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richardjoseph's review
2.0
Maybe i didnt research the angle that this historic book was coming from, and yes the clue is in the title. however i imagined this would give further background into Mussolini and how he then made a pigs ear of war. However it was informative and gave alot of information which is well presented. A little heavy in areas and not much in terms of maps / graphics etc to aid the read who may not know about world geography.
dionisiomulone's review
informative
slow-paced
4.5
Mussolini’s war by John Gooch is an impeccable review of the Italian military endeavors during Mussolini’s tenure. I must admit I made a mistake and thought the book would analyze political history, but that was my mistake for not reading the summary properly. In this vein, the author arrives to cohesive conclusions regarding the political situation and consequences of the regime under the light (and stress) of the military situation. I would encourage people with a vested interest in military history to check this up, for it is – once again – impeccable. If your interest (like mine) lays in political history, I would also recommend you pick this one up, for you may found various previously unknown facts and reasonings.
Of particular interest to me, and demonstrations of excellent research, were the chapters on the war in the Balkans (Chapter 6) and the last days of the regime (Chapter 9).
Of particular interest to me, and demonstrations of excellent research, were the chapters on the war in the Balkans (Chapter 6) and the last days of the regime (Chapter 9).
oleksandr's review
3.0
This is a non-fic about (military) history of Fascist Italy in the 30s and 40s. it is very heavy on data (who ordered how many troops to go where) and therefore a nice reference, but maybe not the best overview book, especially on audio, at least for me.
It is very interesting because unlike many historical novels it shows what info was available whenthis or that decision was made, not what we know really happened after. Maybe one of the prominent example is joining the WW2. The WW2 started on September, 1st, but Italy hasn’t joined Germany until mid-1940, after Germany almost finished France: “The Dunkirk evacuation began on 26 May. Three days later Mussolini called the heads of the armed forces together and told them he was going to join in the war at any time from 5 June. Waiting for a fortnight or a month would not improve things and would risk giving Germany the impression that the Italians were arriving ‘when the job was done’. Joining in when the risk was minimal would do Italy no good when it came to peacemaking.” He was warned that the army isn’t ready and won’t be ready for at least several years (it just started reform and re-armament, scheduled to end in 1949!), but the situation was that after France the operation of attack on England was expected and Mussolini feared to jump in too late.
Another important issue that book shows perfectly is that modern wars are won not on battlefields but by ones with better logistics and deeper pockets. Mussolini often wanted to go fast and decisive but it is impossible to throw armies from theater to theater instantly, especially if your armies are only on paper. For example, to join the war against the USSR, Mussolini sends “an army corps composed of two ‘auto-transportable’ infantry divisions (a term which meant that they were trained as lorry-borne troops, but not that they actually possessed the lorries they needed)” and starts to seek lorries after the commitment, so that “Watching the drive-past of requisitioned trucks still carrying the names of the commercial companies they had come from, one of Mussolini’s diplomatic entourage saw ‘a gypsy-like improvisation’ when compared with the highly organized German war machine.”
Also the lightning war or Blitzkrieg was suggested and used by Italians under the name guerra lampo (‘fast war’) as early as Abyssinian campaign of 1935. To which they prepared for three years and it was a victory of logisticians and engineers, who created roads and readied supplies.
With deficit of almost everything from trained officers to rubber, steel and coal, it is more surprising that they were able to keep even for so long.
It is very interesting because unlike many historical novels it shows what info was available whenthis or that decision was made, not what we know really happened after. Maybe one of the prominent example is joining the WW2. The WW2 started on September, 1st, but Italy hasn’t joined Germany until mid-1940, after Germany almost finished France: “The Dunkirk evacuation began on 26 May. Three days later Mussolini called the heads of the armed forces together and told them he was going to join in the war at any time from 5 June. Waiting for a fortnight or a month would not improve things and would risk giving Germany the impression that the Italians were arriving ‘when the job was done’. Joining in when the risk was minimal would do Italy no good when it came to peacemaking.” He was warned that the army isn’t ready and won’t be ready for at least several years (it just started reform and re-armament, scheduled to end in 1949!), but the situation was that after France the operation of attack on England was expected and Mussolini feared to jump in too late.
Another important issue that book shows perfectly is that modern wars are won not on battlefields but by ones with better logistics and deeper pockets. Mussolini often wanted to go fast and decisive but it is impossible to throw armies from theater to theater instantly, especially if your armies are only on paper. For example, to join the war against the USSR, Mussolini sends “an army corps composed of two ‘auto-transportable’ infantry divisions (a term which meant that they were trained as lorry-borne troops, but not that they actually possessed the lorries they needed)” and starts to seek lorries after the commitment, so that “Watching the drive-past of requisitioned trucks still carrying the names of the commercial companies they had come from, one of Mussolini’s diplomatic entourage saw ‘a gypsy-like improvisation’ when compared with the highly organized German war machine.”
Also the lightning war or Blitzkrieg was suggested and used by Italians under the name guerra lampo (‘fast war’) as early as Abyssinian campaign of 1935. To which they prepared for three years and it was a victory of logisticians and engineers, who created roads and readied supplies.
With deficit of almost everything from trained officers to rubber, steel and coal, it is more surprising that they were able to keep even for so long.
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