Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. by Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Thrainn Eggertsson, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Randall Calvert
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions.

Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Thrainn Eggertsson, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Randall Calvert

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions.

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions

Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney, Thrainn Eggertsson, Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Randall Calvert

406 pages first pub 2006 (editions)

nonfiction challenging informative reflective slow-paced
Powered by AI (Beta)
Loading...

Description

Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Exam...

Read more

Community Reviews

Loading...

Content Warnings

Loading...