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stiansi's review
4.0
I decided to read this book after a long walk that I took while listening to a Philosophy Bites episode titled "Who's your favourite philosopher?" In it, Nigel Warburton simply asks a host of prominent philosophers the question, and the answers, predictably, vary wildly. But one name kept popping up all the time: David Hume. Everyone seemed to love David. And, because I soon want to read Kant anyway, I figured it made sense to finally delve into this work and try to understand what it's all about.
I'll forego actually writing a review of the book - at least for now - but I figured I would share some of my favourite passages from it. They may suffice to whet your appetite for Hume's philosophy, and get you to explore his philosophy on your own - to wake you from your dogmatic slumber, to refer to what is a cliché at this point. Hume is at times incredibly insightful, sometimes arrogant, sometimes humble to a fault, and always fascinating. I marked these with a pencil in the book and then wrote them all into Word, and here they are, ctrl-c and ctrl-v'd. The quotes are all from the Penguin Classics edition, with the magisterial Hume depicted on the cover.
Vol. 1: Of the Understanding
p. 70: “To explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is impossible. ‘Tis sufficient, if we give any satisfactory account of them from experience and analogy.”
p. 84: “Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho’ there be a real succession in the objects. From these phaenomena, as well as from many others, we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover’d by some perceivable succession of changeable objects.”
p. 91: “Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence; and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any argument deriv’d from the clear idea, in reality asserts, that we have no clear idea of it, because we have a clear idea. ‘Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceiv’d by the mind. Did it imply any contradiction, ‘tis impossible it cou’d ever be conceiv’d.”
p. 129: “The true state of the question is, whether every object, which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause; and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain, and hope to have prov’d it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments.”
p. 132: “As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ‘twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc’d by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our being.”
p. 140: “Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction, ‘tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.”
p. 153: “Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. ‘Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am convinc’d of any principle, ‘tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another.”
p. 153 cont.: “’Twill here be worth our observation, that the past experience, on which all our judgments concerning cause and effect depend, may operate on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some measure be unknown to us.”
p. 184: “First we may observe, that the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is deriv’d entirely from habit, by which we are determin’d to expect for the future the same train of objects, to which we have been accustom’d.”
p. 197: “A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that deriv’d from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call PREJUDICE. An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity; for which reason, tho’ the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertain’d such a prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason. Human nature is very subject to errors of this kind; and perhaps this nation as much as any other.”
p. 226: “Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow’d with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant.”
p. 234: “Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falsehood; I shou’d reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total skepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render’d unavoidable.”
pp. 267-268: “This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur’d, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it.”
p. 312: “When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho’ such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning.”
p. 319: “Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.”
Vol. 2: Of the Passions
p. 361: “Every thing belonging to a vain man is the best that is any where to be found. His houses, equipage, furniture, cloaths, horses, hounds, excel all others in his conceit; and ‘tis easy to observe, that from the least advantage in any of these, he draws a new subject of pride and vanity.”
p. 412: “This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer.”
p. 450: “Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government. Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such a uniformity in human life.”
p. 456: “We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition.”
p. 462: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
p. 480: “This is also true in the universe. Opposition not only enlarges the soul; but the soul, when full of courage and magnanimity, in a manner seeks opposition.”
p. 487: Now if we consider the human mind, we shall find, that with regard to the passions, ‘tis not the nature of a wind-instrument of music, which in running over all the notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases; but rather resembles a string-instrument, where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound, which gradually and insensibly decays. The imagination is extreme quick and agile; but the passions are slow and restive.”
p. 494: “The same care of avoiding prolixity is the reason why I wave the examination of the will and direct passions, as they appear in animals; since nothing is more evident, than that they are of the same nature, and excited by the same causes as in human creatures.”
Vol. 3: Of Morals
p. 509: “Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov’d, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."
p. 517: “In order, therefore, to prove, that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, ‘tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it must take place and have its influence; tho’ the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinte. […] it will be impossible to fulfil the first condition required to the system of eternal measures of right and wrong; because it is impossible to shew those relations, upon which such a distinction may be founded: And ‘tis as impossible to fulfil the second condition; because we cannot prove a priori, that these relations, if they really existed and were perceiv’d, wou’d be universally forcible and obligatory.”
p. 520: “There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ‘tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.”
p. 537: “'Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated; and tho’ in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities are still more augmented, and leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy, than ‘tis possible for him, in his savage and solitary condition, ever to become. When every individual person labours a-part, and only for himself, his force is too small to execute any considerable work; his labour being employ’d in supplying all his different necessities, he never attaints a perfection in any particular art; and as his force and success are not at all times equal, the least failure in either of these particulars must be attended with inevitable ruin and misery. Society provides a remedy for these three inconveniences. By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability increases: And by mutual succour we are less expos’d to fortune and accidents. ‘Tis by this additional force, ability, and security, that society becomes advantageous.”
p. 590: “There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value.”
p. 600: “To which we may add, that a man living under an absolute government, wou’d owe it no allegiance; since, by its very nature, it depends not on consent.”
p. 603: “’Tis certain, therefore, that in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression.”
p. 615: “Those, therefore, who wou’d seem to respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have renounc’d all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious answer.”
I'll forego actually writing a review of the book - at least for now - but I figured I would share some of my favourite passages from it. They may suffice to whet your appetite for Hume's philosophy, and get you to explore his philosophy on your own - to wake you from your dogmatic slumber, to refer to what is a cliché at this point. Hume is at times incredibly insightful, sometimes arrogant, sometimes humble to a fault, and always fascinating. I marked these with a pencil in the book and then wrote them all into Word, and here they are, ctrl-c and ctrl-v'd. The quotes are all from the Penguin Classics edition, with the magisterial Hume depicted on the cover.
Vol. 1: Of the Understanding
p. 70: “To explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is impossible. ‘Tis sufficient, if we give any satisfactory account of them from experience and analogy.”
p. 84: “Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho’ there be a real succession in the objects. From these phaenomena, as well as from many others, we may conclude, that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover’d by some perceivable succession of changeable objects.”
p. 91: “Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence; and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any argument deriv’d from the clear idea, in reality asserts, that we have no clear idea of it, because we have a clear idea. ‘Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceiv’d by the mind. Did it imply any contradiction, ‘tis impossible it cou’d ever be conceiv’d.”
p. 129: “The true state of the question is, whether every object, which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause; and this I assert neither to be intuitively nor demonstratively certain, and hope to have prov’d it sufficiently by the foregoing arguments.”
p. 132: “As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ‘twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc’d by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our being.”
p. 140: “Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction, ‘tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery.”
p. 153: “Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. ‘Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am convinc’d of any principle, ‘tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another.”
p. 153 cont.: “’Twill here be worth our observation, that the past experience, on which all our judgments concerning cause and effect depend, may operate on our mind in such an insensible manner as never to be taken notice of, and may even in some measure be unknown to us.”
p. 184: “First we may observe, that the supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of any kind, but is deriv’d entirely from habit, by which we are determin’d to expect for the future the same train of objects, to which we have been accustom’d.”
p. 197: “A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that deriv’d from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call PREJUDICE. An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity; for which reason, tho’ the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertain’d such a prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops in spite of sense and reason. Human nature is very subject to errors of this kind; and perhaps this nation as much as any other.”
p. 226: “Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow’d with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant.”
p. 234: “Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falsehood; I shou’d reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total skepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render’d unavoidable.”
pp. 267-268: “This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur’d, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it.”
p. 312: “When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho’ such is my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my reasoning.”
p. 319: “Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.”
Vol. 2: Of the Passions
p. 361: “Every thing belonging to a vain man is the best that is any where to be found. His houses, equipage, furniture, cloaths, horses, hounds, excel all others in his conceit; and ‘tis easy to observe, that from the least advantage in any of these, he draws a new subject of pride and vanity.”
p. 412: “This is still more conspicuous in man, as being the creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advantages. We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer.”
p. 450: “Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government. Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such a uniformity in human life.”
p. 456: “We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition.”
p. 462: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”
p. 480: “This is also true in the universe. Opposition not only enlarges the soul; but the soul, when full of courage and magnanimity, in a manner seeks opposition.”
p. 487: Now if we consider the human mind, we shall find, that with regard to the passions, ‘tis not the nature of a wind-instrument of music, which in running over all the notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases; but rather resembles a string-instrument, where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound, which gradually and insensibly decays. The imagination is extreme quick and agile; but the passions are slow and restive.”
p. 494: “The same care of avoiding prolixity is the reason why I wave the examination of the will and direct passions, as they appear in animals; since nothing is more evident, than that they are of the same nature, and excited by the same causes as in human creatures.”
Vol. 3: Of Morals
p. 509: “Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov’d, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason."
p. 517: “In order, therefore, to prove, that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, ‘tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it must take place and have its influence; tho’ the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinte. […] it will be impossible to fulfil the first condition required to the system of eternal measures of right and wrong; because it is impossible to shew those relations, upon which such a distinction may be founded: And ‘tis as impossible to fulfil the second condition; because we cannot prove a priori, that these relations, if they really existed and were perceiv’d, wou’d be universally forcible and obligatory.”
p. 520: “There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ‘tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.”
p. 537: “'Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated; and tho’ in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities are still more augmented, and leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy, than ‘tis possible for him, in his savage and solitary condition, ever to become. When every individual person labours a-part, and only for himself, his force is too small to execute any considerable work; his labour being employ’d in supplying all his different necessities, he never attaints a perfection in any particular art; and as his force and success are not at all times equal, the least failure in either of these particulars must be attended with inevitable ruin and misery. Society provides a remedy for these three inconveniences. By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability increases: And by mutual succour we are less expos’d to fortune and accidents. ‘Tis by this additional force, ability, and security, that society becomes advantageous.”
p. 590: “There is no quality in human nature, which causes more fatal errors in our conduct, than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value.”
p. 600: “To which we may add, that a man living under an absolute government, wou’d owe it no allegiance; since, by its very nature, it depends not on consent.”
p. 603: “’Tis certain, therefore, that in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression.”
p. 615: “Those, therefore, who wou’d seem to respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have renounc’d all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious answer.”
lakmus's review
Finished volume 1 re: understanding, stopped a bit into volume 2: morals. Pick up again later.
It seems somewhat fantastic (although I am lacking a lot of context, so maybe not that unusual) how many nails you can hit on the head with some good observations and reasoning, and having stripped away hand-waving about the mysteries of the human soul.
Language is definitely a barrier though, and makes it hard to wade through the denser places, which I suspect also have the largest probability of errors the guy made.
But it truly is amazing that the bits about belief influencing reasoning could have come out straight from any theoretical paper in the past fifty years. Shows we really haven't advanced that far, and a lot of the empirical work has not advanced beyond finding support for the relatively obvious.
It seems somewhat fantastic (although I am lacking a lot of context, so maybe not that unusual) how many nails you can hit on the head with some good observations and reasoning, and having stripped away hand-waving about the mysteries of the human soul.
Language is definitely a barrier though, and makes it hard to wade through the denser places, which I suspect also have the largest probability of errors the guy made.
But it truly is amazing that the bits about belief influencing reasoning could have come out straight from any theoretical paper in the past fifty years. Shows we really haven't advanced that far, and a lot of the empirical work has not advanced beyond finding support for the relatively obvious.
carise's review
4.0
“‘Tis obvious… that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay” (403) [accidental allyship for the win].
This treatise is thick but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding” or how we come to knowledge, I largely agree with. He focusses a significant portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
This treatise is thick but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding” or how we come to knowledge, I largely agree with. He focusses a significant portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
ffriasguada's review against another edition
challenging
slow-paced
2.0
q infumables son los empiristas shut upppp 😭
lander01's review
5.0
It was an honour to read A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's simultaneously elucidating, insightful, and problem-laden discourse is a gorgeous treasure trove for the philosophically inclined. Book one, Of the Understanding, is frankly—genius—so much so that it is challenging to comprehend in its entirety—I admit that I often found myself referring to third-party sources and supplementary information to understand Hume's arguments; the book is monumental in scope; its significance so extensive and pertinent. Hume's philosophy and argumentation are so relevant to the human condition. In particular, the discussion and formulation of the problem of induction and its profound implications for how we reason; what reason have we for presuming that preceding relations between objects (i.e., causes and effects) will resemble those of unrelated, future relations between objects? Why might we infer the future to resemble the past? Though I had known of Hume's problem of induction, to read its formulation in his own words was a truly humbling and illuminating experience. I do wish to, in addition, read his formulation in The Enquiry—which, as of writing this review, I am yet to do.
Also worthy of particular mention is Hume's fascinating characterisation, in Book 1, of how we understand and, thereafter, his discussions of impressions and ideas and their relations to memory, belief formation, knowledge, and probability. Although I suspect that Hume's characterisation of ideas exclusively arising as a consequence of impressions may be considered outdated or impoverished by many modern philosophers (particularly rationalists—that school which opposes empiricism), I nevertheless found it an exhilarating mental exercise to dive into Hume's empiricism. I found myself time and time again persuaded by his arguments!
I particularly enjoyed Hume's discussion on cause and effect and how he tied such concepts to probability and necessity. I had never beforehand considered probability's components till I read this book—and to philosophically deconstruct the objects of probability and necessity was both a fascinating intellectual challenge and pleasure. Hume's discussion of efficacy furthermore is intriguing—certainly within the realm of challenging conventional wisdom, or the "vulgar belief", as Hume would say.
Of note, this book is not an easy read, and I do not claim to comprehend every section utterly, nor that various controversies or differences of interpretation, discourse, and debate, though I will certainly return to it once again when I am further versed in philosophy. Also of note, the book is meandering and difficult to follow. As of now, however, these books have been a fascinating endeavour.
Also worthy of particular mention is Hume's fascinating characterisation, in Book 1, of how we understand and, thereafter, his discussions of impressions and ideas and their relations to memory, belief formation, knowledge, and probability. Although I suspect that Hume's characterisation of ideas exclusively arising as a consequence of impressions may be considered outdated or impoverished by many modern philosophers (particularly rationalists—that school which opposes empiricism), I nevertheless found it an exhilarating mental exercise to dive into Hume's empiricism. I found myself time and time again persuaded by his arguments!
I particularly enjoyed Hume's discussion on cause and effect and how he tied such concepts to probability and necessity. I had never beforehand considered probability's components till I read this book—and to philosophically deconstruct the objects of probability and necessity was both a fascinating intellectual challenge and pleasure. Hume's discussion of efficacy furthermore is intriguing—certainly within the realm of challenging conventional wisdom, or the "vulgar belief", as Hume would say.
Of note, this book is not an easy read, and I do not claim to comprehend every section utterly, nor that various controversies or differences of interpretation, discourse, and debate, though I will certainly return to it once again when I am further versed in philosophy. Also of note, the book is meandering and difficult to follow. As of now, however, these books have been a fascinating endeavour.
carist's review
4.0
“‘Tis obvious… that men of gay tempers naturally love the gay” (403).
It sure is, Hume.
This treatise is thick, but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding”, or how we come to knowledge, I have the fewest contentions with. He focusses a large portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct, but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
It sure is, Hume.
This treatise is thick, but quite insightful at several turns. Hume’s discussion on “the understanding”, or how we come to knowledge, I have the fewest contentions with. He focusses a large portion on the principles of cause and effect, which is phenomenal. However, Books 2 and 3 on the passions and morals betray the norms of Hume’s time. His claims range from objectionable to absurd, and most of these relate to wealth and government, such as: “Nothing has a greater tendency to give us an esteem for any person, than his power and riches; or a contempt, than his poverty and meanness” (406). Of course, this perspective comes before most formal communist thought took root in Europe. Our bourgeois philosopher isn’t wrong about the purpose of the state though: “To remedy disputes over property between proprietors” (590). Hume believes this to be a noble purpose for the state, but what it actually amounts to is that the state exists to serve the wealthiest, who are proprietors. In cases like this, Hume’s observations are technically correct, but they lack a critical understanding. Nonetheless, this work really earns its rank in classic philosophy.
therealesioan's review against another edition
2.0
Yeah I'm cheating here a bit by just reading the first book, but Hume's smug anglo-ism (despite being Scottish) is too much for me for 4 fucking volumes. Still, his system has some utility is in its empirical and logical rigor. I can certainly see how Hume kind of brought in a much more naturalistic and relatable approach to philosophy - as opposed to the rationalists who came before him - in a similar way that Aristotle and the Peripatetics changed up the more mystical Platonic style which was dominant.
Insights like how Spinoza's monism is the logical conclusion to the Church Father's thought is quite interesting. And similarly the take that Spinoza's philosophy must affirm the position of the immortality of the souls. In general I do support the more analytic, challenging and utilitarian turn Hume took philosophy with his empiricism. You have to remember that without Hume Kant never wakes up from his dogmatic slumber, and then we'd never have the Critiques.
But still, all that being said, Hume's system is disastrous. It's not that the critical phase of his philosophy is flawed, as the problem of induction and necessary connextion are compelling puzzles. Where he falls flat is in building much of an alternative system. And yes I'm aware he does most of that in the following books, but as I understand it there's a reason everyone really remembers Hume for his deconstruction - not his building back up.
By the end of this book he's already setting the tone for a radical skepticism of truth itself - ironic considering he's meant to be rejecting the skepticism of the Cartesians. He discards the concept of the self, the process of induction, much of mathematics, miracles, God, truth really. He himself clearly begins questioning his destructive attitude in the conclusion here: "Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escaped shipwreck in passing a small firth, has yet temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel". That is not the talk of a confident philosophical architect.
Insights like how Spinoza's monism is the logical conclusion to the Church Father's thought is quite interesting. And similarly the take that Spinoza's philosophy must affirm the position of the immortality of the souls. In general I do support the more analytic, challenging and utilitarian turn Hume took philosophy with his empiricism. You have to remember that without Hume Kant never wakes up from his dogmatic slumber, and then we'd never have the Critiques.
But still, all that being said, Hume's system is disastrous. It's not that the critical phase of his philosophy is flawed, as the problem of induction and necessary connextion are compelling puzzles. Where he falls flat is in building much of an alternative system. And yes I'm aware he does most of that in the following books, but as I understand it there's a reason everyone really remembers Hume for his deconstruction - not his building back up.
By the end of this book he's already setting the tone for a radical skepticism of truth itself - ironic considering he's meant to be rejecting the skepticism of the Cartesians. He discards the concept of the self, the process of induction, much of mathematics, miracles, God, truth really. He himself clearly begins questioning his destructive attitude in the conclusion here: "Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escaped shipwreck in passing a small firth, has yet temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel". That is not the talk of a confident philosophical architect.