Reviews

On War by Carl Von Clausewitz

roader22's review against another edition

adventurous challenging informative reflective slow-paced

4.25

hey_hoser's review against another edition

Very dry

jchammer's review against another edition

5.0

Lots of gems packed into this one. The later books have more details based on 18th and 19th century tactics, but bites of wisdom can be pulled even from those and applied to modern strategic warfare.

nwstender's review against another edition

informative reflective fast-paced

5.0

a_chandler_blake's review against another edition

challenging informative reflective slow-paced

4.25

srbolton's review against another edition

Reading the analytical essays that accompany vC's work to give better context to the Emile Simpson work on Afghanistan and war viewed from a policy context.

ferris_mx's review against another edition

3.0

Is this what the age of reason was about? I need to review. An interesting attempt to systematize knowledge of war and classify, categorize, and conclude a military science. Of course applicability to modern times is much less than Clausewitz imagined - and the key conclusions such as "war is the continuation of policy by other means" can hardly be held above the incomplete conclusions of the rest of the work. But, he tried, I'll give him that much.

wwatts1734's review against another edition

5.0

"On War" is one of those books that was at the same time amazingly influential and almost never actually read. While Clausewitz is quoted and discussed by military men repeatedly, it fascinates me how many military officers serve long and distinguished careers without ever having read this book. In many ways this is understandable. Clausewitz is very philosophical and abstract, to the point that many of his ideas are simply not applicable to everyday military planning. One must also remember that, despite the frequency with which he is cited, Clausewitz was a radical and very much opposed to the thinking of military men in his own day, and certainly in ours. While Clausewitz wrote in the first half of the 19th Century, his thought never really came to be accepted in the armies of France, Britain or the United States until well into the 20th century. Why was that? For one thing, Clausewitz bucked tradition by refusing to write about historical examples from antiquity. While most military authors waxed eloquently about the battles of Cannae, Thermopylae and Agincourt, Clausewitz felt, correctly I believe, that it is useless to take military lessons from battles so long ago because the tactics and technology of those days were very different from our own. For another thing, Clausewitz wrote far more at length about the defense, praising the defense as an excellent way to buy time and attrit the enemy before wearing him down enough to take the initiative in the attack. In most militaries of the 19th Century such thinking was heresy. The attack was the decisive form of battle, and it took on the aspect of almost a religion among military planners. These thinkers would scoff at the tendency of Clausewitz to praise the defense and discuss it at such great length. Finally, Clausewitz discussed the goal of a military campaign, not to take the enemy's capital, some key fortification or some key terrain feature, but rather to attack the enemy's "Center of Gravity". This concept applied to whatever it was that drove the enemy's military strength. In most cases this would be his forces, but perhaps it could be his ideology or perhaps even his leaders. Again, such thinking was scoffed by military thinkers who were sure that their objective must be some fixed location on the map. It was only in the wars of the 20th Century that we have learned how even an insignificant place like Stalingrad or Omaha Beach could be so decisive in war.

This particular edition of "On War" is undoubtedly the best one out there. The introduction gives the reader a great background on Clausewitz and the world in which he lived. Since most of us are relatively unfamiliar with the wars of Fredrick the Great, or the wars of the French Revolution and Napolean, this insight is invaluable. Reading this really made me want to understand better the Napoleanic era about which Clausewitz writes. Another thing that fascinated me about this book is how similar Clausewitz's view of war was to the view of Adam Smith concerning the economy. Whereas Smith spelled out the key components of the economy as land, labor, capital, transportation and entrepreneurial ability, Clausewitz discusses the five great elements of military success as the terrain, the troops, the weapons, maneuver and generalship. It would be fascinating to compare and contrast these similarities, especially since military theory has in recent years become so much in vogue among Corporate executives.

Overall I would highly recommend this book to everyone who is interested in military theory. It is an indispensable read for military leaders. And this edition is particularly valuable for both.

binstonbirchill's review against another edition

3.0

It's a good idea to have some knowledge of the campaigns of Napoleon and Fredrick the Great before reading this. Knowledge of their campaigns (and a few others to a lesser extent) is assumed by the author. The first half of the book contains a good amount of theory that could also be applicable to non-military situations, the second half is almost exclusively applicable to war. There is no in-depth analysis of specific campaigns or battles but rather little snippets that apply to each situation that von Clausewitz analyses. The book is not so much about the hard and fast rules of war, since there are none, instead this is an attempt to give the reader an almost scientific look at what is involved in the planning of a campaign.

bloodyfool0's review against another edition

2.0

Man, this author waffles on and on. Such a mediocre read.