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A review by canada_matt
A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and The Creation of the Modern Middle East by David Fromkin
4.0
Fromkin's thorough and highly exploratory piece on the creation of the modern Middle East is a delight for the armchair historian and academic alike. With clear and well-developed arguments throughout, a plethora of first-hand documentation, and plausible theses, the book moves effectively through its three main tenets and leaves the reader with a better understanding of the situation at the time and in the current political as well as social denouement. Fromkin argues three key points worth exploring below as it relates to the formation of the modern Middle East: loss of the Great War; post-war treaty divisions; and, the lack of foundational European imperialism. Fromkin argues the aforementioned points effectively and leaves the reader to judge whose fault the entire mess could fall to, though it is doubtful the modern actors would take the credit for their predecessors. A stellar piece of work that anyone with an itch for history would surely find captivating.
'To the victors, the spoils!' So goes the adage and how true it is in this context. Fromkin illustrates, through two-thirds of the book, that the modern Middle East was greatly shaped by the side it (for simplicity purposes, let us unite the Ottoman Empire as a cohesive and non-porous entity) chose in the Great War. Turning to Germany, the Ottomans fought alongside the Kaiser in an attempt to hold its territory and defend the honour it had nurtures for half a millennium. While many readers may be familiar with the European arena of war, Fromkin turns the focus of the book on the Asiatic region, specifically that territory under Ottoman control. Taking direction from German military leaders, Ottoman armies were able, for a time, to hold off troops from Britain, France, and Russia, but did eventually fall victim to the larger defeat that befell the German military. This was, inevitably, the first step towards reshaping the Middle East, as the victors took it upon themselves to claim ownership and direct rule over the defeated (and deflated) Empire. The loss in the Great War did play a key role in shaping the modern Middle East, in that it allowed the intoxicated Powers to bandy about ideas for colonising the region in a way that had partially ruined parts of Europe and Africa. The aforementioned adage could have potentially ruined modern political and geography harmony within the region, all due to the European power gluttony that took place as soon as the ink on the armistice documents was left to dry.
Fromkin's second key argument related to the modern outcome of the region relates to the power-sharing and territorial smorgasbord the victors imposed on the region. France and Britain took special delight in carving up the region and negotiating treaties to shape these newly independent states in their own image. The two other powers, the United States and Russia, were not as effective in wresting power for themselves (the latter due to its democratic system whereby Congress would not uphold the treaties negotiated on Woodrow Wilson's behalf and the latter because of English-French greed to keep any region from falling to the Bolsheviks), but did play a small role in the early stages of treaty negotiations. While seen as a single entity in modern geography (though keeping its independent states), the Middle East was turned into a sausage-making experiment, jamming many ideas into one area in hopes that something productive might ensue. This was not the case, nor did it effectively work in the short-term. Fromkin's arcing thesis for the book can best be summed up in his own words in the latter pages of this work: “The Middle East became what it is today both because the European powers undertook to re-shape it and because Britain and France failed to ensure that the dynasties, the states, and the political system that they established would permanently endure.”
In addition to this treaty-negotiation venture, one area bandied about for long periods of time, but never effectively actioned was the role of a Jewish State. Arguments were made by both Britain and France, outlining the importance of this (the Balfour Declaration was also newly minted), but nothing came to fruition, even while its importance spanned pages of Fromkin's narrative. Hindsight being what it is, could proper and thorough negotiations have been undertaken to effectively push for a Jewish State (choosing the modern location of Israel), the 'coming home' might have taken place, leaving the new German regime from enacting its atrocities and keeping Stalin from instilling his demented Soviet pogroms on the Jews. All this can, again, be summed up by Fromkin's aforementioned quote and only goes to illustrate how poorly the victors handled the entire process.
Fromkin's final argument about the development of the modern Middle East flows directly from its second. After trying to instil order in the region with puppet governments and like-minded leaders, the two European powers stood back and watched. They let these regimes flounder and saw countless states revert to old ways, though this time without the umbrella of Ottoman guidance. Fromkin makes a point (and a simplistic one at that) throughout, that these states were not only under Ottoman rule for centuries, but also that their ways of life were completely different from European political and social norms. Nomadic rather than aristocratic; survivalist rather than socially-minded; Muslim rather than Christian. The great differences abound, which only go to show how this loose imperialism could not help but fail, especially when the two political puppeteers would not stand by their work and force its development in their own images. Infighting amongst the allies did not help either, but it was this pathetic straw foundation on which these new nation-states were placed that made their westernised failure all but inevitable. Fromkin pushes this argument from the outset, that Middle Eastern divisions were not made to effectively help the various nation-states to walk on their own two feet after Ottoman rule, but to expand a dwindling imperial dream of two European states whose influence in the world was itself fizzling out faster than anything else.
As a final comment to the reader, while Fromkin's book is by no means a swift read, its attention to detail and strong arguments cannot be matched. Read alongside Margaret MacMillan's PARIS 1919, the reader will see the power (and failure) of post-Great War treaty making and might, if given the chance, help bolster the idea that much of the modern world's issues and challenges, at least from a political and civil unrest perspective in Europe and the Middle East all stem from the negotiations to redesign these regions from 1919-1922. Both books are powerful tomes whose theses leave a full on omelet on the faces of British, French, American, and even Russian politicians. Well worth the invested time and effort of any curious reader.
Kudos, Dr. Fromkin for yet another stellar piece of work surrounding the Great War. I have nothing but the utmost praise for you and all you do.
'To the victors, the spoils!' So goes the adage and how true it is in this context. Fromkin illustrates, through two-thirds of the book, that the modern Middle East was greatly shaped by the side it (for simplicity purposes, let us unite the Ottoman Empire as a cohesive and non-porous entity) chose in the Great War. Turning to Germany, the Ottomans fought alongside the Kaiser in an attempt to hold its territory and defend the honour it had nurtures for half a millennium. While many readers may be familiar with the European arena of war, Fromkin turns the focus of the book on the Asiatic region, specifically that territory under Ottoman control. Taking direction from German military leaders, Ottoman armies were able, for a time, to hold off troops from Britain, France, and Russia, but did eventually fall victim to the larger defeat that befell the German military. This was, inevitably, the first step towards reshaping the Middle East, as the victors took it upon themselves to claim ownership and direct rule over the defeated (and deflated) Empire. The loss in the Great War did play a key role in shaping the modern Middle East, in that it allowed the intoxicated Powers to bandy about ideas for colonising the region in a way that had partially ruined parts of Europe and Africa. The aforementioned adage could have potentially ruined modern political and geography harmony within the region, all due to the European power gluttony that took place as soon as the ink on the armistice documents was left to dry.
Fromkin's second key argument related to the modern outcome of the region relates to the power-sharing and territorial smorgasbord the victors imposed on the region. France and Britain took special delight in carving up the region and negotiating treaties to shape these newly independent states in their own image. The two other powers, the United States and Russia, were not as effective in wresting power for themselves (the latter due to its democratic system whereby Congress would not uphold the treaties negotiated on Woodrow Wilson's behalf and the latter because of English-French greed to keep any region from falling to the Bolsheviks), but did play a small role in the early stages of treaty negotiations. While seen as a single entity in modern geography (though keeping its independent states), the Middle East was turned into a sausage-making experiment, jamming many ideas into one area in hopes that something productive might ensue. This was not the case, nor did it effectively work in the short-term. Fromkin's arcing thesis for the book can best be summed up in his own words in the latter pages of this work: “The Middle East became what it is today both because the European powers undertook to re-shape it and because Britain and France failed to ensure that the dynasties, the states, and the political system that they established would permanently endure.”
In addition to this treaty-negotiation venture, one area bandied about for long periods of time, but never effectively actioned was the role of a Jewish State. Arguments were made by both Britain and France, outlining the importance of this (the Balfour Declaration was also newly minted), but nothing came to fruition, even while its importance spanned pages of Fromkin's narrative. Hindsight being what it is, could proper and thorough negotiations have been undertaken to effectively push for a Jewish State (choosing the modern location of Israel), the 'coming home' might have taken place, leaving the new German regime from enacting its atrocities and keeping Stalin from instilling his demented Soviet pogroms on the Jews. All this can, again, be summed up by Fromkin's aforementioned quote and only goes to illustrate how poorly the victors handled the entire process.
Fromkin's final argument about the development of the modern Middle East flows directly from its second. After trying to instil order in the region with puppet governments and like-minded leaders, the two European powers stood back and watched. They let these regimes flounder and saw countless states revert to old ways, though this time without the umbrella of Ottoman guidance. Fromkin makes a point (and a simplistic one at that) throughout, that these states were not only under Ottoman rule for centuries, but also that their ways of life were completely different from European political and social norms. Nomadic rather than aristocratic; survivalist rather than socially-minded; Muslim rather than Christian. The great differences abound, which only go to show how this loose imperialism could not help but fail, especially when the two political puppeteers would not stand by their work and force its development in their own images. Infighting amongst the allies did not help either, but it was this pathetic straw foundation on which these new nation-states were placed that made their westernised failure all but inevitable. Fromkin pushes this argument from the outset, that Middle Eastern divisions were not made to effectively help the various nation-states to walk on their own two feet after Ottoman rule, but to expand a dwindling imperial dream of two European states whose influence in the world was itself fizzling out faster than anything else.
As a final comment to the reader, while Fromkin's book is by no means a swift read, its attention to detail and strong arguments cannot be matched. Read alongside Margaret MacMillan's PARIS 1919, the reader will see the power (and failure) of post-Great War treaty making and might, if given the chance, help bolster the idea that much of the modern world's issues and challenges, at least from a political and civil unrest perspective in Europe and the Middle East all stem from the negotiations to redesign these regions from 1919-1922. Both books are powerful tomes whose theses leave a full on omelet on the faces of British, French, American, and even Russian politicians. Well worth the invested time and effort of any curious reader.
Kudos, Dr. Fromkin for yet another stellar piece of work surrounding the Great War. I have nothing but the utmost praise for you and all you do.