduction, Freud held a famously unflattering view of human beings. The mere absence of religion would not change our most basic human nature; we would remain just as hostile and antisocial as ever before, and every bit as neurotic—just with one fewer outlet for that neuroticism.
The premise that early civilization was ushered in through mass coercion implies that our ancestors were somehow incapable of following the social order found among all other social species. This is a baseless premise, as it presumes that our venerable, god-fearing ancestors—among them Copernicus, Bacon, Keppler, Descartes, and so on—were cognitively deficient. This strikes me as reductive, considering all the phenomenal advancements made not just by religious philosophers, but also within highly faith-based cultures (notably amongst the ancient Greeks, Romans and Egyptians). This creates a false dichotomy between our “ignorant” ancestors and their rational, futuristic, atheistic counterparts. This also would seem to ignore the irrational behavior evident in most “modern” societies, including our own. Hong Kong is among the most atheistic cities in the world, and yet we still observe rash, erratic, illogical behavior. Observe: a shopaholic in the IFC mall; a banker on a drinking bender; any student putting off a term assignment until the evening before it is due. Would that atheism could save us from our human foibles! Unfortunately for us, embracing rationality is not as simple as renouncing faith.
adammtucker's review against another edition
3.0
"No, science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere." This line in Sigmund Freud's The Future of an Illusion is perhaps the best in the entire short book. It is also the last.
This book is a fairly usual atheist treatise concerning the roles of religion and science in the educated person's life, with perhaps the noted inclusion of some support of religion - that ridding society of religion would cause chaos within the strata of the less-educated population.
A must-read for all educated readers, but perhaps less informative than I was hoping for.
This book is a fairly usual atheist treatise concerning the roles of religion and science in the educated person's life, with perhaps the noted inclusion of some support of religion - that ridding society of religion would cause chaos within the strata of the less-educated population.
A must-read for all educated readers, but perhaps less informative than I was hoping for.
jcovey's review against another edition
5.0
My first time reading Freud, I bought this copy from a library sale and found probably three quarters was either highlighted or underlined. Before reading I assumed the previous owner had some sort of obsessive annotation compulsion, but it turns out the text really is that dense, Freud's mind really was that powerful and his writing that concise. If your goal is to mark every powerful idea or notable notion, you will find little left unmarked.
bwhitetn's review against another edition
4.0
Surprisingly engaging and accessible short book from Freud. Civilization is a powerful force for constraining behavior, especially when supported by beliefs without question.
aimeerose_lumsden's review against another edition
As this piece was a foray into the psychological basis on the need for religion, I don’t believe a subjective rating is necessary. Overall a very interesting read. Freud claims that religion is created by civilisation in order to harness the unknown and stems from the need to please and be comforted by the father. Relating back to typical Freudian concepts such as the Id, ego, super ego and the Oedipus complex, some interesting points were made that still ring true in our modern society.