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A review by socraticgadfly
Poorly Made in China: An Insider's Account of the Tactics Behind China's Production Game by Paul Midler
5.0
Author Paul Midler, a non-Chinese U.S. native, learned Chinese as an undergrad and eventually got an MBA. Not wanting a stereotypical U.S. finance job, he became a middleman in southeast China's economic heartland -- a middleman between U.S. importers and Chinese manufacturers.
First, many American companies dealing with China are just that -- importers. Their companies never made a thing in America. They're start-up or near start-up entrepreneurs, aglow at the idea of selling cheap made-in-China stuff like health and beauty aids (and how dumb is it to ship 90 percent-water shampoo across the ocean) as house or generic brands to sell at places like Dollar General.
And, Chinese plants dealing with such importers seem to cheat in the manufacturing process every way they can, besides the obvious, exposed ones such as lead in paint and melamine in dog food. They simply refuse to pay for internal quality inspectors, then try to obstruct U.S. ones, people like the middleman author. They deliberately underbid in an intensely competitive market, then cut corners in any way they can.
Then, when they really get busted? Like the lead on Barbies last year? Did the Chinese manufacturer apologize to Mattel?
NO. Remember what happened? Eventually, Mattel apologized to the Chinese manufacturer for bringing its integrity, its Asian "face," into doubt.
And, that's another theme of the book. Asian "face" gets mingled, and mangled, with a developing Chinese aggressiveness, and you get more and more shenanigans like this.
Meanwhile, the importers, like the "other person" in a dysfunctional relationship, afraid that if they stand tough, a competitor will get a better deal, often quail, show inopportune emotion, or otherwise lose "face." If it happened to Mattel, contrary to a couple of reviewers here, it's happening a lot in China, don't doubt it.
Meanwhile, it appears, from this book and many other things, the Chinese Potemkin economy is a 3-legged stool: Beijing, local governors, and the manufacturers themselves. The manufacturers are often playing off Beijing and local governors, probably through a mix of threats, kickbacks, etc.
So, American importers have a mix of ongoing infatuation with China, fear of leaving if a competitor stays, fear of provoking a manufacturer if a competitor doesn't, and more. It's hugely dysfunctional.
First, many American companies dealing with China are just that -- importers. Their companies never made a thing in America. They're start-up or near start-up entrepreneurs, aglow at the idea of selling cheap made-in-China stuff like health and beauty aids (and how dumb is it to ship 90 percent-water shampoo across the ocean) as house or generic brands to sell at places like Dollar General.
And, Chinese plants dealing with such importers seem to cheat in the manufacturing process every way they can, besides the obvious, exposed ones such as lead in paint and melamine in dog food. They simply refuse to pay for internal quality inspectors, then try to obstruct U.S. ones, people like the middleman author. They deliberately underbid in an intensely competitive market, then cut corners in any way they can.
Then, when they really get busted? Like the lead on Barbies last year? Did the Chinese manufacturer apologize to Mattel?
NO. Remember what happened? Eventually, Mattel apologized to the Chinese manufacturer for bringing its integrity, its Asian "face," into doubt.
And, that's another theme of the book. Asian "face" gets mingled, and mangled, with a developing Chinese aggressiveness, and you get more and more shenanigans like this.
Meanwhile, the importers, like the "other person" in a dysfunctional relationship, afraid that if they stand tough, a competitor will get a better deal, often quail, show inopportune emotion, or otherwise lose "face." If it happened to Mattel, contrary to a couple of reviewers here, it's happening a lot in China, don't doubt it.
Meanwhile, it appears, from this book and many other things, the Chinese Potemkin economy is a 3-legged stool: Beijing, local governors, and the manufacturers themselves. The manufacturers are often playing off Beijing and local governors, probably through a mix of threats, kickbacks, etc.
So, American importers have a mix of ongoing infatuation with China, fear of leaving if a competitor stays, fear of provoking a manufacturer if a competitor doesn't, and more. It's hugely dysfunctional.