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A review by armin_nikkhah_shirazi
A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time by Adrian Bardon
3.0
The introduction actually provides a really good overview on how philosophers go about investigating any difficult issue and connects the discussion of their methods to time.
Chapter 1 "Time and Change" contrasts the Eleatic (Parmenides, Zeno) idealist view of a timeless world with Aristotle's relationist response, which only partly addresses their objections to the existence of time, then moves on to the idealism of St. Augustine, pointing out the flaw in his view as well (where do temporal concepts or "ideas" come from in a timeless universe?)
Chapter 2 "Idealism and Experience" Discusses Locke's realist empiricist view on time and a mistake in it. I learned that Locke, primarily known as a political philosopher, developed empiricism ("All we learn is through experience and reflection upon it") as a direct reaction to the then prevailing claim that political and religious authorities had special insights to The Truth hidden from common folks, thus justifying their exalted status.
Then Kant's idealism is explained, but other than that his view also has problems, it was difficult to understand. (personal note:I think Kant is overrated simply because his ideas are apparently so difficult to understand or unclear that different philosophers come to different, and at times mutually contradictory conclusions about what he meant. That, to me, is not the mark of good philosophy, which is above all characterized by clarity). Finally, more modern philosophical approaches are discussed and compared to the results of psychology experiments like the phi phenomenon, Flash lag effect, the cutaneous rabbit and cross-saccadic continuity, which indicate that to a certain extent, we "reconstruct" time, duration or temporal order in our minds.
Chapter 3 "Time and spacetime" first describes the features of a Newtonian conception of time (and space) as an absolute thing in of itself, which replaced the relationist view of Aristotle and his physics, which considered time as essentially a device for tracking change. Subsequently, it contrasts it first with Leibniz's view of time as a relation between events, then with Einstein's relativity, where realism about time is replaced by realism about spacetime.
Chapter 4 "Does time pass?" Is divided into "reasons to think not" and "why it seems it does". The first part gives an accessible account of McTaggart's argument against the passage of time (though I don't follow why the problem with his A-theory isn't already in the set-up, by taking a future contingent to be true. "P will happen" in a sense can never be true: before it has happened, it is not a fact yet, and once it happens and thereafter, it has already happened. I see his infinite regress as merely confirming that we cannot take a future contingent to be true, not an argument against the passage of time).
Then it gives a reason against passing time from special relativity, but stumbles. It says "as strange as it sounds, if relativity is right then the dynamic theory of time is wrong". No! Only any *global* dynamic theory of time is wrong. But then, already the relativity of simultaneity tells us that time in relativity cannot be global. The insistence on "globalizing" time in relativity is what leads to the block universe view.
The second part does a good job of showing the drastic consequences of a static view, which unfortunately too few of its proponents seem to be aware of, e.g. rendering reality unknowable beyond our immediate sense impressions by annihilating causality, laws, probabilities etc. Everything becomes just one grand set of conjunctions e.g. each time you drop an object, it cannot be that the law of gravity "causes" it to fall, since a "cause" would presuppose a dynamic "before" and "after", which in a static universe do not exist. There is no law, only a conjunction of an object falling with an object being dropped.
The author then gives his own theory that the passage of time is mind-dependent: a psychological projection, the ascription of objective status to something inherently subjective, like color or virtue. The final passage in the chapter in my opinion throws the towel too soon on the prospect of science ever becoming reconcilable with our experience of time.
Chapter 5 "The arrow of time" briefly discusses the psychological, thermodynamic and causal arrows. It then brings in quantum physics and makes the claim that quantum entanglement "fundamentally conflicts with standard relativistic physics".
The issue is a very subtle one, and until we understand the mechanism for the enforcement of the quantum correlations, we cannot be absolutely certain, but under the standard textbook interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the assumption that nothing is being superluminally trasmitted(very likely), the claim is false. I have explained this in some detail here:
https://www.quora.com/Does-quantum-entanglement-violate-special-relativity/answer/Armin-Nikkhah-Shirazi
Retrocausation is considered favorably by viewing causation as a human projection enabled by the thermodynamic arrow of time against a fundamentally time-symmetric universe.
Chapter 6"Is time travel possible?" considers the question first from a logical perspective, discussing the grandfather paradox and concluding that it does not logically prohibit travel into one's past but only inconsistent stories about how the world is through time. It then considers time travel from the perspective of physical possibility, briefly discussing the Gödel Universe, wormholes and the twin paradox before concluding that, in the sense portrayed in science fiction, it is practically impossible to travel into one's past. It concludes with the question of why in a static universe travel into the future ("aging") is so much easier than travel into the past. I personally interpret this as evidence that the universe is not static.
Chapter 7 "Time and Freedom" begins by discussing forms of fatalism, which involves the absence of alternative possibilities: logical fatalism is discussed as a consequence of the application of two logical principles to future events: the principle of bivalence (also called law of excluded middle) and the principle of non-contradiction and implies that we are not free. In my view, the problem here is that non-modal logic is applied to an inherently modal situation, so I see logical fatalism as the result of misapplying logic. Metaphysical fatalism is discussed in relation to the static universe, and a way to escape absence of freedom due to Oaklander is proposed which I had trouble understanding as such.
Causal determinism is contrasted with fatalism (determinism: causal chain necessitates a particular future, fatalism: if statements about the future are timelessly true or false, then everything necessarily occurs as it does occur) and is then linked to scientific naturalism.
Compatibilism is offered as a response to both determinism and fatalism and some its implications are considered.
Chapter 8 " Could the Universe have no beginning or end in time?" expands the scope of inquiry to the entire universe, contrasting the views of Aristotle, Kant and Leibniz with modern cosmological findings, giving a brief review of modern physics as well as speculative extrapolations of it, and also delving into some theological questions. It concludes by wondering whether certain questions are simply unanswerable.
The epilogue considers this in more depth for the question "what is time?", coming down on the side that time may be more of an answer, namely to the question of how we organize our experiences as well as events all around the world. It concludes with a brief review of the many issues touched in the book.
Overall, this is a mostly good and accessible introduction to the philosophy of time. There are a few mistakes here and there (Leibniz was German, not Austrian; an infinitesimal distance is not zero etc.) but not enough to drag the work down significantly, except for a couple physics mistakes: 1) the author's failure to recognize that special relativity does allow for a local dynamic description of time, 2) the almost certainly false claim that Quantum Entanglement "fundamentally conflicts" with special relativity.
As the author's sympathies for a fundamentally static universe seem to spring in part from these misapprehensions, they should be taken with a grain of salt.
Chapter 1 "Time and Change" contrasts the Eleatic (Parmenides, Zeno) idealist view of a timeless world with Aristotle's relationist response, which only partly addresses their objections to the existence of time, then moves on to the idealism of St. Augustine, pointing out the flaw in his view as well (where do temporal concepts or "ideas" come from in a timeless universe?)
Chapter 2 "Idealism and Experience" Discusses Locke's realist empiricist view on time and a mistake in it. I learned that Locke, primarily known as a political philosopher, developed empiricism ("All we learn is through experience and reflection upon it") as a direct reaction to the then prevailing claim that political and religious authorities had special insights to The Truth hidden from common folks, thus justifying their exalted status.
Then Kant's idealism is explained, but other than that his view also has problems, it was difficult to understand. (personal note:I think Kant is overrated simply because his ideas are apparently so difficult to understand or unclear that different philosophers come to different, and at times mutually contradictory conclusions about what he meant. That, to me, is not the mark of good philosophy, which is above all characterized by clarity). Finally, more modern philosophical approaches are discussed and compared to the results of psychology experiments like the phi phenomenon, Flash lag effect, the cutaneous rabbit and cross-saccadic continuity, which indicate that to a certain extent, we "reconstruct" time, duration or temporal order in our minds.
Chapter 3 "Time and spacetime" first describes the features of a Newtonian conception of time (and space) as an absolute thing in of itself, which replaced the relationist view of Aristotle and his physics, which considered time as essentially a device for tracking change. Subsequently, it contrasts it first with Leibniz's view of time as a relation between events, then with Einstein's relativity, where realism about time is replaced by realism about spacetime.
Chapter 4 "Does time pass?" Is divided into "reasons to think not" and "why it seems it does". The first part gives an accessible account of McTaggart's argument against the passage of time (though I don't follow why the problem with his A-theory isn't already in the set-up, by taking a future contingent to be true. "P will happen" in a sense can never be true: before it has happened, it is not a fact yet, and once it happens and thereafter, it has already happened. I see his infinite regress as merely confirming that we cannot take a future contingent to be true, not an argument against the passage of time).
Then it gives a reason against passing time from special relativity, but stumbles. It says "as strange as it sounds, if relativity is right then the dynamic theory of time is wrong". No! Only any *global* dynamic theory of time is wrong. But then, already the relativity of simultaneity tells us that time in relativity cannot be global. The insistence on "globalizing" time in relativity is what leads to the block universe view.
The second part does a good job of showing the drastic consequences of a static view, which unfortunately too few of its proponents seem to be aware of, e.g. rendering reality unknowable beyond our immediate sense impressions by annihilating causality, laws, probabilities etc. Everything becomes just one grand set of conjunctions e.g. each time you drop an object, it cannot be that the law of gravity "causes" it to fall, since a "cause" would presuppose a dynamic "before" and "after", which in a static universe do not exist. There is no law, only a conjunction of an object falling with an object being dropped.
The author then gives his own theory that the passage of time is mind-dependent: a psychological projection, the ascription of objective status to something inherently subjective, like color or virtue. The final passage in the chapter in my opinion throws the towel too soon on the prospect of science ever becoming reconcilable with our experience of time.
Chapter 5 "The arrow of time" briefly discusses the psychological, thermodynamic and causal arrows. It then brings in quantum physics and makes the claim that quantum entanglement "fundamentally conflicts with standard relativistic physics".
The issue is a very subtle one, and until we understand the mechanism for the enforcement of the quantum correlations, we cannot be absolutely certain, but under the standard textbook interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the assumption that nothing is being superluminally trasmitted(very likely), the claim is false. I have explained this in some detail here:
https://www.quora.com/Does-quantum-entanglement-violate-special-relativity/answer/Armin-Nikkhah-Shirazi
Retrocausation is considered favorably by viewing causation as a human projection enabled by the thermodynamic arrow of time against a fundamentally time-symmetric universe.
Chapter 6"Is time travel possible?" considers the question first from a logical perspective, discussing the grandfather paradox and concluding that it does not logically prohibit travel into one's past but only inconsistent stories about how the world is through time. It then considers time travel from the perspective of physical possibility, briefly discussing the Gödel Universe, wormholes and the twin paradox before concluding that, in the sense portrayed in science fiction, it is practically impossible to travel into one's past. It concludes with the question of why in a static universe travel into the future ("aging") is so much easier than travel into the past. I personally interpret this as evidence that the universe is not static.
Chapter 7 "Time and Freedom" begins by discussing forms of fatalism, which involves the absence of alternative possibilities: logical fatalism is discussed as a consequence of the application of two logical principles to future events: the principle of bivalence (also called law of excluded middle) and the principle of non-contradiction and implies that we are not free. In my view, the problem here is that non-modal logic is applied to an inherently modal situation, so I see logical fatalism as the result of misapplying logic. Metaphysical fatalism is discussed in relation to the static universe, and a way to escape absence of freedom due to Oaklander is proposed which I had trouble understanding as such.
Causal determinism is contrasted with fatalism (determinism: causal chain necessitates a particular future, fatalism: if statements about the future are timelessly true or false, then everything necessarily occurs as it does occur) and is then linked to scientific naturalism.
Compatibilism is offered as a response to both determinism and fatalism and some its implications are considered.
Chapter 8 " Could the Universe have no beginning or end in time?" expands the scope of inquiry to the entire universe, contrasting the views of Aristotle, Kant and Leibniz with modern cosmological findings, giving a brief review of modern physics as well as speculative extrapolations of it, and also delving into some theological questions. It concludes by wondering whether certain questions are simply unanswerable.
The epilogue considers this in more depth for the question "what is time?", coming down on the side that time may be more of an answer, namely to the question of how we organize our experiences as well as events all around the world. It concludes with a brief review of the many issues touched in the book.
Overall, this is a mostly good and accessible introduction to the philosophy of time. There are a few mistakes here and there (Leibniz was German, not Austrian; an infinitesimal distance is not zero etc.) but not enough to drag the work down significantly, except for a couple physics mistakes: 1) the author's failure to recognize that special relativity does allow for a local dynamic description of time, 2) the almost certainly false claim that Quantum Entanglement "fundamentally conflicts" with special relativity.
As the author's sympathies for a fundamentally static universe seem to spring in part from these misapprehensions, they should be taken with a grain of salt.