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A review by djoshuva
The Ethics/Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect/Selected Letters by Baruch Spinoza
5.0
“It will suffice at this point if I take as my basis what must be universally admitted, that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things, that they all have a desire to seek their own advantage, a de sire of which they are conscious. From this it follows, firstly, that men believe that they are free, precisely because they are conscious of their volitions and desires; yet concerning the causes that have determined them to desire and will they do not think, not even dream about, because they are ignorant of them. Secondly, men act always with an end in view, to wit, the advantage that they seek.”
“When men become convinced that everything that is created is created on their behalf, they were bound to consider as the most important quality in every individual thing that which was most useful to them, and to regard as ofthe high est excellence all those things by which they were most benefited. Hence they came to form these abstract notions to explain the natures of things: Good, Bad, Order, Confusion, Hot, Cold, Beauty, Ugliness; and since they believed that they are free, the following abstract notions came into being: Praise, Blame, Right, Wrong.”
“All must surely admit that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For all are agreed that God is the sole cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, God is the cause ofthings not only in respectoftheir coming into being [secundum fieri], as they say, but also in respect oftheir being. But at the same time many assert that that without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived pertains to the essence of the thing, and so they believe that ei ther the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things or that created things can either be or be conceived without God; or else, more probably, they hold no consistent opinion. I think that the reason for this is their failure to ob serve the proper order ofphilosophical inquiry. For the divine nature, which they should have considered before all else-it being prior both in cognition and in Nature-they have taken to be last in the order of cognition, and the things that are called objects of sense they have taken as prior to everything. Hence it has come about that in considering natural phenomena, they have completely disregarded the divine nature. And when thereafter they turned to the contemplation of the divine nature, they could find no place in their thinking for those fictions on which theyhad built their natural science, since these fictions were ofno avail in attaining knowledge of the divine nature. So it is little wonder that they have contradicted themselves on all sides.”
“Further, to retain the usual terminology, we will assign the word "images" [imagines] to those affections ofthe human body the ideas of which set forth external bodies as if they were present to us, although they do n ot represent shapes. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it "imagines" [imaginari].”
“To have a true idea means only to know a thing perfectly, that is, to the utmostdegree. Indeed, nobody can doubt this, unless he thinks thatan idea is some dumb thing like a picture on a tablet, and not a mode ofthinking, to wit, the very act ofunderstanding. And who, pray, can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands it? That is, who can know that he is certain of something unless he is first certain of it? Again, what standard of truth can there be that is clearer and more certain than a true idea? Indeed, just as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and falsity.”
“Most controversies arise from this, that men do not correctly express what is in their mind, or they misunderstand another's mind. For, in reality, while they are hotly contradicting one another, they are either in agreement or have differ ent things in mind, so that the apparent errors and absurdities of their opponents are not really so.”
“If they ask me whether such a man is not to be reckoned an ass rather than a man, I reply that ! do not know, just as I do not know how one should reckon a man who hangs himself, or how one should reckon babies, fools, and madmen.”
“When this conatus is related to the mind alone, it is called Will [vol untas]; when it is related to mind and body together, it is called Appetite [appeti tus], which is therefore nothing else but man's essence, from the nature ofwhich there necessarily follow thosething> that tend to his preservation, and which man is thus determined to perform. Further, there is no difference between appetite and Desire [cupiditas] except that desire is usually related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. Therefore, it can be defined as follows: desire is "appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof." “
“We therefore see that it is possible that what one man loves, another hates, what one man fears, another fears not, and that one and the same man may now love what he previously hated and may now dare what he previously feared, and so on. Again, since everyone according to his emotions judges what is good, what is bad, what is better and what is worse (Sch. Pr. 39, III), it follows that men vary as much in judgment as in emotion.”
“10. Devotion is love toward one at whom we wonder.”
“I assign the term "bondage" to man's lack of power to control and check the emo tions. For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not h is own master but is subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse.”
“For we have demonstrated in Appendix, Part I that Nature does not act with an end in view; that the etemal and infinite being, whom we call God, or Nature, acts by the same necessity whereby it exists. That the necessity of his nature whereby he acts is the same as that whereby he exists has been demonstrated (Prop. 16, I). So the reason or cause why God, or nature, acts, and the reason or cause why he exists, are one and the same. Therefore, just as he does not exist for an end, so he does not act for an end; just as there is no beginning or end to his existing, so there is no beginning or end to his acting. What is termed a "final cause" is nothing but human appetite insofar as it is considered as the starting point or primary cause of something.”
“Besides, if we consider the mind, surely our intellect would be less perfect if the mind were in solitude and understood nothing beyond itself. Therefore, there are many things outside ourselves which are advantageous to us and ought therefore to be sought. Of these none more excellent can be discovered than those which are in complete harmony with our own nature. For example, if two indi viduals ofcompletely the same nature are combined, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one singly.”
“PROPOSITION 21
Nobody can desire to be happy, to do well and to live well without at the same time desiring to be, to do, and to live; that is, actually to exist.”
“It is, I repeat, the part ofa wise man to re fresh and invigorate himself in moderation with good food and drink, as also with perfumes, with the beauty ofblossoming plants, with dress, music, sporting activ ities, theaters, and the like, in which every man can indulge without harm to an other. For the human body is composed of many parts of various kinds which are continually in need of fresh and varied nourishment so that the entire body may be equally capable of all the functions that follow from its own nature, and con sequently that the mind may be equally capable ofsimultaneously understanding many things.”
“PROPOSITION 46
He who lives by the guidance ofreason endeavors as far as he can to repay with love or nobility another's hatred, anger, contempt, etc. toward himself.”
“Although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, the self-abased man is very close to the proud man. For since his pain arises from judging his own weakness by the power or virtue ofothers, his pain will be assuaged, that is, he will feel pleas ure, ifhis thoughts are engaged in contemplating other people's limIts. This is the origin of the proverb: "The consolation of the wretched is to have fellows in mis fortune." On the other hand, he will be more pained in proportion as he thinks himself lower than others. Hence it comes about that the self-abased are more prone to envy than all others, and that they, more than any, endeavor to keep watch on men's deeds with a view to criticizing rather than correcting them, and they end up by praising only self-abasement and exulting in it even while still pre serving the appearance of self-abasement.”
“Vainglory, as it is called, is the self-contentment that is fostered only by popular esteem and ceases with it; that is (Sch. Pr. 52, IV), the highest good which everyone loves, ceases. So it happens that he who exults in popular esteem has the daily burden ofanxiously striving, acting and contriving to preserve his reputation. For the populace is fickle and inconstant, and unless a reputation is preserved it soon withers away. Indeed, since all are eager to capture the applause of the populace, each is ready to decry another's reputation.”
“Whatsoever the mind conceives under the gUidance of reason, it con ceives under the same form of eternity or necessity (Cor. 2, Pr. 44, II), and is af fected with the same certainty (Pr. 43, II and Sch.). Therefore, whether the idea be of the future, the past, or the present, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the same certainty; and whether the idea be of the future, the past, or the present, it will nevertheless be equally true (Pr. 4 1 , II); that is (De£. 4, II), it will nevertheless always have the same properties ofan adequate idea. Therefore, insofar as the mind conceives things according to the dictates ofreason, it is affected in the same way, whether the idea be ofa thing fu ture, past, or present.”
“17. Again, men are won over by generosity, especially those who do not have the wherewithal to produce what is necessary to support life. Yet it is far beyond the power and resources of a private person to come to the assistance of everyone in need. For the wealth ofa private person is quite unequal to such a demand. It is also a practical impossibility for one man to establish friendship with all. Therefore the care of the poor devolves upon society as a whole, and looks only to the common good.”
“28. Now to provide all this the strength of each single person would scarcely suffice if men did not lend mutual aid to one another. However, money has sup plied a token for all things, with the result that its image is wont to obsess the minds of the populace, because they can scarcely th ink of any kind of pleasure that is not accompanied by the idea of money as its cause.”
“PROPOSITION 3
A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”
“PROPOSITION 5
An emotion toward a thing which we imagine merely in itself, and not as necessary, possible, or contingent, is the greatest ofall emotions, other things being equal.”
“From this we clearly understand in what our salvation or blessedness or freedom consists, namely, in the constant and eternal love toward God, that is, in God's love toward men. This love or blessedness is called glory in the Holy Scriptures, and rightly so. For whether this love be related to God or to the mind, it can properly be called spiritual contentment, which in reality cannot be distinguished from glory (Def. of Emotions 25 and 30).”
“The common belief of the multitude seems to be quite different. For the majority appear to think that they are free to the extent that they can indulge their lusts, and that they are giving up their rights to the extent that they are re quired to l ive under the commandments of the divine law. So they believe that piety and religion, in fact everything related to strength of mind, are burdens which they hope to lay aside after death, when they will receive the reward oftheir servitude, that is, of piety and religion. And it is not by this hope alone, but also and especially by fear of incurring dreadful punishment after death, that they are induced to live according to the commandments of the divine law as far as their feebleness and impotent spirit allows. And ifmen did not have this hope and this fear, and if they believed on the contrary that minds perish with bodies and that they, miserable creatures, worn out by the burden of piety, had no prospect of fur ther existence, they would return to their own inclinations and decide to shape their lives according to their lusts, and to be ruled by fortune rather than by them selves. This seems to me no less absurd than if a man, not believing that he can sustain his body on good food forever, were to decide to glut himselfon poisons and deadly fare; or, on realizing that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he pre ferred to be mad and to l ive without reason. Such attitudes are so absurd that they are scarcely worth recounting.”
“If the road I have pointed out as leading to this goal seems very difficult, yet it can be found. Indeed, what is so rarely discovered is bound to be hard. For ifsal vation were ready to hand and could be discovered without great toil, how could it be that it is almost universally neglected? All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”
“When men become convinced that everything that is created is created on their behalf, they were bound to consider as the most important quality in every individual thing that which was most useful to them, and to regard as ofthe high est excellence all those things by which they were most benefited. Hence they came to form these abstract notions to explain the natures of things: Good, Bad, Order, Confusion, Hot, Cold, Beauty, Ugliness; and since they believed that they are free, the following abstract notions came into being: Praise, Blame, Right, Wrong.”
“All must surely admit that nothing can be or be conceived without God. For all are agreed that God is the sole cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence; that is, God is the cause ofthings not only in respectoftheir coming into being [secundum fieri], as they say, but also in respect oftheir being. But at the same time many assert that that without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived pertains to the essence of the thing, and so they believe that ei ther the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things or that created things can either be or be conceived without God; or else, more probably, they hold no consistent opinion. I think that the reason for this is their failure to ob serve the proper order ofphilosophical inquiry. For the divine nature, which they should have considered before all else-it being prior both in cognition and in Nature-they have taken to be last in the order of cognition, and the things that are called objects of sense they have taken as prior to everything. Hence it has come about that in considering natural phenomena, they have completely disregarded the divine nature. And when thereafter they turned to the contemplation of the divine nature, they could find no place in their thinking for those fictions on which theyhad built their natural science, since these fictions were ofno avail in attaining knowledge of the divine nature. So it is little wonder that they have contradicted themselves on all sides.”
“Further, to retain the usual terminology, we will assign the word "images" [imagines] to those affections ofthe human body the ideas of which set forth external bodies as if they were present to us, although they do n ot represent shapes. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it "imagines" [imaginari].”
“To have a true idea means only to know a thing perfectly, that is, to the utmostdegree. Indeed, nobody can doubt this, unless he thinks thatan idea is some dumb thing like a picture on a tablet, and not a mode ofthinking, to wit, the very act ofunderstanding. And who, pray, can know that he understands some thing unless he first understands it? That is, who can know that he is certain of something unless he is first certain of it? Again, what standard of truth can there be that is clearer and more certain than a true idea? Indeed, just as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is the standard both of itself and falsity.”
“Most controversies arise from this, that men do not correctly express what is in their mind, or they misunderstand another's mind. For, in reality, while they are hotly contradicting one another, they are either in agreement or have differ ent things in mind, so that the apparent errors and absurdities of their opponents are not really so.”
“If they ask me whether such a man is not to be reckoned an ass rather than a man, I reply that ! do not know, just as I do not know how one should reckon a man who hangs himself, or how one should reckon babies, fools, and madmen.”
“When this conatus is related to the mind alone, it is called Will [vol untas]; when it is related to mind and body together, it is called Appetite [appeti tus], which is therefore nothing else but man's essence, from the nature ofwhich there necessarily follow thosething> that tend to his preservation, and which man is thus determined to perform. Further, there is no difference between appetite and Desire [cupiditas] except that desire is usually related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. Therefore, it can be defined as follows: desire is "appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof." “
“We therefore see that it is possible that what one man loves, another hates, what one man fears, another fears not, and that one and the same man may now love what he previously hated and may now dare what he previously feared, and so on. Again, since everyone according to his emotions judges what is good, what is bad, what is better and what is worse (Sch. Pr. 39, III), it follows that men vary as much in judgment as in emotion.”
“10. Devotion is love toward one at whom we wonder.”
“I assign the term "bondage" to man's lack of power to control and check the emo tions. For a man at the mercy of his emotions is not h is own master but is subject to fortune, in whose power he so lies that he is often compelled, although he sees the better course, to pursue the worse.”
“For we have demonstrated in Appendix, Part I that Nature does not act with an end in view; that the etemal and infinite being, whom we call God, or Nature, acts by the same necessity whereby it exists. That the necessity of his nature whereby he acts is the same as that whereby he exists has been demonstrated (Prop. 16, I). So the reason or cause why God, or nature, acts, and the reason or cause why he exists, are one and the same. Therefore, just as he does not exist for an end, so he does not act for an end; just as there is no beginning or end to his existing, so there is no beginning or end to his acting. What is termed a "final cause" is nothing but human appetite insofar as it is considered as the starting point or primary cause of something.”
“Besides, if we consider the mind, surely our intellect would be less perfect if the mind were in solitude and understood nothing beyond itself. Therefore, there are many things outside ourselves which are advantageous to us and ought therefore to be sought. Of these none more excellent can be discovered than those which are in complete harmony with our own nature. For example, if two indi viduals ofcompletely the same nature are combined, they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one singly.”
“PROPOSITION 21
Nobody can desire to be happy, to do well and to live well without at the same time desiring to be, to do, and to live; that is, actually to exist.”
“It is, I repeat, the part ofa wise man to re fresh and invigorate himself in moderation with good food and drink, as also with perfumes, with the beauty ofblossoming plants, with dress, music, sporting activ ities, theaters, and the like, in which every man can indulge without harm to an other. For the human body is composed of many parts of various kinds which are continually in need of fresh and varied nourishment so that the entire body may be equally capable of all the functions that follow from its own nature, and con sequently that the mind may be equally capable ofsimultaneously understanding many things.”
“PROPOSITION 46
He who lives by the guidance ofreason endeavors as far as he can to repay with love or nobility another's hatred, anger, contempt, etc. toward himself.”
“Although self-abasement is the opposite of pride, the self-abased man is very close to the proud man. For since his pain arises from judging his own weakness by the power or virtue ofothers, his pain will be assuaged, that is, he will feel pleas ure, ifhis thoughts are engaged in contemplating other people's limIts. This is the origin of the proverb: "The consolation of the wretched is to have fellows in mis fortune." On the other hand, he will be more pained in proportion as he thinks himself lower than others. Hence it comes about that the self-abased are more prone to envy than all others, and that they, more than any, endeavor to keep watch on men's deeds with a view to criticizing rather than correcting them, and they end up by praising only self-abasement and exulting in it even while still pre serving the appearance of self-abasement.”
“Vainglory, as it is called, is the self-contentment that is fostered only by popular esteem and ceases with it; that is (Sch. Pr. 52, IV), the highest good which everyone loves, ceases. So it happens that he who exults in popular esteem has the daily burden ofanxiously striving, acting and contriving to preserve his reputation. For the populace is fickle and inconstant, and unless a reputation is preserved it soon withers away. Indeed, since all are eager to capture the applause of the populace, each is ready to decry another's reputation.”
“Whatsoever the mind conceives under the gUidance of reason, it con ceives under the same form of eternity or necessity (Cor. 2, Pr. 44, II), and is af fected with the same certainty (Pr. 43, II and Sch.). Therefore, whether the idea be of the future, the past, or the present, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity and is affected with the same certainty; and whether the idea be of the future, the past, or the present, it will nevertheless be equally true (Pr. 4 1 , II); that is (De£. 4, II), it will nevertheless always have the same properties ofan adequate idea. Therefore, insofar as the mind conceives things according to the dictates ofreason, it is affected in the same way, whether the idea be ofa thing fu ture, past, or present.”
“17. Again, men are won over by generosity, especially those who do not have the wherewithal to produce what is necessary to support life. Yet it is far beyond the power and resources of a private person to come to the assistance of everyone in need. For the wealth ofa private person is quite unequal to such a demand. It is also a practical impossibility for one man to establish friendship with all. Therefore the care of the poor devolves upon society as a whole, and looks only to the common good.”
“28. Now to provide all this the strength of each single person would scarcely suffice if men did not lend mutual aid to one another. However, money has sup plied a token for all things, with the result that its image is wont to obsess the minds of the populace, because they can scarcely th ink of any kind of pleasure that is not accompanied by the idea of money as its cause.”
“PROPOSITION 3
A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”
“PROPOSITION 5
An emotion toward a thing which we imagine merely in itself, and not as necessary, possible, or contingent, is the greatest ofall emotions, other things being equal.”
“From this we clearly understand in what our salvation or blessedness or freedom consists, namely, in the constant and eternal love toward God, that is, in God's love toward men. This love or blessedness is called glory in the Holy Scriptures, and rightly so. For whether this love be related to God or to the mind, it can properly be called spiritual contentment, which in reality cannot be distinguished from glory (Def. of Emotions 25 and 30).”
“The common belief of the multitude seems to be quite different. For the majority appear to think that they are free to the extent that they can indulge their lusts, and that they are giving up their rights to the extent that they are re quired to l ive under the commandments of the divine law. So they believe that piety and religion, in fact everything related to strength of mind, are burdens which they hope to lay aside after death, when they will receive the reward oftheir servitude, that is, of piety and religion. And it is not by this hope alone, but also and especially by fear of incurring dreadful punishment after death, that they are induced to live according to the commandments of the divine law as far as their feebleness and impotent spirit allows. And ifmen did not have this hope and this fear, and if they believed on the contrary that minds perish with bodies and that they, miserable creatures, worn out by the burden of piety, had no prospect of fur ther existence, they would return to their own inclinations and decide to shape their lives according to their lusts, and to be ruled by fortune rather than by them selves. This seems to me no less absurd than if a man, not believing that he can sustain his body on good food forever, were to decide to glut himselfon poisons and deadly fare; or, on realizing that the mind is not eternal or immortal, he pre ferred to be mad and to l ive without reason. Such attitudes are so absurd that they are scarcely worth recounting.”
“If the road I have pointed out as leading to this goal seems very difficult, yet it can be found. Indeed, what is so rarely discovered is bound to be hard. For ifsal vation were ready to hand and could be discovered without great toil, how could it be that it is almost universally neglected? All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”