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A review by socraticgadfly
The End of Tsarist Russia: The March to World War I and Revolution by Dominic Lieven
medium-paced
1.75
This book is a tough one to rate, and, since coming across The Storygraph and fractional star ratings being reality, it's the biggest hate I have for Goodreads and the Amazonoids behind it not having at least half-star ratings, even after the overhaul.
Specific to this book, it's right on 2.5 stars, and I hate being associated with people low-rating the book because they think it's boring. Anything but. But, I just can't give it 3 stars.
Let's dig in. And, this one is going to be long.
The End of Tsarist Russia
Having read some of his brother’s essays following the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, and always on the lookout for new WWI reading, I glommed this.
Interesting.
First off, as many other reviewers note, it isn’t about the end of Tsarist Russia at all. That said, the original edition, I think, and I know the original British one, had a different title.
Nonetheless, we do judge books by their covers, and that might be a quarter-star ding right there.
Now, the meat?
This is an interesting book in many ways. It’s in-depth in many ways. The flip side of that is that, when Lieven’s grinding an ax, that means you know it’s very deliberate.
And, yes, he does grind one big one.
First, in the very early pages, rather than Fritz Fischer’s “German war guilt” theory, or a “Serbian war guilt” idea, he seems to plump hard for an “Austrian war guilt” theory. Tosh. I know plenty about the 1903 coup that swapped dynasties in Serbia, Apis’ direct involvement in it, Pasic’s likely knowledge of the 1914 assassination plot and more. Even allowing for Conrad’s “Serbia delenda est” bellows, the idea of Austria war guilt as a primary cause of the war is rot.
This plays out at the end of Chapter 4, on the Austrian demarche related to annexation of Bosnia. He notes that Russia made clear in 1912-13 in the Balkan Wars that it wouldn’t accept having its back against the wall again, and that Berlin and Vienna listened, but did not in 1914. This too, at least in implications, is rot as an assassination (even given how little Vienna apparently actually knew about Serbian official and semi-official connections) is not the same as third-party warfare.
Second puzzler? A definitional one, around page 130. What is a “liberal conservative”? I assume Lieven is using “liberal” in its European sense, but still, there’s no definition. Such and such a person, whether in the Foreign Ministry, other government service, or outside, is described as such without explanation.
That said, it seems functionally semi-clear from context. These are the people who would have been in the Kadets party after 1905. (Although I am not sure about that.)
There’s lots of good in this book. A biggee is that not nearly all the professionals in Russian government, or formerly in it, were pan-Slavists or Slavophiles in the run-up to 1914. (Lieven says the two are different, and even distinguishes pan-Slavists from pan-slavists no capital, but says this book is not technical enough to dive into that.) These people distrusted “informed” modern Russian opinion, and in turn, they split into two. One branch wanted to focus on the Straits while setting aside the Balkans; the other wanted to focus on Asia while setting aside both.
In other words, we’re getting into a more nuanced, better backgrounded version of Sean McMeekin.
Later reading between the lines indicate that Slavophile stances would include the idea of “fair play” for Poles while pan-Slavism was more of the Russian Slavism is right, period.
Another issue rises up from Lieven later. All Russians have their names rendered in Russian spelling, ie, “Aleksandr” and not “Alexander.” But, “Wilhelm” is “William”? Given what I’ve noted above one could cite this as an example of historian’s bias and I think that’s plausible. I know that other British historians do it, too. Stop it.
Also of note in similar vein? The author doesn’t note the degree of family relationship to Vice Admiral Lieven, nor whether any family memoirs were used in this book.
Finally, a claim that Rasputin had no major influence on foreign policy before the start of war might be acceptable. (That said, Rasputin DID strongly urge Nicholas NOT to go to war; the fact that this argument failed could be, I guess, considered as proof of “no major influence.”) But making that claim after the war started? Tosh. Even before the war, his power to extract bribes argues for some influence. Also, the fact that Lieven makes this claim as an offhand statement further undercuts its likelihood of truth to me. Using military strategy knowledge to help bribers engage in inside trading on the Bourse is another argument against Lieven. And, above all, Rasputin encouraging Alexandra to encourage Nicholas in his neoabsolutism had its influence on Nicholas’ rule in general, and in the war, above all in Nicholas deciding to take direct command of the armed forces.
This cost Lieven a star by itself.
He also only mentions Apis and the Black Hand in passing. Worse, he does not mention at all Narodna Odbrana. He doesn’t mention Pasiç having likely foreknowledge of plot. He then claims that even had Serbia fully accepted the Austrian ultimatum, Vienna would have found an excuse for war anyway, a doubtful at best conjecture.
That’s another half-star, if not moe.
Other issues add up. And, we’re at 2 stars here. (May get 2.5 at StoryGraph. And, yes, I’m going to continue pushing it.)
It’s funny that Lievan calls MacMeekin “polemical.” He is himself, in his own way.
That’s as this book gets WORSE as it stumbles toward the finish line. Claiming the Ludendorff-Hindenburg dictatorship caused Germany to lose a war it “would probably have won” without them in charge is one of the most asinine comments I’ve ever seen in World War I historiography. But he makes it, on page 346. Pushing the renewal of submarine warfare, over Bethmann-Hollweg’s head, was a gamble, ’tis true. But, at this time, Nicholas hadn’t yet been toppled from the throne, let alone Kerensky replaced by Lenin. And, it wasn’t just the H-L duo who invested high potential power in sub warfare. As for the 1918 Kaiserschlacht? Necessary with the growing US presence; necessary to be won quickly, per how fast it was growing. As for the Hindenberg Program of a command economy? Tis true that the amount of horses removed from farms may have contributed to food scarcity in 1918, but this was a damned if you do, damned if you don’t moment and in no way lost the war.
And, the 2-3 pages before that show that Lieven should never write a word about military history.
He concludes by not only stressing Austrian war guilt, but shades of Fischer, throwing Germany in there as well.
The TL/DR summary? Everything here about Russian internal affairs is good. Everything outside of that is at best an unrevealing "meh" (with an exception or two) when purely Russian, but outside the Imperial bounds. Everything not Russian in this book is bad, often mendacious by omission, in my opinion.
Specific to this book, it's right on 2.5 stars, and I hate being associated with people low-rating the book because they think it's boring. Anything but. But, I just can't give it 3 stars.
Let's dig in. And, this one is going to be long.
The End of Tsarist Russia
Having read some of his brother’s essays following the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, and always on the lookout for new WWI reading, I glommed this.
Interesting.
First off, as many other reviewers note, it isn’t about the end of Tsarist Russia at all. That said, the original edition, I think, and I know the original British one, had a different title.
Nonetheless, we do judge books by their covers, and that might be a quarter-star ding right there.
Now, the meat?
This is an interesting book in many ways. It’s in-depth in many ways. The flip side of that is that, when Lieven’s grinding an ax, that means you know it’s very deliberate.
And, yes, he does grind one big one.
First, in the very early pages, rather than Fritz Fischer’s “German war guilt” theory, or a “Serbian war guilt” idea, he seems to plump hard for an “Austrian war guilt” theory. Tosh. I know plenty about the 1903 coup that swapped dynasties in Serbia, Apis’ direct involvement in it, Pasic’s likely knowledge of the 1914 assassination plot and more. Even allowing for Conrad’s “Serbia delenda est” bellows, the idea of Austria war guilt as a primary cause of the war is rot.
This plays out at the end of Chapter 4, on the Austrian demarche related to annexation of Bosnia. He notes that Russia made clear in 1912-13 in the Balkan Wars that it wouldn’t accept having its back against the wall again, and that Berlin and Vienna listened, but did not in 1914. This too, at least in implications, is rot as an assassination (even given how little Vienna apparently actually knew about Serbian official and semi-official connections) is not the same as third-party warfare.
Second puzzler? A definitional one, around page 130. What is a “liberal conservative”? I assume Lieven is using “liberal” in its European sense, but still, there’s no definition. Such and such a person, whether in the Foreign Ministry, other government service, or outside, is described as such without explanation.
That said, it seems functionally semi-clear from context. These are the people who would have been in the Kadets party after 1905. (Although I am not sure about that.)
There’s lots of good in this book. A biggee is that not nearly all the professionals in Russian government, or formerly in it, were pan-Slavists or Slavophiles in the run-up to 1914. (Lieven says the two are different, and even distinguishes pan-Slavists from pan-slavists no capital, but says this book is not technical enough to dive into that.) These people distrusted “informed” modern Russian opinion, and in turn, they split into two. One branch wanted to focus on the Straits while setting aside the Balkans; the other wanted to focus on Asia while setting aside both.
In other words, we’re getting into a more nuanced, better backgrounded version of Sean McMeekin.
Later reading between the lines indicate that Slavophile stances would include the idea of “fair play” for Poles while pan-Slavism was more of the Russian Slavism is right, period.
Another issue rises up from Lieven later. All Russians have their names rendered in Russian spelling, ie, “Aleksandr” and not “Alexander.” But, “Wilhelm” is “William”? Given what I’ve noted above one could cite this as an example of historian’s bias and I think that’s plausible. I know that other British historians do it, too. Stop it.
Also of note in similar vein? The author doesn’t note the degree of family relationship to Vice Admiral Lieven, nor whether any family memoirs were used in this book.
Finally, a claim that Rasputin had no major influence on foreign policy before the start of war might be acceptable. (That said, Rasputin DID strongly urge Nicholas NOT to go to war; the fact that this argument failed could be, I guess, considered as proof of “no major influence.”) But making that claim after the war started? Tosh. Even before the war, his power to extract bribes argues for some influence. Also, the fact that Lieven makes this claim as an offhand statement further undercuts its likelihood of truth to me. Using military strategy knowledge to help bribers engage in inside trading on the Bourse is another argument against Lieven. And, above all, Rasputin encouraging Alexandra to encourage Nicholas in his neoabsolutism had its influence on Nicholas’ rule in general, and in the war, above all in Nicholas deciding to take direct command of the armed forces.
This cost Lieven a star by itself.
He also only mentions Apis and the Black Hand in passing. Worse, he does not mention at all Narodna Odbrana. He doesn’t mention Pasiç having likely foreknowledge of plot. He then claims that even had Serbia fully accepted the Austrian ultimatum, Vienna would have found an excuse for war anyway, a doubtful at best conjecture.
That’s another half-star, if not moe.
Other issues add up. And, we’re at 2 stars here. (May get 2.5 at StoryGraph. And, yes, I’m going to continue pushing it.)
It’s funny that Lievan calls MacMeekin “polemical.” He is himself, in his own way.
That’s as this book gets WORSE as it stumbles toward the finish line. Claiming the Ludendorff-Hindenburg dictatorship caused Germany to lose a war it “would probably have won” without them in charge is one of the most asinine comments I’ve ever seen in World War I historiography. But he makes it, on page 346. Pushing the renewal of submarine warfare, over Bethmann-Hollweg’s head, was a gamble, ’tis true. But, at this time, Nicholas hadn’t yet been toppled from the throne, let alone Kerensky replaced by Lenin. And, it wasn’t just the H-L duo who invested high potential power in sub warfare. As for the 1918 Kaiserschlacht? Necessary with the growing US presence; necessary to be won quickly, per how fast it was growing. As for the Hindenberg Program of a command economy? Tis true that the amount of horses removed from farms may have contributed to food scarcity in 1918, but this was a damned if you do, damned if you don’t moment and in no way lost the war.
And, the 2-3 pages before that show that Lieven should never write a word about military history.
He concludes by not only stressing Austrian war guilt, but shades of Fischer, throwing Germany in there as well.
The TL/DR summary? Everything here about Russian internal affairs is good. Everything outside of that is at best an unrevealing "meh" (with an exception or two) when purely Russian, but outside the Imperial bounds. Everything not Russian in this book is bad, often mendacious by omission, in my opinion.