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A review by sbenzell
What Is Real?: The Unfinished Quest for the Meaning of Quantum Physics by Adam Becker
3.0
I am ambivalent about this book.
On the one hand, I nearly put the book down a few chapters in. The early material about the initial development of quantum theory was all old news to me, covered (better) in books like ``Thirty Years Which Shook Physics." The actual mechanics of quantum theory are not covered in depth. The only part of this book I felt was novel was the details of how central Bohr was to how QM is thought about.
The book's novelty for me starts about halfway in, after WWII. The discussion of how alternatives to the Copenhagen Interpretation arose and were suppressed is compelling and provocative. The discussion of why the 'Measurement Problem' is indeed a problem is very well articulated.
The social science in the background-- which posits that government funding (which favored 'shut up and calculate' pragmatism), path dependence, Bohr's network centrality -- are all interesting hypotheses that point to both the 'incommensurablity' of different paradigms as well as the role of the political and social in the development of science. I wish the author had speculated on how lessons we learn from this history might help us to do better science in the future.
The book also has very good, if perhaps too extreme, takedowns of logical positivism and verificationism. I agree that they are inadequate (logical positivism is on its face an oxymoron, and 'the decisive experiment'-- as pointed out by 'Two Dogmas'-- can always be dodged by the modification of ancillary hypotheses), but do think they have something to say. One difference between science and non-science is testable prediction (if not the only difference), if not the only one. The example used in the book -- of heliocentrism being observationally equivalent to ptolemyic astronomy -- was only true temporarily. Foundations of Physics, then, might be thought of as proto- or pre- science, until it is able to generate predictions different from Copenhagen.
As an alternative to LP and verificationism, the author proposes a very vague demarcation principle -- one so broad (i.e. science 'tries to integrate distinct knowledges into a unified theory') that I think astrology or theology fit snugly. His more practical demarcation, that e.g. religious groups 'aren't really interested in scientific truth' is inadequate philosophically, because as he points out normal science is often motivated by things outside real science. The author just seems to assume Scientific Realism as true (claiming that this is the consensus of philosophers of science, and painting all continental philosophers' opinions as being prima facie not relevant for some reason; dissing Kuhn for not being sufficiently realist). This is a position I lean towards as well, but needs to be actually argued against a idealist stance (although I think he does well arguing against the instrumentalist stance -- does that term appear? -- in his takedown of positivism).
Finally the book's actually descriptions of quantum riddles -- such as Bell's Thm -- were adequate but still left me with lots of questions. His first appendix -- explaining the 'delayed choice' experiment through 4 different QM interpretations -- also left me looking for clarification. I would also have appreciated more discussion of actual attempts to test different interpretations -- doesn't Deutch have one for many worlds he pushes?
Overall recommended to someone interested in philosophy of science. "Beginning of Infinity" I would recommend first though.
On the one hand, I nearly put the book down a few chapters in. The early material about the initial development of quantum theory was all old news to me, covered (better) in books like ``Thirty Years Which Shook Physics." The actual mechanics of quantum theory are not covered in depth. The only part of this book I felt was novel was the details of how central Bohr was to how QM is thought about.
The book's novelty for me starts about halfway in, after WWII. The discussion of how alternatives to the Copenhagen Interpretation arose and were suppressed is compelling and provocative. The discussion of why the 'Measurement Problem' is indeed a problem is very well articulated.
The social science in the background-- which posits that government funding (which favored 'shut up and calculate' pragmatism), path dependence, Bohr's network centrality -- are all interesting hypotheses that point to both the 'incommensurablity' of different paradigms as well as the role of the political and social in the development of science. I wish the author had speculated on how lessons we learn from this history might help us to do better science in the future.
The book also has very good, if perhaps too extreme, takedowns of logical positivism and verificationism. I agree that they are inadequate (logical positivism is on its face an oxymoron, and 'the decisive experiment'-- as pointed out by 'Two Dogmas'-- can always be dodged by the modification of ancillary hypotheses), but do think they have something to say. One difference between science and non-science is testable prediction (if not the only difference), if not the only one. The example used in the book -- of heliocentrism being observationally equivalent to ptolemyic astronomy -- was only true temporarily. Foundations of Physics, then, might be thought of as proto- or pre- science, until it is able to generate predictions different from Copenhagen.
As an alternative to LP and verificationism, the author proposes a very vague demarcation principle -- one so broad (i.e. science 'tries to integrate distinct knowledges into a unified theory') that I think astrology or theology fit snugly. His more practical demarcation, that e.g. religious groups 'aren't really interested in scientific truth' is inadequate philosophically, because as he points out normal science is often motivated by things outside real science. The author just seems to assume Scientific Realism as true (claiming that this is the consensus of philosophers of science, and painting all continental philosophers' opinions as being prima facie not relevant for some reason; dissing Kuhn for not being sufficiently realist). This is a position I lean towards as well, but needs to be actually argued against a idealist stance (although I think he does well arguing against the instrumentalist stance -- does that term appear? -- in his takedown of positivism).
Finally the book's actually descriptions of quantum riddles -- such as Bell's Thm -- were adequate but still left me with lots of questions. His first appendix -- explaining the 'delayed choice' experiment through 4 different QM interpretations -- also left me looking for clarification. I would also have appreciated more discussion of actual attempts to test different interpretations -- doesn't Deutch have one for many worlds he pushes?
Overall recommended to someone interested in philosophy of science. "Beginning of Infinity" I would recommend first though.