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A review by ptisdel
Interventions: A Life in War and Peace by Kofi Annan
3.0
A solid review of UN interventions under Annan's tenure as Sec-General. As he says, the UN is not a pacifist organization, but he seems torn over some of his decisions that, in his mind, may have led to unnecessary bloodshed.
His main contribution to UN leadership seems to be the perspective of "serving individuals, not states," which led to R2P, or Responsibility to Protect - a formalization of the UN's responsibility in intervening in state-internal human rights abuses. This seems to be reaction to a series of atrocities in the 90s, in which the UN's choice was between acting with the consent of member states and acting to save lives.
He seems of two minds about it, though. I'll give one of several illustrations. In the 90s, the UN strictly required 1) the consent of states to intervene in domestic conflicts and 2) the an endorsement from the Security Council. This has worked relatively well, with its best positive use probably being the Gulf War. The framework divides wars into the illegal and increasingly shunned, versus the legal and well-coordinated.
However, this set the UN up to sit on its heels in cases of state-internal genocide, or in cases of a rogue permanent SC member vetoing intervention. This was the case in Rwanda, when the UN desperately bid for support in a peacemaking mission, but the other major powers declined endorsement (the US, for example, had been bitten by a foolish mission into Somalia, and interventions were not popular; Clinton's hands were tied).
Rwanda gave Amman a crisis of confidence; how could the UN serve individuals, not states, in such an environment?
Determined not to let Rwanda happen again, Annan unofficially endorsed an upcoming NATO intervention in Kosovo, without SC approval and state-internal. It saved lives, but Annan now fears set a terrible precedent for ignoring the Security Council requirement, and perhaps led indirectly to the US/UK ignoring the SC in pursuit of its disastrous war in Iraq. He's afraid he changed the normative structure of interventions that made calamity more likely in sum. I am tempted to say he is right.
Like nearly all world leaders, he can be a bit formal and long-winded, but he was a vastly easier read than Tang JiaXuan. Not quire as good as Wendy Sherman. But you got to see how a SG works, and that's illuminating. And he freely admitted his failings, in direct terms. Refreshing.
His main contribution to UN leadership seems to be the perspective of "serving individuals, not states," which led to R2P, or Responsibility to Protect - a formalization of the UN's responsibility in intervening in state-internal human rights abuses. This seems to be reaction to a series of atrocities in the 90s, in which the UN's choice was between acting with the consent of member states and acting to save lives.
He seems of two minds about it, though. I'll give one of several illustrations. In the 90s, the UN strictly required 1) the consent of states to intervene in domestic conflicts and 2) the an endorsement from the Security Council. This has worked relatively well, with its best positive use probably being the Gulf War. The framework divides wars into the illegal and increasingly shunned, versus the legal and well-coordinated.
However, this set the UN up to sit on its heels in cases of state-internal genocide, or in cases of a rogue permanent SC member vetoing intervention. This was the case in Rwanda, when the UN desperately bid for support in a peacemaking mission, but the other major powers declined endorsement (the US, for example, had been bitten by a foolish mission into Somalia, and interventions were not popular; Clinton's hands were tied).
Rwanda gave Amman a crisis of confidence; how could the UN serve individuals, not states, in such an environment?
Determined not to let Rwanda happen again, Annan unofficially endorsed an upcoming NATO intervention in Kosovo, without SC approval and state-internal. It saved lives, but Annan now fears set a terrible precedent for ignoring the Security Council requirement, and perhaps led indirectly to the US/UK ignoring the SC in pursuit of its disastrous war in Iraq. He's afraid he changed the normative structure of interventions that made calamity more likely in sum. I am tempted to say he is right.
Like nearly all world leaders, he can be a bit formal and long-winded, but he was a vastly easier read than Tang JiaXuan. Not quire as good as Wendy Sherman. But you got to see how a SG works, and that's illuminating. And he freely admitted his failings, in direct terms. Refreshing.