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A review by lissielove
Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil by Timothy Mitchell
2.0
Timothy Mitchell’s book attempted to deconstruct the idea of democracy as it applied to the world in the twentieth century, specifically how countries that depended on carbon as an essential resource (coal, then oil) used the idea and concept of democracy to control that resource. He began his argument with the nineteenth century in Britain and the importance of coal to the rise of working-class demands for political rights before moving to an analysis of the development of the oil industry in the Middle East and the uncertain future the industry faces today. Mitchell argued that the fight to dominate this resource did more to shape the twentieth century than almost any other factor, and that the United States, as well as other Western countries, twisted the idea of democracy to fit their demands for oil.
This book takes on way too many topics over too long a period to be succinctly and well argued in two hundred and sixty-seven pages. Mitchell took on not only the rise of the working class demands of the nineteenth century, but two world wars, the creation of the post-war order, and the crisis (conjured or not) of the 1970. The relationship between either coal and oil in any of these topics could have constituted a volume of research of their own. Because Mitchell attempted all of them, none of these topics are given any space to breathe. As a result, his analysis is superficial at best, and often, skewed to make his point.
There is no doubt that coal and steam engines fundamentally changed the British world, creating conditions for the first Industrial Revolution, but to suggest that it is this development that accounts for the rise of the working class ignores all the foundation laid by earlier generations. Great Britain’s evolution in the area of representation is unique in the developed world—over a long period of three hundred years, they reformed their own government and relocated power from aristocracy to the common people without a civil war, without organized violence. It had taken those things to wrest control from the monarchy (half a century of turmoil in the English Civil War, the Restoration of 1660, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688). After 1688, however, Parliament fought an internal battle to keep the power for themselves. They fought against the idea of representation, against the idea that the power in the country flowed from the people who put them into office (at least in the commons). For Parliament, sovereignty was theirs. It was not given to them. By the end of the eighteenth century, common men who lacked the right to vote were vociferously arguing that the power came from them, and they deserved parliamentary reform.
When studying British history, it is incredibly reductive to simply point to the Industrial Revolution as the pivotal turning point that led to the demand for political rights and mass politics in the nineteenth century. Yes, steam engines created the conditions for factories and increased the rate of urbanization that been happening more slowly over time, but it is a mistake to give so much of the credit of the working-class consciousness to industrial capacity because all that did was create low-paying jobs and poverty on a larger scale. A more influential development was the trading revolution a century earlier. By the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain had become a trading power, and it was merchants who benefited first. Rich merchants and traders acquired a new way of life with new paths to education and new opportunities. Some merchants married into the aristocracy, some were given titles of their own, and still others stayed common and agitated for something they did not yet have—representation in Parliaments. The boroughs of Parliament had not kept up with increase and many larger cities went unrepresented while uninhabited places had two representatives. This was the key to demanding political rights because once merchants began demanding their share, those who worked for them began to think of themselves as deserving as well. In Mitchell’s own words, the importance of coal was not felt until the end of the eighteenth century, but political conscious already existed. The French Revolution did not just happen in France—it transformed the Western world, and Britain had already been thrust into ideas of representation and equality thanks to writings of the American War for Independence.
It would be easy to for many to say that Mitchell was talking about the Western world, and Britain’s unique position makes it the exception, not the rule. But that doesn’t hold up either. The political consciousness he pointed still begins in the eighteenth century with merchants in France and members of the Third Estate. The Industrial Revolution didn’t come to France for another century, but by 1789, the Third Estate was already demanding political power. Those ideas traveled throughout the Western world, laying the crucial foundation for the transformation of class and power that happened in the period Mitchel analyzed. The Industrial Revolution increased the rate and amplified those demands, but I think it’s a mistake to simply say that it “enabled new forms of mass politics” without talking about those mass politics in more depth. (14)
That was the major weakness of this book—it began with a flawed premise of the importance of coal and then carried that thread throughout his analysis of modern history. Coal and oil have an important relationship to democracy, one that deserves to be studied and analyzed, but to divorce those commodities from the world in which they were traded, mined, and developed left this book without any depth or lasting value.
This book takes on way too many topics over too long a period to be succinctly and well argued in two hundred and sixty-seven pages. Mitchell took on not only the rise of the working class demands of the nineteenth century, but two world wars, the creation of the post-war order, and the crisis (conjured or not) of the 1970. The relationship between either coal and oil in any of these topics could have constituted a volume of research of their own. Because Mitchell attempted all of them, none of these topics are given any space to breathe. As a result, his analysis is superficial at best, and often, skewed to make his point.
There is no doubt that coal and steam engines fundamentally changed the British world, creating conditions for the first Industrial Revolution, but to suggest that it is this development that accounts for the rise of the working class ignores all the foundation laid by earlier generations. Great Britain’s evolution in the area of representation is unique in the developed world—over a long period of three hundred years, they reformed their own government and relocated power from aristocracy to the common people without a civil war, without organized violence. It had taken those things to wrest control from the monarchy (half a century of turmoil in the English Civil War, the Restoration of 1660, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688). After 1688, however, Parliament fought an internal battle to keep the power for themselves. They fought against the idea of representation, against the idea that the power in the country flowed from the people who put them into office (at least in the commons). For Parliament, sovereignty was theirs. It was not given to them. By the end of the eighteenth century, common men who lacked the right to vote were vociferously arguing that the power came from them, and they deserved parliamentary reform.
When studying British history, it is incredibly reductive to simply point to the Industrial Revolution as the pivotal turning point that led to the demand for political rights and mass politics in the nineteenth century. Yes, steam engines created the conditions for factories and increased the rate of urbanization that been happening more slowly over time, but it is a mistake to give so much of the credit of the working-class consciousness to industrial capacity because all that did was create low-paying jobs and poverty on a larger scale. A more influential development was the trading revolution a century earlier. By the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain had become a trading power, and it was merchants who benefited first. Rich merchants and traders acquired a new way of life with new paths to education and new opportunities. Some merchants married into the aristocracy, some were given titles of their own, and still others stayed common and agitated for something they did not yet have—representation in Parliaments. The boroughs of Parliament had not kept up with increase and many larger cities went unrepresented while uninhabited places had two representatives. This was the key to demanding political rights because once merchants began demanding their share, those who worked for them began to think of themselves as deserving as well. In Mitchell’s own words, the importance of coal was not felt until the end of the eighteenth century, but political conscious already existed. The French Revolution did not just happen in France—it transformed the Western world, and Britain had already been thrust into ideas of representation and equality thanks to writings of the American War for Independence.
It would be easy to for many to say that Mitchell was talking about the Western world, and Britain’s unique position makes it the exception, not the rule. But that doesn’t hold up either. The political consciousness he pointed still begins in the eighteenth century with merchants in France and members of the Third Estate. The Industrial Revolution didn’t come to France for another century, but by 1789, the Third Estate was already demanding political power. Those ideas traveled throughout the Western world, laying the crucial foundation for the transformation of class and power that happened in the period Mitchel analyzed. The Industrial Revolution increased the rate and amplified those demands, but I think it’s a mistake to simply say that it “enabled new forms of mass politics” without talking about those mass politics in more depth. (14)
That was the major weakness of this book—it began with a flawed premise of the importance of coal and then carried that thread throughout his analysis of modern history. Coal and oil have an important relationship to democracy, one that deserves to be studied and analyzed, but to divorce those commodities from the world in which they were traded, mined, and developed left this book without any depth or lasting value.