A review by colin_cox
Scalia Speaks: Reflections on Law, Faith, and Life Well Lived by Antonin Scalia

3.0

I was attracted to Scalia Speaks for two reasons: first, Justice Scalia is an intriguing figure. I have read several of his dissents, and unlike the small portion of legal scholarship I have read, they burst with clarity, humor, and an unmistakable style. The second reason I was attracted to this book reflects my growing interest in the law. Before his death, Scalia became a celebrity in contemporary politics, particularly on the right (on the left, Ruth Bader Ginsburg occupies a similar position). He developed a reputation for judicial contrarianism best expressed by his approach to Constitutional interpretation: Originalism. He defines Originalism multiple times in Scalia Speaks, but his definition on page 201 is the clearest: "The Constitution, as you know, contains a number of broad provisions...Originalism gives to those terms the meaning they were understood to have when the people adopted them" (201). Simply put, Originalism sees the Constitution as a reflection of the historical and cultural period that produced it. Therefore, Originalism is an ethnolinguistic approach to Constitutional interpretation that appears less interested in the founders' intentions and more interested in how the culture that constituted this moment in history perceived and understood the language of the Constitution.

If I didn't think about it too much, I might find this line of reasoning seductive. The problem, of course, is that Originalism presents a myriad of interpretative challenges. According to the tenets of Originalism, as described by Scalia, a Supreme Court Justice must also be a historian, a linguistic, a cultural anthropologist, and a legal scholar. After reading Scalia Speaks, I don't doubt the man's brilliance and intelligence, but that's a tall order. In addition, this approach seems to make a troubling a priori assumption about the moral and ethical supremacy of the moment in history that produced our Constitution. Scalia bypasses this criticism by suggesting that the Supreme Court need not have broad, sweeping authority to enact change. If the people want change, then they should use the vote rather than appeal to the Supreme Court. Once again, this position makes a troubling assumption because it believes the vote has more power than it does. This position ignores the unequivocal efforts to suppress and delegitimize vast swaths of constituents both now and in the past. It would be nice to think the vote is as powerful as Scalia purports it to be.

But to the credit of book's editors, Scalia Speaks represents Scalia's charm and humor, and while I find some of his positions unsettling, I cannot help but wonder if the limits of the public speech may explain some of the problems I have with the book. That is not to say that public talks cannot be thorough and rigorous because they certainly can. Most of these speeches, however, feel frustratingly undeveloped and repetitive.