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A review by fourtriplezed
The End by Ian Kershaw
5.0
In this excellent book Ian Kershaw scrutinises the fall of Nazi Germany from the Assassination attempt on Hitler in July 44 through to the final unconditional surrender.
Fascinating analysis is given throughout each chapter. Brilliant footnotes through to works cited (bibliography) that should have anyone interested in the subject of the last year of Nazi Germany’s demise salivating. For those who may wonder why Nazi Germany fought to the very limits of their capabilities this book covers many possible discussion points. A few follow.
The failed July 20th assassination plot left any possible opposition to the regime utterly leaderless, leading to the further politicisation of the Wehrmacht upper echelons. Any hint of insubordination towards even military tactics was treated as treasonous. With that any thought of political involvement in a movement to discuss the end with the allies was made moot once there was a demand for unconditional surrender. With military power now in the hands of Nazis it was now committed to victory or downfall. Also considered is if the assassination had been successful there could have been another ‘stab in the back’ legend.This played on the minds of many.
The blame game following the fall of France to the Allies was an event that was a great shock to all Germany. An example covered is that in September 1944 Aachen was the first city in Germany proper to come under Allied attack with the panic of the citizens and inability of the Nazi Party to organise and assist causing a “shambles” to quote the author. 116th Panzer Division arrived and took control of the civilian population by stopping the ‘stupid evacuation’. This evacuation comment by the commander General Gerd Graf von Schwerin lead to his eventual dismissal even with the defence becoming fierce. Hitler ordering an utmost radical defence of the city. Relationships between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht Officer class broke down with the Officer Class accused of being ‘saboteurs of war’ by even their own soldiers. To quote the author “…..sunk resignation, not burning rebellion….” became the course of the bitter defence.
Operation Bagration may have prolonged the war. Instead of a four front attack “a huge concentrated surge” through south Poland to cut off Centre and North army groups may possibly have allowed the Wehrmacht to be “patched up and fight on.” Inhabitants of East Prussia, with memories of Russian incursions in The Great War, were also more susceptible to Nazi anti Bolshevik propaganda than their western German counterparts. Those that had listened to the troops returning from the east knew that the war had been bitter and that atrocities towards Jews and the civilian populations had now become a serious issue for the average German with the Red Army on the doorstep.
The Battle of the Bulge and the decline of German economic output as the Allies attacks on transport networks etc takes its toll. A Werner Bosch, who worked for Speer, while under interrogation by the allies after the war had ended, was quoted as saying that people in his position “….could do nothing except get on with their own work” even considering that he thought the war lost in the Spring of 1944. He was one of many effective in keeping the war going for as long as it did no matter how desperate the situation. The regime also let the allied Morgenthau plan be known to the public at large. With this the plan to split Germany into a “powerless, dismembered country with a pre-industrial economy” played very much into the thoughts that there was ‘no opportunity’ for individuals ‘to take action against the war’.
So called defeatist attitudes were heavily punished. All ranks fought on due to fear of reprisals to their family plus general apathy in some circumstances. Even when most thought the war nearly over an automatic sense of obedience was held as other than family what else was there to do! Fatalism was a major issue with many. For those that deserted there was death. Many received death sentences from flying courts and those left fighting had little more to do than conform or face the harshest of penalties. Added was a propaganda campaign that at this point became shriller than all previous with specific reference to the “Asiatic hordes” as Nazi racial policy since 1933 had been ingrained into the masses. This caused mass panic among the civilian population with the soldiers being bombarded with exhortation to fight against those that would slaughter their women and children. Fear of foreigners was rife and even at the end the public invariably had no issue with the treatment of the prisoners on death marches as they were considered criminals.
At the top level many excuses were used from the duty not to the break loyalty pledge to Hitler, fear of Bolshevism through to the likes of Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring claiming they fought on in hope of the fracturing of the Allies into east and west camps. The state had built a cult around Hitler that was so solid in structure that there was little that could be changed. The elites had been divided and never had the “..collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction.”
Easily one of the the best books I have read. Highly recommended.
Fascinating analysis is given throughout each chapter. Brilliant footnotes through to works cited (bibliography) that should have anyone interested in the subject of the last year of Nazi Germany’s demise salivating. For those who may wonder why Nazi Germany fought to the very limits of their capabilities this book covers many possible discussion points. A few follow.
The failed July 20th assassination plot left any possible opposition to the regime utterly leaderless, leading to the further politicisation of the Wehrmacht upper echelons. Any hint of insubordination towards even military tactics was treated as treasonous. With that any thought of political involvement in a movement to discuss the end with the allies was made moot once there was a demand for unconditional surrender. With military power now in the hands of Nazis it was now committed to victory or downfall. Also considered is if the assassination had been successful there could have been another ‘stab in the back’ legend.This played on the minds of many.
The blame game following the fall of France to the Allies was an event that was a great shock to all Germany. An example covered is that in September 1944 Aachen was the first city in Germany proper to come under Allied attack with the panic of the citizens and inability of the Nazi Party to organise and assist causing a “shambles” to quote the author. 116th Panzer Division arrived and took control of the civilian population by stopping the ‘stupid evacuation’. This evacuation comment by the commander General Gerd Graf von Schwerin lead to his eventual dismissal even with the defence becoming fierce. Hitler ordering an utmost radical defence of the city. Relationships between the Nazi Party and the Wehrmacht Officer class broke down with the Officer Class accused of being ‘saboteurs of war’ by even their own soldiers. To quote the author “…..sunk resignation, not burning rebellion….” became the course of the bitter defence.
Operation Bagration may have prolonged the war. Instead of a four front attack “a huge concentrated surge” through south Poland to cut off Centre and North army groups may possibly have allowed the Wehrmacht to be “patched up and fight on.” Inhabitants of East Prussia, with memories of Russian incursions in The Great War, were also more susceptible to Nazi anti Bolshevik propaganda than their western German counterparts. Those that had listened to the troops returning from the east knew that the war had been bitter and that atrocities towards Jews and the civilian populations had now become a serious issue for the average German with the Red Army on the doorstep.
The Battle of the Bulge and the decline of German economic output as the Allies attacks on transport networks etc takes its toll. A Werner Bosch, who worked for Speer, while under interrogation by the allies after the war had ended, was quoted as saying that people in his position “….could do nothing except get on with their own work” even considering that he thought the war lost in the Spring of 1944. He was one of many effective in keeping the war going for as long as it did no matter how desperate the situation. The regime also let the allied Morgenthau plan be known to the public at large. With this the plan to split Germany into a “powerless, dismembered country with a pre-industrial economy” played very much into the thoughts that there was ‘no opportunity’ for individuals ‘to take action against the war’.
So called defeatist attitudes were heavily punished. All ranks fought on due to fear of reprisals to their family plus general apathy in some circumstances. Even when most thought the war nearly over an automatic sense of obedience was held as other than family what else was there to do! Fatalism was a major issue with many. For those that deserted there was death. Many received death sentences from flying courts and those left fighting had little more to do than conform or face the harshest of penalties. Added was a propaganda campaign that at this point became shriller than all previous with specific reference to the “Asiatic hordes” as Nazi racial policy since 1933 had been ingrained into the masses. This caused mass panic among the civilian population with the soldiers being bombarded with exhortation to fight against those that would slaughter their women and children. Fear of foreigners was rife and even at the end the public invariably had no issue with the treatment of the prisoners on death marches as they were considered criminals.
At the top level many excuses were used from the duty not to the break loyalty pledge to Hitler, fear of Bolshevism through to the likes of Keitel, Jodl and Kesselring claiming they fought on in hope of the fracturing of the Allies into east and west camps. The state had built a cult around Hitler that was so solid in structure that there was little that could be changed. The elites had been divided and never had the “..collective will nor the mechanisms of power to prevent Hitler taking Germany to total destruction.”
Easily one of the the best books I have read. Highly recommended.