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A review by colin_cox
Emancipation After Hegel: Achieving a Contradictory Revolution by Todd McGowan
5.0
Professional athletes and professional academics share one unique characteristic: neither wants to peak too early. Like professional athletes, professional academics think and hope the best is yet to come.
Many academics want to think that ideas and theories, like stats, awards, and championships, follow a linear trajectory. A good idea for an academic establishes the foundation for a great idea. Of course, this is not always the case—academics like athletes peak at different, inconsistent, and even non-linear times. Luckily, Todd McGowan's new book, Emancipation After Hegel demonstrates that his 2016 book, Capitalism and Desire was not his peak.
McGowan describes his overarching thesis on Hegel early in Emancipation After Hegel. On page 6, he writes, "Being itself is contradictory and...we have the capacity to apprehend this contradiction by thinking. Rather than trying to eliminate contradiction, subjects attempt to sustain and further it. Contradiction is not anathema to thought but what animates both thought and being. Hegel's primary philosophical contribution is to reverse the historical judgment on contradiction. It is the driving force of his philosophy" (6). We do not, as many might suspect, attempt to resolve or simply accept contradiction, but as McGowan argues, contradiction "drives our thinking and our actions. We don't retreat from contradiction but seek it out" (7). Therefore, contradiction has a "constitutive status" for the subject (9).
Seeing contradiction as constitutive clarifies why McGowan can read Hegel in psychoanalytic terms. In Chapter 2, "Hegel After Freud," McGowan argues that many misreadings of Hegel stem from Hegel emerging "as a thinker almost too soon" (40). That is to say, the Freudian unconscious offers "a theoretical supplement for Hegel, giving us a language that makes Hegel's otherwise misleading philosophy accessible" (41). By thinking Hegel in psychoanalytic terms, McGowan demonstrates the prevalence of psychoanalysis' claims. Said another way, even when we attempt to reject and suppress psychoanalysis, we are reifying and validating it.
My favorite chapter, though, is Chapter 7, which grapples with freedom and restriction. Via Hegel, McGowan claims, "Freedom does not consist in fighting against some dominant external power but in recognizing that the subject must provide the ground for its own act" (164). Barriers cannot remain external, which, as McGowan suggests, is the fundamental problem with the rebel. McGowan argues the rebel is "an insider who experiences existence as an outsider" (170). McGowan continues, "The rebel always has a substantial Other in the form of the authority that the rebel struggles against" (172). By capitalizing the "O" in "Other," McGowan successfully links Hegel to psychoanalysis. McGowan extends this link to psychoanalysis by writing, "If one wants freedom, one must discover what happens when there are no external authorities left to fight" (172). In the book's conclusion, McGowan reiterates these sentiments: "Freedom, equality, and solidarity are inherently traumatic values insofar as they require us to confront the absence of any substantial authority. We can only live out these values if we forgo any self-identical other that provides a secure background for our subjectivity" (219). This movement from externality to internality is necessary but far from painless. However, the reconciliation of one contradiction does not lead to a contradiction-free space. Instead, as McGowan suggests, the reconciliation of one contradiction simply deepens the sense of contradiction that animates our lives.
Even though it's challenging, we must, as McGowan suggests, "reconcile ourselves to contradiction" (220). By doing so, we understand "the insubstantiality of whatever authority we worship," therefore, we "uphold the values of freedom, equality, and solidarity" (220). This is as close as McGowan gets to articulating a political program or philosophy. While some have challenged McGowan to clarify a political philosophy, he seems reluctant to do so. However, he seems to think that any political philosophy without a clear recognition of contradiction is either absurd or ineffectual, and this is what Emancipation After Hegel wants to say.
Many academics want to think that ideas and theories, like stats, awards, and championships, follow a linear trajectory. A good idea for an academic establishes the foundation for a great idea. Of course, this is not always the case—academics like athletes peak at different, inconsistent, and even non-linear times. Luckily, Todd McGowan's new book, Emancipation After Hegel demonstrates that his 2016 book, Capitalism and Desire was not his peak.
McGowan describes his overarching thesis on Hegel early in Emancipation After Hegel. On page 6, he writes, "Being itself is contradictory and...we have the capacity to apprehend this contradiction by thinking. Rather than trying to eliminate contradiction, subjects attempt to sustain and further it. Contradiction is not anathema to thought but what animates both thought and being. Hegel's primary philosophical contribution is to reverse the historical judgment on contradiction. It is the driving force of his philosophy" (6). We do not, as many might suspect, attempt to resolve or simply accept contradiction, but as McGowan argues, contradiction "drives our thinking and our actions. We don't retreat from contradiction but seek it out" (7). Therefore, contradiction has a "constitutive status" for the subject (9).
Seeing contradiction as constitutive clarifies why McGowan can read Hegel in psychoanalytic terms. In Chapter 2, "Hegel After Freud," McGowan argues that many misreadings of Hegel stem from Hegel emerging "as a thinker almost too soon" (40). That is to say, the Freudian unconscious offers "a theoretical supplement for Hegel, giving us a language that makes Hegel's otherwise misleading philosophy accessible" (41). By thinking Hegel in psychoanalytic terms, McGowan demonstrates the prevalence of psychoanalysis' claims. Said another way, even when we attempt to reject and suppress psychoanalysis, we are reifying and validating it.
My favorite chapter, though, is Chapter 7, which grapples with freedom and restriction. Via Hegel, McGowan claims, "Freedom does not consist in fighting against some dominant external power but in recognizing that the subject must provide the ground for its own act" (164). Barriers cannot remain external, which, as McGowan suggests, is the fundamental problem with the rebel. McGowan argues the rebel is "an insider who experiences existence as an outsider" (170). McGowan continues, "The rebel always has a substantial Other in the form of the authority that the rebel struggles against" (172). By capitalizing the "O" in "Other," McGowan successfully links Hegel to psychoanalysis. McGowan extends this link to psychoanalysis by writing, "If one wants freedom, one must discover what happens when there are no external authorities left to fight" (172). In the book's conclusion, McGowan reiterates these sentiments: "Freedom, equality, and solidarity are inherently traumatic values insofar as they require us to confront the absence of any substantial authority. We can only live out these values if we forgo any self-identical other that provides a secure background for our subjectivity" (219). This movement from externality to internality is necessary but far from painless. However, the reconciliation of one contradiction does not lead to a contradiction-free space. Instead, as McGowan suggests, the reconciliation of one contradiction simply deepens the sense of contradiction that animates our lives.
Even though it's challenging, we must, as McGowan suggests, "reconcile ourselves to contradiction" (220). By doing so, we understand "the insubstantiality of whatever authority we worship," therefore, we "uphold the values of freedom, equality, and solidarity" (220). This is as close as McGowan gets to articulating a political program or philosophy. While some have challenged McGowan to clarify a political philosophy, he seems reluctant to do so. However, he seems to think that any political philosophy without a clear recognition of contradiction is either absurd or ineffectual, and this is what Emancipation After Hegel wants to say.