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A review by jgn
Ronald Reagan by Jacob Weisberg
5.0
This is about as concise a biography of Reagan as one could imagine. One reason for this is that apparently Reagan had very little inner life (cf. the Edmund Morris bio), so there's not much to tell about his emotional drama, if it even ever existed.
The book generally considers Reagan to be a great myth-maker, but essentially a hypocrite -- one who would call for the reduction in government, only to, again and again, spend vast amounts of taxpayer money (or go into debt). Weisberg is judicious in his account of the fall of the Soviet regime and the destruction of the Berlin Wall. He never really says whether Reagan's actual position really had anything to do with what happened, but he says again and again that Reagan was the only person in his conservative circles who stuck to and believed in the idea that the Soviet system would collapse on its own (and to support this kind of historical determinism, Reagan even occasionally quoted Marx regarding the flow and inevitability of history).
The book also necessary debunks a lot of the Reagan myth.
For instance, Weisberg dismantles the notion that Reagan was a tax-cutter and government reducer: 'Reagan left the Governor's Mansion in 1975 without any significant record as either a tax cutter or a budget cutter. During his time in office, California's top personal income tax rose from 7 percent to 11 percent, while the sales tax rose from 3 percent to 6 percent, the corporate tax rate went up from 5.5 percent to 9.0 percent, and the top inheritance tax rose from 10 percent to 15 percent. State revenues climbed from $2.9 billion in 1966 (the last year before Reagan took office) to $8.6 billion in 1974 (the last year for which he was responsible). In inflation-adjusted terms, state government doubled on his watch, a faster rate of growth that under his predecessor, Pat Brown, or his successor, Jerry Brown.' (p. 50)
He notes several occasions when Reagan would ignore the facts or not search for them, playing to the biases of his audience. Example: 'On the campaign trail, he would tell the story of a Chicago "welfare queen" who became his emblem of the problem. "She has eight names, thirtyaddresses, twelve Social Security cards and is collecting veteran's benefits on four nonexisting deceased husbands. Ahd she is collecting Social Security on her cards," he said. "She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income is over $150,000." This story was largely accurate, but rested on a mistaken assumption. Middle-class whites who believed that federal social security spending meant transferring their tax dollars to minorities thought that the welfare queen was black, as did Reagan. Linda Taylor, the person on whom the story was based, was actually white.' (p. 54)
He notes that the Reagan boom had everything to do with spending: 'By late 1983 the combination of tax cuts and deficit spending was delivering a tremendous Keynesian boost to the economy. GDP rose 4.6 percent that year. It would rise 7.3 percent in 1984, the economy's best annual performance in two decades.' (p. 111)
And that the 80s generally were not so rosy, economically. There was obviously the slump after his first election, but in the second term, let us not forget the drop in the Dow of 22.6% in one day in October of 1987 (p. 137).
Good index.
About my only complaint is that the book could use a 2-3 page guide to further reading.
The book generally considers Reagan to be a great myth-maker, but essentially a hypocrite -- one who would call for the reduction in government, only to, again and again, spend vast amounts of taxpayer money (or go into debt). Weisberg is judicious in his account of the fall of the Soviet regime and the destruction of the Berlin Wall. He never really says whether Reagan's actual position really had anything to do with what happened, but he says again and again that Reagan was the only person in his conservative circles who stuck to and believed in the idea that the Soviet system would collapse on its own (and to support this kind of historical determinism, Reagan even occasionally quoted Marx regarding the flow and inevitability of history).
The book also necessary debunks a lot of the Reagan myth.
For instance, Weisberg dismantles the notion that Reagan was a tax-cutter and government reducer: 'Reagan left the Governor's Mansion in 1975 without any significant record as either a tax cutter or a budget cutter. During his time in office, California's top personal income tax rose from 7 percent to 11 percent, while the sales tax rose from 3 percent to 6 percent, the corporate tax rate went up from 5.5 percent to 9.0 percent, and the top inheritance tax rose from 10 percent to 15 percent. State revenues climbed from $2.9 billion in 1966 (the last year before Reagan took office) to $8.6 billion in 1974 (the last year for which he was responsible). In inflation-adjusted terms, state government doubled on his watch, a faster rate of growth that under his predecessor, Pat Brown, or his successor, Jerry Brown.' (p. 50)
He notes several occasions when Reagan would ignore the facts or not search for them, playing to the biases of his audience. Example: 'On the campaign trail, he would tell the story of a Chicago "welfare queen" who became his emblem of the problem. "She has eight names, thirtyaddresses, twelve Social Security cards and is collecting veteran's benefits on four nonexisting deceased husbands. Ahd she is collecting Social Security on her cards," he said. "She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income is over $150,000." This story was largely accurate, but rested on a mistaken assumption. Middle-class whites who believed that federal social security spending meant transferring their tax dollars to minorities thought that the welfare queen was black, as did Reagan. Linda Taylor, the person on whom the story was based, was actually white.' (p. 54)
He notes that the Reagan boom had everything to do with spending: 'By late 1983 the combination of tax cuts and deficit spending was delivering a tremendous Keynesian boost to the economy. GDP rose 4.6 percent that year. It would rise 7.3 percent in 1984, the economy's best annual performance in two decades.' (p. 111)
And that the 80s generally were not so rosy, economically. There was obviously the slump after his first election, but in the second term, let us not forget the drop in the Dow of 22.6% in one day in October of 1987 (p. 137).
Good index.
About my only complaint is that the book could use a 2-3 page guide to further reading.