Take a photo of a barcode or cover
charles__ 's review for:
Kaigun is an important read for someone with both a strong background and a keen interest in naval history and the Pacific War. In great detail it goes through the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) from Perry's Black Ships right up to (but excluding) the Pacific War. It’s a history of men, organizations, machines and doctrine. Doctrine includes the evolution of strategy and tactics. I had several revelations on 19th and early 20th century naval history reading this book.
However, this book is not perfect. The level of detail can vary, sometimes greatly between the sections, although it is generally quiet high. The book has a laser focus on the IJN. Yet it purposefully avoids details of Imperial Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the Army that greatly affected the IJN during its history. A reader without a background in late 19th to early 20th century Japanese Imperial history will only benefit from a small part of this book. Having written that, to a serious student of late 19th and early 20th century naval history this is a must read.
In general, the book was well edited. The book's prose is good. It is less technically dense than strictly militarily-authored works I’ve read. Very occasionally I found awkward sentence constructions, but information was conveyed in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
Use of maps was good. I would have liked there to have been more and more detailed maps. In addition, I would have liked them to have used standard military symbols.
Diagrams usage was excellent. I found myself poring at length over the ship and aircraft diagrams.
Chart and graph usage was fair. Some were not immediately understandable to me. Their usage would have benefited from some information design and data visualization analysis. Compared to the quality of the maps and diagrams the charts and graphs appeared amateurish.
The authors wrote this book to describe the IJN’s organization, technology, strategy and tactics. To this end, they were very successful. I felt they were most successful in describing the: technology, strategy and tactics. The organization somewhat less so. In particular there was a concentration on the air and surface ship arms of the IJN. Any issues I have with these are merely quibbles.
A quibbling example would be, is that without Japanese language or cultural training, the IJN’s ship naming conventions will be opaque. Most western naval historians understand the naming conventions used for 19th and early 20th century American warships. For example, an American ship named Arizona is immediately recognized as a battleship (BB) because it’s a US state name. The IJN’s convention was more complex. For example, the Shōkaku-class fleet carriers might translate to the Crane-class after the waterfowl with mythical Japanese significance. The authors did explain the naming of the Yamato-class battleships but no other ship classes received this attention.
The discussion of the IJN’s submarine service was more detailed than any I’ve ever encountered. However, it was considerably less detailed than the air or surface ship discussions. For example, still left largely unexplained was why despite having German Allies and earlier observing WWI submarine tactics wolfpacking and preying on the extensive supply train the Americans was never adopted as part of overall strategy?
An area I thought was not covered adequately was the effect of geography on strategy and logistics. Study of additional smaller scaled maps was called-for by me to understand the progressive construction of IJN home islands fleet bases and air stations. In addition, the final evolution of the attritive strategy against the American advance across the Pacific was dependent on island airfields fortified with land based naval bombers. The the entirety of the: names, locations and the operation of this interlocking network of island naval bases and airfields were never described. Truk being an exception.
My great caution over this book is that the authors break the link between “cause and effect”. This book is about the Navy. They took a very parochial approach to the IJN’s story to keep their page count manageable. You will find a superb discussion of the Battle of Tsushima Strait. However, the IJN was greatly affected by Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the IJN’s nemesis the Imperial Japanese Army. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 had at least as much effect on the development of the IJN as the Battle of Tsushima Strait. The authors decline to delve into the politics of the naval limitation treaties despite their effect on naval construction. A reader who is not cognizant of late 19th and early 20th century world and Japanese history is frequently going to be left wondering, Why did they (the IJN) do it that way?
Finally, the IJN’s story is about men, machines and organizations in contention. The IJN spanned almost one hundred years in a time of rapid technological and political change. The book was a worthwhile read for someone interested in naval history and the lead-up to the Pacific War. The narrative is authoritative in the changes in the IJN’s : military technology, organizational behavior, strategy and tactics for the period covered, which is just short of the Pacific War. However, to get a full(er) picture of the IJN previous knowledge of late 19th and early 20th century Imperial Japanese diplomatic and political history is needed .
Readers of this book may also be interested in: War Plan Orange: The U. S. Strategy To Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 by Edward S. Mille (my review).
However, this book is not perfect. The level of detail can vary, sometimes greatly between the sections, although it is generally quiet high. The book has a laser focus on the IJN. Yet it purposefully avoids details of Imperial Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the Army that greatly affected the IJN during its history. A reader without a background in late 19th to early 20th century Japanese Imperial history will only benefit from a small part of this book. Having written that, to a serious student of late 19th and early 20th century naval history this is a must read.
In general, the book was well edited. The book's prose is good. It is less technically dense than strictly militarily-authored works I’ve read. Very occasionally I found awkward sentence constructions, but information was conveyed in a clear and unambiguous fashion.
Use of maps was good. I would have liked there to have been more and more detailed maps. In addition, I would have liked them to have used standard military symbols.
Diagrams usage was excellent. I found myself poring at length over the ship and aircraft diagrams.
Chart and graph usage was fair. Some were not immediately understandable to me. Their usage would have benefited from some information design and data visualization analysis. Compared to the quality of the maps and diagrams the charts and graphs appeared amateurish.
The authors wrote this book to describe the IJN’s organization, technology, strategy and tactics. To this end, they were very successful. I felt they were most successful in describing the: technology, strategy and tactics. The organization somewhat less so. In particular there was a concentration on the air and surface ship arms of the IJN. Any issues I have with these are merely quibbles.
A quibbling example would be, is that without Japanese language or cultural training, the IJN’s ship naming conventions will be opaque. Most western naval historians understand the naming conventions used for 19th and early 20th century American warships. For example, an American ship named Arizona is immediately recognized as a battleship (BB) because it’s a US state name. The IJN’s convention was more complex. For example, the Shōkaku-class fleet carriers might translate to the Crane-class after the waterfowl with mythical Japanese significance. The authors did explain the naming of the Yamato-class battleships but no other ship classes received this attention.
The discussion of the IJN’s submarine service was more detailed than any I’ve ever encountered. However, it was considerably less detailed than the air or surface ship discussions. For example, still left largely unexplained was why despite having German Allies and earlier observing WWI submarine tactics wolfpacking and preying on the extensive supply train the Americans was never adopted as part of overall strategy?
An area I thought was not covered adequately was the effect of geography on strategy and logistics. Study of additional smaller scaled maps was called-for by me to understand the progressive construction of IJN home islands fleet bases and air stations. In addition, the final evolution of the attritive strategy against the American advance across the Pacific was dependent on island airfields fortified with land based naval bombers. The the entirety of the: names, locations and the operation of this interlocking network of island naval bases and airfields were never described. Truk being an exception.
My great caution over this book is that the authors break the link between “cause and effect”. This book is about the Navy. They took a very parochial approach to the IJN’s story to keep their page count manageable. You will find a superb discussion of the Battle of Tsushima Strait. However, the IJN was greatly affected by Japanese: politics, diplomacy and the IJN’s nemesis the Imperial Japanese Army. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 had at least as much effect on the development of the IJN as the Battle of Tsushima Strait. The authors decline to delve into the politics of the naval limitation treaties despite their effect on naval construction. A reader who is not cognizant of late 19th and early 20th century world and Japanese history is frequently going to be left wondering, Why did they (the IJN) do it that way?
Finally, the IJN’s story is about men, machines and organizations in contention. The IJN spanned almost one hundred years in a time of rapid technological and political change. The book was a worthwhile read for someone interested in naval history and the lead-up to the Pacific War. The narrative is authoritative in the changes in the IJN’s : military technology, organizational behavior, strategy and tactics for the period covered, which is just short of the Pacific War. However, to get a full(er) picture of the IJN previous knowledge of late 19th and early 20th century Imperial Japanese diplomatic and political history is needed .
Readers of this book may also be interested in: War Plan Orange: The U. S. Strategy To Defeat Japan, 1897-1945 by Edward S. Mille (my review).