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3.83 AVERAGE
3.83 AVERAGE
Had to read this for one of my classes in school, and was rewarded with immense insights into the making of Britain's fiscal-military state. Author was detailed with his arguments, and although it is not an easy read, it is very informative for those interested in Britain's rise in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Brewer seeks to explain an apparent paradox of 18th century Britain. At the same time that Britain became a militarily-renowned world power, it became a society famous for its love of liberty and the rights of the subject. He thus asks "why Britain was able to enjoy the fruits of military prowess without the misfortunes of a dirigiste or despotic regime" (xviii). He argues that 18th century Britain was strong in infrastructural power - the practical capability to successfully accomplish objectives within its accepted limits - but weak in despotic power, i.e., relatively limited in terms of what it had the authority to do (xx).
Brewer notes in part 1 that the English state - which after the Act of Union in 1707 effectively served as the nucleus for the British state - had 3 key advantages from the late medieval period. The first of these was "its centralization in the period between the tenth and thirteenth centuries" (3). This early centralization meant that while "regionalism was not absent... it lacked any institutional focus to challenge the authority of the central state" (5) lacking the particularism and heterogeneity of the French state apparatus (6).
The second advantage was England's escape from continental wars between the end of the 100 Years' War in the mid-15th century and the beginning of the second hundred years' war in 1688. "In a period of ferocious and continuous warfare, England was remarkable for its lack of participation in international conflict and for its many years of peace. England, in other words, was not a major participant in the so-called 'Military Revolution'" which greatly increased the scale of war in Early Modern Europe (7-8).
The third advantage was largely a consequence of the second; because England was not heavily militarized and had relatively less need of funds in the late medieval and early modern periods, the English entered the 18th century with a much smaller class of venal officeholders. "England's greatest advantage was that it was never put to the sort of grueling fiscal-military test that year after year drain the nation of its resources and the treasury of its wealth... for the proliferation and sale of offices... was the necessary price that the absolutist ruler paid for waging major wars" (21).
Part 2 details the nature of the fiscal-military state as it emerged in Britain. Britain gave a unique emphasis to its navy - an emphasis that was"singularly appropriate for a state which governed a commercial society with such a substantial commitment to overseas trade" (34). Three features were critical to the raising of vast sums necessary for fiscal-military state formation: "the existence of a powerful representative with undisputed powers of national taxation; the presence of a commercialized economy whose structure made it comparatively easy to tax; and the deployment of fiscal expertise that made borrowing against tax income an easy tax" (42). Crucially, taxation was centralized and publicized. Anglo-British warmaking in the 18th century was managed by public offices - "from the mid-17th century states began to exercise an unprecedented control over the business of war, largely because they succeeded in improving their administrative capacity" (64).
Part III contains chapter 5, "The Paradoxes of State Power." Here Brewer answers "why, in what is conventionally viewed as the most unstate-like of states, did the government manage both to cope with the pressures of war and to retain much of its integrity?" He says "first, William and his followers were the beneficiaries of the administrative reforms initiated by their predecessors. ... Secondly, the commons restrained malfeasance and secured public accountability" (139). He argues that the wars which required the expansion of the state apparatus were "fought to preserve the revolution of 1688, to avert the return of James II, whom Louis supported, and to avoid the Catholicism and executive intrusion" of his reign (140). "The Glorious Revolution was not only a Protestant but a 'country' revolution, concerned both to preserve the true faith as England's official religion and to reduce the powers of central government. But in order to protect the revolution from its enemies, the powers of the state had perforce to grow as never before" (142). Country politicians - essentially opposition politics - limited the excesses of government.
Brewer notes in part 1 that the English state - which after the Act of Union in 1707 effectively served as the nucleus for the British state - had 3 key advantages from the late medieval period. The first of these was "its centralization in the period between the tenth and thirteenth centuries" (3). This early centralization meant that while "regionalism was not absent... it lacked any institutional focus to challenge the authority of the central state" (5) lacking the particularism and heterogeneity of the French state apparatus (6).
The second advantage was England's escape from continental wars between the end of the 100 Years' War in the mid-15th century and the beginning of the second hundred years' war in 1688. "In a period of ferocious and continuous warfare, England was remarkable for its lack of participation in international conflict and for its many years of peace. England, in other words, was not a major participant in the so-called 'Military Revolution'" which greatly increased the scale of war in Early Modern Europe (7-8).
The third advantage was largely a consequence of the second; because England was not heavily militarized and had relatively less need of funds in the late medieval and early modern periods, the English entered the 18th century with a much smaller class of venal officeholders. "England's greatest advantage was that it was never put to the sort of grueling fiscal-military test that year after year drain the nation of its resources and the treasury of its wealth... for the proliferation and sale of offices... was the necessary price that the absolutist ruler paid for waging major wars" (21).
Part 2 details the nature of the fiscal-military state as it emerged in Britain. Britain gave a unique emphasis to its navy - an emphasis that was"singularly appropriate for a state which governed a commercial society with such a substantial commitment to overseas trade" (34). Three features were critical to the raising of vast sums necessary for fiscal-military state formation: "the existence of a powerful representative with undisputed powers of national taxation; the presence of a commercialized economy whose structure made it comparatively easy to tax; and the deployment of fiscal expertise that made borrowing against tax income an easy tax" (42). Crucially, taxation was centralized and publicized. Anglo-British warmaking in the 18th century was managed by public offices - "from the mid-17th century states began to exercise an unprecedented control over the business of war, largely because they succeeded in improving their administrative capacity" (64).
Part III contains chapter 5, "The Paradoxes of State Power." Here Brewer answers "why, in what is conventionally viewed as the most unstate-like of states, did the government manage both to cope with the pressures of war and to retain much of its integrity?" He says "first, William and his followers were the beneficiaries of the administrative reforms initiated by their predecessors. ... Secondly, the commons restrained malfeasance and secured public accountability" (139). He argues that the wars which required the expansion of the state apparatus were "fought to preserve the revolution of 1688, to avert the return of James II, whom Louis supported, and to avoid the Catholicism and executive intrusion" of his reign (140). "The Glorious Revolution was not only a Protestant but a 'country' revolution, concerned both to preserve the true faith as England's official religion and to reduce the powers of central government. But in order to protect the revolution from its enemies, the powers of the state had perforce to grow as never before" (142). Country politicians - essentially opposition politics - limited the excesses of government.