librarianonparade's review against another edition

Go to review page

4.0

The title of this book refers to the Doomsday Clock, a symbolic clock which charts how close mankind is to global catastrophe, which is obviously 'midnight'. The clock was never adjusted during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the events of which took place over too short a period for the clock to be 'officially' adjusted, but had it been one minute is probably a pretty accurate adjustment. This book takes an hour-by-hour overview of the thirteen days of the Missile Crisis, from the American, Soviet and Cuban viewpoints. It includes a lot of information that has only recently come to light, such as the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons that were aimed at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base or the American U-2 spy-plane that got lost during a routine mission over the North Pole and strayed in Soviet airspace right at the height of the confrontation. It's a very good book, and the hour-by-hour format really makes you appreciate the tension of the major players and how close things came. Dobbs also makes you realise, by charting not just the actions of Kennedy and Khrushchev, but the soldiers and civilians on the ground, how much of an illusion control is and how easily things could have spiralled beyond retreat or redemption.

pendar's review

Go to review page

informative medium-paced

5.0

mtyanco's review against another edition

Go to review page

4.0

“The real good fortune is that men as sane and level-headed as John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev occupied the White House and the Kremlin in October 1962.”
This book recounts many little instances during the “thirteen days” of the Cuban Missile Crisis where nuclear war nearly became a reality. Khrushchev and Kennedy were finally able to come to terms before nuclear weapons were used. Good thing too! The world would be drastically different if they had listened to some of their hawkish advisors urging them to strike the enemy first.

thomasroche's review against another edition

Go to review page

4.0

This book did not feel overly coherent, but I still enjoyed it. It consists of too many disparate anecdotes to feel like an incisive analysis or history of the crisis. Nonetheless, many of its pieces parts are GREAT. Most interesting is the author's takedown of Kennedy-as-Messiah theories of the Cuban Missile Crisis, at the end of the book. I am a big admirer of Kennedy in many respects, but his handling of the Crisis was not above reproach. The author takes the view that reason prevailed on both sides, and that there was no eye-to-eye stand-off, but a more complicated interaction of clusterfuck and close call. Dobbs is not quite a proponent of the "sheer dumb luck" view that Robert McNamara took in later years, but he certainly gives that idea a fair hearing, in a compelling and chilling way. I also very much enjoyed the very vivid vignettes about front-line pilots and ship crews interacting. The Russian side of the conflict is not as well represented as the American, but there is more info about the Russian perception than in previous English-language books on the subject.

Overall, a decent read and an interesting take on the Crisis and the cold war.

ronindune's review against another edition

Go to review page

4.0

A poetic, in-depth look at the worst nuclear crisis of the 20th century, told from the perspectives of those who are usually forgotten. Argues persuasively against conventional wisdom and infallible traditional power-brokers.

garyboland's review

Go to review page

2.0

Overly detailed with trivia e.g. where someone grew up, school grades etc but still compelling piece of history. Would have rated higher if narrative was tighter

cydelafield's review

Go to review page

4.0

So far I have learned that in the first few days of the Cuban missile crisis, an Air Force lieutenant colonel of the 509th Bombardment Wing had to buy fuel for the B-47s with his personal credit card at a Mobile station in Boston because arrangements weren't made with Logan airport to host a strategic bombing force.

This book is great.

tiedyedude's review against another edition

Go to review page

4.0

I am fascinated by the Cold War era, and this book provides an exhaustive look at the Cuban Missile Crisis. Avoiding the pitfalls of overdramatization, Dobbs highlights, almost casually, how easily we could have slipped into nuclear war. Great book.
Sometimes to its detriment, the narration lacked emphasis, and there was also so much detailed information, it was very easy to miss key moments. I think it would have been better to read the print.

alexbond3's review

Go to review page

4.0

It’s hard to intellectually accept, even today, how close the world came to nuclear apocalypse in October 1962. It’s just a hard thing to imagine, especially given the near total lack of military conflict in or near the United States, that tens of millions of people came hours - even minutes - away from being vaporized, with literally thousands of massive mushroom clouds darkening the sky around the world. This book delves into a mountain of materials, newly unclassified after five decades, that detail just what happened, minute to minute, to bring us closer to World War III than we ever were or have been since. It’s written like a journalistic thriller. I was most struck by how savvy and cool-headed John Kennedy remained, all while dealing with a scarily instinctual, uneducated counterpart in Khrushchev, who had his own, even more unhinged and unpredictable revolutionary, Fidel Castro, shouting absurdly irresponsible demands in Khrushchev’s ear both during and after the crisis. Kennedy also had to deal with idiotically hawkish military advisors and a slew of physical ailments, not to mention his sustained philandering. Thank goodness he overcame all these obstacles, and had his brother Bobby there too to help keep him sane.

charliemudd's review

Go to review page

3.0

Audio book: Very well researched with a lot of good content, but a little chaotic. I understand the Cuban Missle Crisis was chaotic, but I lost track of some of the threads in this book. Probably would have been better as a read, and also if two of the discs weren't scratched and skipped. Dobbs concludes that both Kennedy and Kruschev were tyring to stop the war machine that they had both put in place, and both of them were scared of what they had started. The "eyeball to eyeball" story never happened, and Kruschev pretty much turned his ships around as soon as the quarantine was announced. Castro proved that he was emotional and crazy, as we all knew, but many of the stories that came from the crisis were untrue and hurt us by causing the hubris that was Vietnam.