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A review by bucketoffish
Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? by Graham Allison
4.0
I think this book has an interesting thesis and is well-argued. It uses applied history to look at instances where one dominant power has become threatened by the coupled economic and military rise of another power. In recognition of the realpolitik principle that international agreements are backed by military force, the rising power threatens to gain more sway on the international stage, with the current power standing to lose influence. If this situation arises, the actual intentions of the two parties become essentially irrelevant - the ground becomes set for conflict.
Allison analyzes multiple instances in history where this type of situation has occurred, and discusses the events that followed. The situation begins like this: the leading power is maintaining some kind of international order (control of trade routes, economic systems, colonies, military bases, political alliances, etc.) which is detrimental in some way to the rising power. The rising power now feels strong enough to resist the systems put in place by the leading power. If it were the case of a weaker state, the leading power could simply force compliance via blockades, military threats, government overthrow, or economic sanctions, but these tactics aren't necessarily effective if the rising power has become strong enough to stand up for itself. If there is no clear stronger party, then disagreements could lead to actual fighting, rather than deference to the international law upheld by the stronger state.
Most often in the cases studied, the parties involved didn't actually want war, but were led to it almost against their will. In the case of conflicts of essential national interests, there is often a slow ramping up, essentially a game of chicken, where the goal is to get the other country to back down and accept the new (or current) order without actual use of force. The problem is that a country can't simply give up its own interests without any protest, but if shows of force continue to escalate on both sides to a point short of actual conflict, then a small incident can cross the line and set an actual war in motion. In almost all of the cases studied, the spark for war was something tangential to the main conflict, or even based on misinformation, but since tensions had already built so high, the advent of war was now unstoppable. The balancing act here is to get the other country to back down by getting as close to a war as possible without actually having a war (which is usually a lose-lose situation for both sides). But obviously this situation is unstable.
In most cases studied in the Thucydides Trap Project, nations in these situations have ended up at war, but there were several instances where war was successfully averted. Allison talks a bit about these situations, but I feel that his analysis here was a bit weak. Overall though, I still feel the book presents a valuable viewpoint and was well argued.
Allison analyzes multiple instances in history where this type of situation has occurred, and discusses the events that followed. The situation begins like this: the leading power is maintaining some kind of international order (control of trade routes, economic systems, colonies, military bases, political alliances, etc.) which is detrimental in some way to the rising power. The rising power now feels strong enough to resist the systems put in place by the leading power. If it were the case of a weaker state, the leading power could simply force compliance via blockades, military threats, government overthrow, or economic sanctions, but these tactics aren't necessarily effective if the rising power has become strong enough to stand up for itself. If there is no clear stronger party, then disagreements could lead to actual fighting, rather than deference to the international law upheld by the stronger state.
Most often in the cases studied, the parties involved didn't actually want war, but were led to it almost against their will. In the case of conflicts of essential national interests, there is often a slow ramping up, essentially a game of chicken, where the goal is to get the other country to back down and accept the new (or current) order without actual use of force. The problem is that a country can't simply give up its own interests without any protest, but if shows of force continue to escalate on both sides to a point short of actual conflict, then a small incident can cross the line and set an actual war in motion. In almost all of the cases studied, the spark for war was something tangential to the main conflict, or even based on misinformation, but since tensions had already built so high, the advent of war was now unstoppable. The balancing act here is to get the other country to back down by getting as close to a war as possible without actually having a war (which is usually a lose-lose situation for both sides). But obviously this situation is unstable.
In most cases studied in the Thucydides Trap Project, nations in these situations have ended up at war, but there were several instances where war was successfully averted. Allison talks a bit about these situations, but I feel that his analysis here was a bit weak. Overall though, I still feel the book presents a valuable viewpoint and was well argued.