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poxav's review against another edition
4.0
Well-structured and eye-opening. Definitely delved deeper than I had expected.
jwsg's review against another edition
4.0
Klein starts off Why We're Polarized by taking stock of just how politically polarized American society is today:
"We are so locked into our political identities that there is virtually no candidate, no information, no condition, that can force us to change our minds. We will justify almost anything or anyone so long as it helps our side, and the result is a politics devoid of guardrails, standards, persuasion or accountability."
Describing American politics as a "toxic system" that takes "[w]hat is rational and even moral for us to do individually" and turns these dispositions into something "destructive when done collectively", Klein in this book attempts to unpack how, in operating rationally and as intended by design, the system is now resulting in dysfunctional outcomes.
But American politics was not always so polarized and dysfunctional. So what changed? Klein points out that the Republicans and Democrats were not always divided by the "conservative-liberal line". Each party were "scrambled" and had both liberals and conservatives within their ranks and therefore differences in opinion on major campaign and policy issues had to be first addressed (whether by suppression or compromise) within each party. This effectively curbed their power as identities and lowered partisanship. Because of this, most Americans did not identify too deeply with either party and tended to vote for personalities; they had a "baseline comfort with both political parties" and ticket splitting was common (e.g. voting in a Democrat for President and a Republican for Governor). Indeed, political leaders in the 1950s and 1960s viewed the fact that each party encompassed a broad spectrum opinion as a strength; they felt that "dogmatic ideological parties tend[ed] to splinter the political and social fabric of a nation, lead to governmental crises and deadlocks, and stymie the compromises so often necessary to preserve freedom and achieve progress".
And this is indeed the case today. Today, the key division is between parties and is addressed primarily by conflict, which in turn deepens divisions. Klein argues that as the parties have become "visibly, undeniably more different…the country has rationally become more partisan in response". He pins this shift down to the rupture in the Democratic Party between the Democrats in the south (the Dixiecrats) and the rest of the party when the Democratic Party began to embrace civil rights and passed the Civil Rights Act. The Democratic Party had allied themselves with the Dixiecrats in order to control Congress and the congressional agenda. But the Democratic Party's gradual moves to include African Americans in its redistribution and uplift efforts (vs just poor white Southerners) made the alliance untenable for the Dixiecrats. In contrast with the rest of the party, which was a mish mash of views and leanings, the Dixiecrats were united and consistent in their agenda of upholding white supremacy in the south. And so southern conservatives allied themselves with the Republican Party instead, overcoming their distaste for the party affiliated with Abraham Lincoln.
From this initial schism, several other developments and factors have led to the political fissures deepening:
#1: Fights in American politics are fundamentally about group identity and status. Fights and debates that are genuinely about policy can be resolved in a manner that is positive sum; identity conflict, however, is zero sum. Hence, as identity becomes a more salient issue in politics, we can expect conflict to increase in frequency and intensity.
#2: While individuals' views may not have changed that much, sorting between the parties has resulted in polarization. Klein clarifies that polarization is not extremism but is about sorting - as beliefs and view are sorted by party, we get polarization (vs each party having a broad spectrum of views). Issue-based polarization tends to lead to political identity polarization. This is not the same as extremism, which is a value judgement. Klein explains that the contemporary acceptance of gay marriage would be seen as extreme several decades ago. Conversely, racist attitudes which were seen as banal in the 40s and 50s would be considered unacceptable and out of bounds today.
#3: With psychological sorting as a powerful driver of identity politics, politics increasingly becomes less about the arguments for and against a particular position and its impact and more about how this aligns with one's identity. The question for the unengaged citizen is what the policy will do for them. For the engaged on the other hand, the question is what support for the policy will say about them. Moreover, our brains are wired to support those we consider to belong in our groups while ostracising and dismissing those outside the group. Not only that, "winning is positional, not material; we often prefer outcomes that are worse for everyone so long as they maximise our group's advantages over other groups." The most engaged individuals therefore experience politics differently from everyone else.
#4: As political group identities strengthen, this incentivises political parties to play to these identities to win support. Parties gear their efforts to the most politically engaged - these are the ones who can be mobilised to vote, to donate, to volunteer for the campaign. Mobilising their support base necessarily entails playing up "us and them" messaging and rousing emotions against The Other.
#5: Polarisation has also been fuelled by the merging of partisan identities with racial, religious, geographic, ideological and cultural identities over the past 50 years. Moreover, our political identities are polarizing these other identities as well. Whereas people with cross-cutting identities tend to be more tolerant of outsiders, people with highly aligned identities see outsiders as a much bigger threat to themselves, given that more of their identities can be threatened simultaneously. This partisan mega-identity has greater potential to tear the social fabric apart than lots of different divisions would; "a society…which is riven by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction, may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split along just one line."
#6: Our opinions are influenced by the groups we belong to, including the political parties we belong to, not by facts. Conventional wisdom proposes that providing people with more civic education or media literacy classes will help them make more informed decisions. In reality, however, the direction is reversed - it is not information that informs our view; rather, we look for information that confirms our views (which are shaped by the groups we belong to). It is not to say that we can't be convinced by information and evidence, so long as it doesn't threaten our identity. This explains why scientific evidence can't seem to resolve disagreement over climate change and gun control but has shaped our thinking on drinking and driving and whether we should wear seatbelts when driving. After all, "the [personal] cost to [someone] of making a mistake on the science is zero…but the cost of being out of synch with her peers [is] potentially catastrophic."
#7: There is nothing that makes us identify with our groups so strongly as the feeling that the power we took for granted may soon be lost or the injustices we've long borne may soon be rectified. Demographic changes in the US is threatening the majority status and hence power of the white population; this threatening prospect not only makes white individuals cling to their identity more fervently but also makes them more conservative and less likely show generosity or compromise with outsiders (think immigration, welfare). Klein explains the rise of identity politics compellingly:
"When a single group dominates the political agenda, its grievances and demands are just coded as politics, and the vast majority of policy is designed in response to its concerns. But that changes when no one group can control the agenda but many groups can push items onto it; the the competition among identity-based groups becomes visible. It wasn't called identity politics when every cabinet member of every administration was a while male. It's only identity politics when there's pressure to diversify appointments. And yet that process doesn't reflect a strengthening of a particular identity group's hold on politics but a weakening of it."
#8: The media landscape exacerbates polarisation. The proliferation of media options, by offering more choice (vs everyone reading the same papers, watching the same programming) means that only those who are interested in political information follow political reporting. This widens the "interested-uninterested divide". To attract audiences in this context, media channels have an incentive to be partisan, to those who care because this is who they are and because of what is at stake (that our side wins!). The incentive for the media to write the news that will draw audiences the most, not necessarily the most newsworthy or significant in terms of impact (think of all the reporting on Trump vs unpacking some major new policy initiative.)
Klein notes that "polarized media doesn't emphasize commonalities, it weaponizes differences; it doesn't focus on the best of the other side, it threatens you with the worst." This is what identity media is fundamentally about. And if we believe that identities are malleable rather than fixed and pre-existing, then consuming identity-oriented content will "deepen the identities it repeatedly triggers, confirms, or threatens….turn[ing] interests or opinions into identities."
#9: It is a vicious cycle: "Politics is, first and foremost, driven by the people who pay the most attention and wield the most power - and those people opt in to extraordinarily politicised media. They then create the political system they perceive. The rest of the country then has to choose from more polarized options, and that in turn polarizes them - the larger the difference between the parties, the more compelling it becomes for even the uninterested to choose a side."
#10: Today, parties are weak and partisanship is strong which increases the likelihood of political candidates who are playing to the "intense minority of party supporters who turn out to vote in primaries". Whereas in the past, political candidates had to win over party bosses before they could have a viable candidacy, the current system of primaries and caucases favours candidates with intense supporters, not necessarily broad based support.
#11: Whereas the Founding Fathers had envisioned politics to be largely local affair (where people would identify more with their home state), politics has largely been nationalised. People now care more about who their president is rather than their local representative, even though the latter's impact on their daily lives is arguably more significant. This nationalisation of politics limits the ability of political representatives to engage in bipartisanship and negotiate compromise. That political control now flips between the parties also limits incentives to cooperate and raises incentives to sabotage the other party's agenda.
So what might we do to stem the tide against polarisation? Klein discusses a number of reforms to the political system which are less relevant to a non-American audience. Beyond political reforms, the book also touches on the following:
- Politicians articulating a vision that is inclusive, inspiring and non threatening - like what Obama tried to do.
- Klein cites Richeson's research suggesting that if you can add reassurance to discussions of demographic change e.g. telling people that "shifts are unlikely to upend existing power or economic arrangements", this could lower the sense of threat and hence shift towards racial and political conservatism. But this is a hard message to put out, politically.
- Structuring positive, collaborative interactions between members of different sides can promote understanding. This takes effort; political and social media isn't designed for persuasion, much less positive interactions with the other side. (Indeed, evidence suggests that reading content from the other side is likely to harden one's own position).
- Rediscovering the politics of place and paying less attention to party ideology and more to the specific conditions and challenges of one's neighbourhood and locale.
"We are so locked into our political identities that there is virtually no candidate, no information, no condition, that can force us to change our minds. We will justify almost anything or anyone so long as it helps our side, and the result is a politics devoid of guardrails, standards, persuasion or accountability."
Describing American politics as a "toxic system" that takes "[w]hat is rational and even moral for us to do individually" and turns these dispositions into something "destructive when done collectively", Klein in this book attempts to unpack how, in operating rationally and as intended by design, the system is now resulting in dysfunctional outcomes.
But American politics was not always so polarized and dysfunctional. So what changed? Klein points out that the Republicans and Democrats were not always divided by the "conservative-liberal line". Each party were "scrambled" and had both liberals and conservatives within their ranks and therefore differences in opinion on major campaign and policy issues had to be first addressed (whether by suppression or compromise) within each party. This effectively curbed their power as identities and lowered partisanship. Because of this, most Americans did not identify too deeply with either party and tended to vote for personalities; they had a "baseline comfort with both political parties" and ticket splitting was common (e.g. voting in a Democrat for President and a Republican for Governor). Indeed, political leaders in the 1950s and 1960s viewed the fact that each party encompassed a broad spectrum opinion as a strength; they felt that "dogmatic ideological parties tend[ed] to splinter the political and social fabric of a nation, lead to governmental crises and deadlocks, and stymie the compromises so often necessary to preserve freedom and achieve progress".
And this is indeed the case today. Today, the key division is between parties and is addressed primarily by conflict, which in turn deepens divisions. Klein argues that as the parties have become "visibly, undeniably more different…the country has rationally become more partisan in response". He pins this shift down to the rupture in the Democratic Party between the Democrats in the south (the Dixiecrats) and the rest of the party when the Democratic Party began to embrace civil rights and passed the Civil Rights Act. The Democratic Party had allied themselves with the Dixiecrats in order to control Congress and the congressional agenda. But the Democratic Party's gradual moves to include African Americans in its redistribution and uplift efforts (vs just poor white Southerners) made the alliance untenable for the Dixiecrats. In contrast with the rest of the party, which was a mish mash of views and leanings, the Dixiecrats were united and consistent in their agenda of upholding white supremacy in the south. And so southern conservatives allied themselves with the Republican Party instead, overcoming their distaste for the party affiliated with Abraham Lincoln.
From this initial schism, several other developments and factors have led to the political fissures deepening:
#1: Fights in American politics are fundamentally about group identity and status. Fights and debates that are genuinely about policy can be resolved in a manner that is positive sum; identity conflict, however, is zero sum. Hence, as identity becomes a more salient issue in politics, we can expect conflict to increase in frequency and intensity.
#2: While individuals' views may not have changed that much, sorting between the parties has resulted in polarization. Klein clarifies that polarization is not extremism but is about sorting - as beliefs and view are sorted by party, we get polarization (vs each party having a broad spectrum of views). Issue-based polarization tends to lead to political identity polarization. This is not the same as extremism, which is a value judgement. Klein explains that the contemporary acceptance of gay marriage would be seen as extreme several decades ago. Conversely, racist attitudes which were seen as banal in the 40s and 50s would be considered unacceptable and out of bounds today.
#3: With psychological sorting as a powerful driver of identity politics, politics increasingly becomes less about the arguments for and against a particular position and its impact and more about how this aligns with one's identity. The question for the unengaged citizen is what the policy will do for them. For the engaged on the other hand, the question is what support for the policy will say about them. Moreover, our brains are wired to support those we consider to belong in our groups while ostracising and dismissing those outside the group. Not only that, "winning is positional, not material; we often prefer outcomes that are worse for everyone so long as they maximise our group's advantages over other groups." The most engaged individuals therefore experience politics differently from everyone else.
#4: As political group identities strengthen, this incentivises political parties to play to these identities to win support. Parties gear their efforts to the most politically engaged - these are the ones who can be mobilised to vote, to donate, to volunteer for the campaign. Mobilising their support base necessarily entails playing up "us and them" messaging and rousing emotions against The Other.
#5: Polarisation has also been fuelled by the merging of partisan identities with racial, religious, geographic, ideological and cultural identities over the past 50 years. Moreover, our political identities are polarizing these other identities as well. Whereas people with cross-cutting identities tend to be more tolerant of outsiders, people with highly aligned identities see outsiders as a much bigger threat to themselves, given that more of their identities can be threatened simultaneously. This partisan mega-identity has greater potential to tear the social fabric apart than lots of different divisions would; "a society…which is riven by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction, may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split along just one line."
#6: Our opinions are influenced by the groups we belong to, including the political parties we belong to, not by facts. Conventional wisdom proposes that providing people with more civic education or media literacy classes will help them make more informed decisions. In reality, however, the direction is reversed - it is not information that informs our view; rather, we look for information that confirms our views (which are shaped by the groups we belong to). It is not to say that we can't be convinced by information and evidence, so long as it doesn't threaten our identity. This explains why scientific evidence can't seem to resolve disagreement over climate change and gun control but has shaped our thinking on drinking and driving and whether we should wear seatbelts when driving. After all, "the [personal] cost to [someone] of making a mistake on the science is zero…but the cost of being out of synch with her peers [is] potentially catastrophic."
#7: There is nothing that makes us identify with our groups so strongly as the feeling that the power we took for granted may soon be lost or the injustices we've long borne may soon be rectified. Demographic changes in the US is threatening the majority status and hence power of the white population; this threatening prospect not only makes white individuals cling to their identity more fervently but also makes them more conservative and less likely show generosity or compromise with outsiders (think immigration, welfare). Klein explains the rise of identity politics compellingly:
"When a single group dominates the political agenda, its grievances and demands are just coded as politics, and the vast majority of policy is designed in response to its concerns. But that changes when no one group can control the agenda but many groups can push items onto it; the the competition among identity-based groups becomes visible. It wasn't called identity politics when every cabinet member of every administration was a while male. It's only identity politics when there's pressure to diversify appointments. And yet that process doesn't reflect a strengthening of a particular identity group's hold on politics but a weakening of it."
#8: The media landscape exacerbates polarisation. The proliferation of media options, by offering more choice (vs everyone reading the same papers, watching the same programming) means that only those who are interested in political information follow political reporting. This widens the "interested-uninterested divide". To attract audiences in this context, media channels have an incentive to be partisan, to those who care because this is who they are and because of what is at stake (that our side wins!). The incentive for the media to write the news that will draw audiences the most, not necessarily the most newsworthy or significant in terms of impact (think of all the reporting on Trump vs unpacking some major new policy initiative.)
Klein notes that "polarized media doesn't emphasize commonalities, it weaponizes differences; it doesn't focus on the best of the other side, it threatens you with the worst." This is what identity media is fundamentally about. And if we believe that identities are malleable rather than fixed and pre-existing, then consuming identity-oriented content will "deepen the identities it repeatedly triggers, confirms, or threatens….turn[ing] interests or opinions into identities."
#9: It is a vicious cycle: "Politics is, first and foremost, driven by the people who pay the most attention and wield the most power - and those people opt in to extraordinarily politicised media. They then create the political system they perceive. The rest of the country then has to choose from more polarized options, and that in turn polarizes them - the larger the difference between the parties, the more compelling it becomes for even the uninterested to choose a side."
#10: Today, parties are weak and partisanship is strong which increases the likelihood of political candidates who are playing to the "intense minority of party supporters who turn out to vote in primaries". Whereas in the past, political candidates had to win over party bosses before they could have a viable candidacy, the current system of primaries and caucases favours candidates with intense supporters, not necessarily broad based support.
#11: Whereas the Founding Fathers had envisioned politics to be largely local affair (where people would identify more with their home state), politics has largely been nationalised. People now care more about who their president is rather than their local representative, even though the latter's impact on their daily lives is arguably more significant. This nationalisation of politics limits the ability of political representatives to engage in bipartisanship and negotiate compromise. That political control now flips between the parties also limits incentives to cooperate and raises incentives to sabotage the other party's agenda.
So what might we do to stem the tide against polarisation? Klein discusses a number of reforms to the political system which are less relevant to a non-American audience. Beyond political reforms, the book also touches on the following:
- Politicians articulating a vision that is inclusive, inspiring and non threatening - like what Obama tried to do.
- Klein cites Richeson's research suggesting that if you can add reassurance to discussions of demographic change e.g. telling people that "shifts are unlikely to upend existing power or economic arrangements", this could lower the sense of threat and hence shift towards racial and political conservatism. But this is a hard message to put out, politically.
- Structuring positive, collaborative interactions between members of different sides can promote understanding. This takes effort; political and social media isn't designed for persuasion, much less positive interactions with the other side. (Indeed, evidence suggests that reading content from the other side is likely to harden one's own position).
- Rediscovering the politics of place and paying less attention to party ideology and more to the specific conditions and challenges of one's neighbourhood and locale.
kstumpf's review against another edition
5.0
Scary reality. As a midwesterner who follows politics relatively closely, this book presents a terrifying foundation for what is likely to come in the years ahead. Especially if Republicans continue to put forth radicals such as MTG, Boebert, Cawthorn, Gaetz, etc.
Partisanship is one thing. Hatred and disseminators of fear is another. As a fifty year old former Republican this book was eye opening in demonstrating the lack of adaptability or movement of the party. It was a stark example of why many have, and are, leaving the party. The failure to welcome non-white, non-Christians into the party will prove to be a democracy shifting and potentially Republican Party destructive decision.
Partisanship is one thing. Hatred and disseminators of fear is another. As a fifty year old former Republican this book was eye opening in demonstrating the lack of adaptability or movement of the party. It was a stark example of why many have, and are, leaving the party. The failure to welcome non-white, non-Christians into the party will prove to be a democracy shifting and potentially Republican Party destructive decision.
jdintr's review against another edition
3.0
Why are we polarized?
I'LL TELL YOU WHY WE'RE POLARIZED, YOU SEE....
Ezra Klein has an explanation, and in the first part of his book, he lays down a history of American political parties since the Civil War, showing how coalitions (southern Conservatives, business, socialists, etc.) formed and led the country up to the present day--a day in which America is, well, polarized. This helps us to see how Republicans went from being the "good guys" of racial history (think Lincoln and Grant) to the "blue lives matter more" crowd that they are now.
In the second part of his book, Klein uses social sciences to show how fundamentally different liberals are from republicans: ideas covered in much more depth by Jonathan Haidt and others. Demographics play a key role in this. As America's white majority faced an end to its supremacy (births of non-whites have exceeded those of whites for most of this century, and then there's immigration), it retreated to two key bastions: the Republican Party and the Evangelical Church (the word "christian" is left out intentionally).
In the final part of his book, Klein looks ahead at ways that America's political system could eventually reflect its demographic sea change.
I really enjoy listening to Klein's podcasts. He loves to dig into ideas and explore new solutions. His book was no disappointment in this regard. Leading up to the 2020 US Election, when America will once again hold a mirror up to itself and reveal its Nature, it's nice to have this book inside my brain to help understand a very confusing time.
I'LL TELL YOU WHY WE'RE POLARIZED, YOU SEE....
Ezra Klein has an explanation, and in the first part of his book, he lays down a history of American political parties since the Civil War, showing how coalitions (southern Conservatives, business, socialists, etc.) formed and led the country up to the present day--a day in which America is, well, polarized. This helps us to see how Republicans went from being the "good guys" of racial history (think Lincoln and Grant) to the "blue lives matter more" crowd that they are now.
In the second part of his book, Klein uses social sciences to show how fundamentally different liberals are from republicans: ideas covered in much more depth by Jonathan Haidt and others. Demographics play a key role in this. As America's white majority faced an end to its supremacy (births of non-whites have exceeded those of whites for most of this century, and then there's immigration), it retreated to two key bastions: the Republican Party and the Evangelical Church (the word "christian" is left out intentionally).
In the final part of his book, Klein looks ahead at ways that America's political system could eventually reflect its demographic sea change.
I really enjoy listening to Klein's podcasts. He loves to dig into ideas and explore new solutions. His book was no disappointment in this regard. Leading up to the 2020 US Election, when America will once again hold a mirror up to itself and reveal its Nature, it's nice to have this book inside my brain to help understand a very confusing time.
rbogue's review against another edition
In America, we’ve become more divisive and more polarized in our politics, but why? In Why We’re Polarized, Ezra Klein seeks to explain the progression of polarization and the factors that drive it. Short on solutions, Klein is content to describe a problem of polarization and its causes with the hope that others will be able to help in the identification of solutions.
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patriciareedreads's review against another edition
5.0
Those without interest in details could read the last two chapters. Some solid information and suggestions.
branch_c's review against another edition
4.0
More than most books, this one actually lives up to its title: Klein does a masterful job explaining exactly why the US is polarized. The answer is complicated, but at the same time fairly straightforward: the system is working largely as designed, where parties are shortcuts for voters to use instead of having to know everything about the candidates when voting. And there really is value to this! But this leads voters to start treating parties as part of their identity, which parties go along with. And it explains why the battle moves to the primaries - by the general election, very few voters are persuadable. Which in turn encourages parties to cater to their “base” - their most extreme members.
The result is a minority party whose incentive is not to compromise and work with the majority - it’s to use tricks and antagonism to become the majority next time around. In other words, “Bipartisan cooperation is often necessary for governance but irrational for the minority party to offer.” (p. 218)
With books like this one, there’s an expectation that after describing the problem, the author propose solutions at the end. Klein attempts to head this off with a caveat that “I have more confidence in my diagnosis than my prescription.” (p. 250) But in fact, the conclusion is surprisingly satisfying, because as stated in the afterword, “polarization isn’t the problem, it’s the interaction between polarization and our political institutions that’s the problem.” (p. 274) So Klein has a list of solid suggestions to address our situation by improving our political institutions so they’re more compatible with the polarization that’s possibly unavoidable and maybe even desirable. His recommendations (spoiler?):
- Eliminate the debt ceiling (artificial and needlessly destabilizing).
- Eliminate the electoral college (thoroughly undemocratic).
- Eliminate the filibuster (most ridiculous “rule” ever, introduced by accident (!) as a side effect of a recommendation by Aaron Burr in 1805 (p. 220)).
- Give congressional representation to DC and Puerto Rico.
- Make voting easier, including automatic voter registration and expanding voting by mail.
- Rebuilding the Supreme Court, with an interesting proposal by Epps and Sitaraman to have 15 justices and equal partisan representation (p. 260).
I agree with all of this, and given the intelligence and authority with which this book is written, I expect that others would too. Yes, these are largely liberal/Democratic positions, but there’s no reason why Republicans couldn’t embrace them too and engineer a turnaround for conservatism - the alternative is to continue down their current path into full-blown anti-democracy.
As an aside, I’ll note that I’m not an unvarnished fan of Klein: in particular, he betrayed a surprising lack of intellectual integrity during his clash with Sam Harris some years ago over Charles Murray, issues of race science, and the platforming of unpopular opinions. I found Harris to be more correct in his position, and logically he and Klein should be on the same side. In this book, Klein unfairly lumps Harris into the “intellectual dark web” (p. 123), a loose group of contrarians that Harris currently has little in common with, even though he did (half-jokingly) originate the term.
Anyway, overall this is a fascinating and well-written book; Democrats will like it better, but I honestly recommend it for readers of any partisan stripe.
The result is a minority party whose incentive is not to compromise and work with the majority - it’s to use tricks and antagonism to become the majority next time around. In other words, “Bipartisan cooperation is often necessary for governance but irrational for the minority party to offer.” (p. 218)
With books like this one, there’s an expectation that after describing the problem, the author propose solutions at the end. Klein attempts to head this off with a caveat that “I have more confidence in my diagnosis than my prescription.” (p. 250) But in fact, the conclusion is surprisingly satisfying, because as stated in the afterword, “polarization isn’t the problem, it’s the interaction between polarization and our political institutions that’s the problem.” (p. 274) So Klein has a list of solid suggestions to address our situation by improving our political institutions so they’re more compatible with the polarization that’s possibly unavoidable and maybe even desirable. His recommendations (spoiler?):
- Eliminate the debt ceiling (artificial and needlessly destabilizing).
- Eliminate the electoral college (thoroughly undemocratic).
- Eliminate the filibuster (most ridiculous “rule” ever, introduced by accident (!) as a side effect of a recommendation by Aaron Burr in 1805 (p. 220)).
- Give congressional representation to DC and Puerto Rico.
- Make voting easier, including automatic voter registration and expanding voting by mail.
- Rebuilding the Supreme Court, with an interesting proposal by Epps and Sitaraman to have 15 justices and equal partisan representation (p. 260).
I agree with all of this, and given the intelligence and authority with which this book is written, I expect that others would too. Yes, these are largely liberal/Democratic positions, but there’s no reason why Republicans couldn’t embrace them too and engineer a turnaround for conservatism - the alternative is to continue down their current path into full-blown anti-democracy.
As an aside, I’ll note that I’m not an unvarnished fan of Klein: in particular, he betrayed a surprising lack of intellectual integrity during his clash with Sam Harris some years ago over Charles Murray, issues of race science, and the platforming of unpopular opinions. I found Harris to be more correct in his position, and logically he and Klein should be on the same side. In this book, Klein unfairly lumps Harris into the “intellectual dark web” (p. 123), a loose group of contrarians that Harris currently has little in common with, even though he did (half-jokingly) originate the term.
Anyway, overall this is a fascinating and well-written book; Democrats will like it better, but I honestly recommend it for readers of any partisan stripe.
colers12's review against another edition
4.0
Another book I gobbled up - my problem is that I can't remember all the studies he cited (which is a case for me to re-read and make better notes) that challenged my own thinking. A historical narrative of how and perhaps, why, our government, our media, and Americans have become so polarized. Klein ends the book in defense of healthy polarization, which is one area I push back on - I find polarization toxic, at least in the ways it shows up now, and while I believe it is healthy for a democracy to have debate on issues, the competition and ugliness has done nothing positive for the average American. I really enjoyed the learnings in this book and it has helped me challenge my own behaviors in a way I haven't been in quite some time. While he does inject his own political perspective at times, to which much I agreed with, I would highly recommend everyone to read this and have some healthy debate on how to bridge the divide!
justine3's review against another edition
5.0
A very timely read - one that resonated with me because of what’s been on my mind. I find that I generally agree with everything Ezra Klein writes (or says on his podcast) so probably was destined to like this book.
I appreciated that he provided context for everything he talked about (you don’t need to bring your own), and offered his perspective on solutions at the end.
I hadn’t thought about the role of political parties (the entities and ppl in charge vs than the identity) so that was interesting. And it challenged some of my assumptions about the undeniable benefit of large grassroots support (bc grassroots supporters are also the most polarized). It reaffirms some of my beliefs about the need for small d democratic reform, why we should focus more locally (for our own sanity too), and why in the current state, Democrats are at a structural disadvantage.
I appreciated that he provided context for everything he talked about (you don’t need to bring your own), and offered his perspective on solutions at the end.
I hadn’t thought about the role of political parties (the entities and ppl in charge vs than the identity) so that was interesting. And it challenged some of my assumptions about the undeniable benefit of large grassroots support (bc grassroots supporters are also the most polarized). It reaffirms some of my beliefs about the need for small d democratic reform, why we should focus more locally (for our own sanity too), and why in the current state, Democrats are at a structural disadvantage.
adrian_bubie's review against another edition
5.0
Klein is among my favorite podcasters and I've been a big fan of him since his early Vox days, so its unsurprising that I loved this book. For those of you who may not be as familiar with his work, I'll try to sell you on why you should definitely pick this up:
I think a lot of people have the sense that politics are growing more polarized in the US in recent years, even beyond the signals provided daily online and in the media, based on the interactions and conversation topics that have become more fraught in recent years. I think the cleverness of Klein's approach here is not to focus on in what ways this polarization is manifesting or how we can slow, stop, or reverse it, but to simply investigate why it is happening and to reveal the history that provides the context for how we've arrived here. Like me, you may may think you already know all this; but I promise, history will surprise you. Klein provides, I would argue, a relatively unbiased recounting of how both Democrats and Republicans have positioned themselves more in opposition to each other than around core constituency issues. Compromise and consistency are weaponized as it has become increasingly clear that a win for one party is a not just a political but identity-crushing loss for the other. The analogy of sports teams the author invokes towards the middle of the book strikes as particularly apt -- two groups of rabid fans looking to crush their other over, at it's most base level, a common goal (a functioning government). Rational consideration of policy has been replaced by a win-at-all-costs mentality -- and for some good reasons, on both sides of the aisle for sure -- but to the absolute detriment to our ability to address increasingly pressing challenges like climate change and a globalizing and automating economy. Klein's writing is so clear and succinct as to make even the more laborious data and conclusions clear, and his humor punctuates the generally dismal subject matter at just the right points (I *highly* recommend the audio book if you can get your hands on it). Overall, I finished reading with a greater understanding of why polarization may not be as bad a thing as we might think, and a little better equipped to contextualize decisions made by those in power trying to keep it. It's not an easy set of problems to resolve; but, understanding the root of it is always the first step. (5/5 stars)
I think a lot of people have the sense that politics are growing more polarized in the US in recent years, even beyond the signals provided daily online and in the media, based on the interactions and conversation topics that have become more fraught in recent years. I think the cleverness of Klein's approach here is not to focus on in what ways this polarization is manifesting or how we can slow, stop, or reverse it, but to simply investigate why it is happening and to reveal the history that provides the context for how we've arrived here. Like me, you may may think you already know all this; but I promise, history will surprise you. Klein provides, I would argue, a relatively unbiased recounting of how both Democrats and Republicans have positioned themselves more in opposition to each other than around core constituency issues. Compromise and consistency are weaponized as it has become increasingly clear that a win for one party is a not just a political but identity-crushing loss for the other. The analogy of sports teams the author invokes towards the middle of the book strikes as particularly apt -- two groups of rabid fans looking to crush their other over, at it's most base level, a common goal (a functioning government). Rational consideration of policy has been replaced by a win-at-all-costs mentality -- and for some good reasons, on both sides of the aisle for sure -- but to the absolute detriment to our ability to address increasingly pressing challenges like climate change and a globalizing and automating economy. Klein's writing is so clear and succinct as to make even the more laborious data and conclusions clear, and his humor punctuates the generally dismal subject matter at just the right points (I *highly* recommend the audio book if you can get your hands on it). Overall, I finished reading with a greater understanding of why polarization may not be as bad a thing as we might think, and a little better equipped to contextualize decisions made by those in power trying to keep it. It's not an easy set of problems to resolve; but, understanding the root of it is always the first step. (5/5 stars)