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3.44 AVERAGE
3.44 AVERAGE
I am approaching the end of my temporary reading program on the phenomenon of time and temporality. This book lists the various philosophical and scientific points of view, especially focussing on the question of whether time is real. To be honest, no matter how interesting, I think this is a very academic issue. As a historian, I can only ascertain, and so does Adrian Bardon, that for us humans, time indeed is tangible, that we constantly live 'in' time, and that we cannot but use notions of time and temporality in our lives to organize the world. Agreed, those notions past-present-future are vague and problematic, but we constantly use them to orient ourselves through chaotic reality. As Bardon correctly states, we cannot and must not ignore that empirical experience. “Our experience of the world is real and fundamentally involves dynamic temporality and temporal directionality. Whether or not a theoretical objective perspective would include change and direction is irrelevant to our human concerns.”
Of course, these theoretical approaches are relevant to a certain extent in formal historiography. Just think of the fierce discussions at the end of the last century, when the question was asked from a postmodernist perspective whether the study of history was not merely a representation, a construction, and - in its most radical version - independent of the question of truth. That approach was not senseless, because of course history to a certain extent IS a construction, there is no other way. But the disconnection from the question of truth was clearly a bridge too far that opened the door to fatal relativism. Fortunately, the dust has settled down a bit, and reason has largely returned.
Just like Bardon in this book concludes that different approaches are relevant, but that we cannot ignore scientific realism, I argue for a step-by-step, careful questioning of the past, in a methodologically responsible and transparent manner, with insight into the immanent necessary subjectivity, but also with a belief in a gradual growth of our knowledge of the past, every time we approach history with specific questions from our own context. Acquiring 'ultimate' knowledge about the past is an utopian and absurd pursuit. But a pragmatic approach, aimed at a better orientation in the historical reality, and therefore also in the reality of today and tomorrow, is and must be the appropriate way that can be provided by the study of history. Nothing more, but certainly nothing less.
Of course, these theoretical approaches are relevant to a certain extent in formal historiography. Just think of the fierce discussions at the end of the last century, when the question was asked from a postmodernist perspective whether the study of history was not merely a representation, a construction, and - in its most radical version - independent of the question of truth. That approach was not senseless, because of course history to a certain extent IS a construction, there is no other way. But the disconnection from the question of truth was clearly a bridge too far that opened the door to fatal relativism. Fortunately, the dust has settled down a bit, and reason has largely returned.
Just like Bardon in this book concludes that different approaches are relevant, but that we cannot ignore scientific realism, I argue for a step-by-step, careful questioning of the past, in a methodologically responsible and transparent manner, with insight into the immanent necessary subjectivity, but also with a belief in a gradual growth of our knowledge of the past, every time we approach history with specific questions from our own context. Acquiring 'ultimate' knowledge about the past is an utopian and absurd pursuit. But a pragmatic approach, aimed at a better orientation in the historical reality, and therefore also in the reality of today and tomorrow, is and must be the appropriate way that can be provided by the study of history. Nothing more, but certainly nothing less.
“If an answer to the question “What is time?” still seems to elude us, perhaps it is because we have been asking the wrong question. Time is not so much a ‘what’ as a ‘how,’ and not so much a question as an answer”
Throughout the centuries, according to Adrian Bardon, the central issue in thinking about time has been whether time actually exists: is time tangible, as all kinds of language expressions (“time is running”, “I have time”) and our intuitive experience suggest? Is it not just a mental construction with which we (unconsciously) make order in chaotic reality? Or is time pure fiction and is there only a permanently shifting present? Dozens of philosophers and scientists have broken their brains on this issue and have taken up contradictory positions.
Bardon nicely takes stock of the discussion, in a very didactic and relatively accessible story. And, happily, his horizon is very wide. Of course, Parmenides, Aristotle and Augustine are discussed, how could it be otherwise. But Bardon also examines what the positive sciences have contributed to the debate. And I don't just mean the physics of the last centuries, especially Newton, Einstein, Planck and Hawking, but also human sciences such as cognitive psychology and neurology. The author explores their findings, theories and models, in a balanced argument. Occasionally he takes a side path that to me wasn’t really necessary, such as his parenthesis on the free will discussion or on the idle question of whether time travel is possible.
His carefully formulated final conclusion, which leaves room for different approaches (relationalistic, idealistic and realistic), will not satisfy everyone, especially those looking for black-and-white answers, but it is wise. It also opens up the prospect of progress, a slowly better understanding of what time is, and thus also reality, especially by asking new (philosophical) questions over and over again.
(rating 2.5 stars)
For a more elaborate review, see my History-account on Goodreads: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/2831252746
Throughout the centuries, according to Adrian Bardon, the central issue in thinking about time has been whether time actually exists: is time tangible, as all kinds of language expressions (“time is running”, “I have time”) and our intuitive experience suggest? Is it not just a mental construction with which we (unconsciously) make order in chaotic reality? Or is time pure fiction and is there only a permanently shifting present? Dozens of philosophers and scientists have broken their brains on this issue and have taken up contradictory positions.
Bardon nicely takes stock of the discussion, in a very didactic and relatively accessible story. And, happily, his horizon is very wide. Of course, Parmenides, Aristotle and Augustine are discussed, how could it be otherwise. But Bardon also examines what the positive sciences have contributed to the debate. And I don't just mean the physics of the last centuries, especially Newton, Einstein, Planck and Hawking, but also human sciences such as cognitive psychology and neurology. The author explores their findings, theories and models, in a balanced argument. Occasionally he takes a side path that to me wasn’t really necessary, such as his parenthesis on the free will discussion or on the idle question of whether time travel is possible.
His carefully formulated final conclusion, which leaves room for different approaches (relationalistic, idealistic and realistic), will not satisfy everyone, especially those looking for black-and-white answers, but it is wise. It also opens up the prospect of progress, a slowly better understanding of what time is, and thus also reality, especially by asking new (philosophical) questions over and over again.
(rating 2.5 stars)
For a more elaborate review, see my History-account on Goodreads: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/2831252746
informative
slow-paced
informative
medium-paced
The introduction actually provides a really good overview on how philosophers go about investigating any difficult issue and connects the discussion of their methods to time.
Chapter 1 "Time and Change" contrasts the Eleatic (Parmenides, Zeno) idealist view of a timeless world with Aristotle's relationist response, which only partly addresses their objections to the existence of time, then moves on to the idealism of St. Augustine, pointing out the flaw in his view as well (where do temporal concepts or "ideas" come from in a timeless universe?)
Chapter 2 "Idealism and Experience" Discusses Locke's realist empiricist view on time and a mistake in it. I learned that Locke, primarily known as a political philosopher, developed empiricism ("All we learn is through experience and reflection upon it") as a direct reaction to the then prevailing claim that political and religious authorities had special insights to The Truth hidden from common folks, thus justifying their exalted status.
Then Kant's idealism is explained, but other than that his view also has problems, it was difficult to understand. (personal note:I think Kant is overrated simply because his ideas are apparently so difficult to understand or unclear that different philosophers come to different, and at times mutually contradictory conclusions about what he meant. That, to me, is not the mark of good philosophy, which is above all characterized by clarity). Finally, more modern philosophical approaches are discussed and compared to the results of psychology experiments like the phi phenomenon, Flash lag effect, the cutaneous rabbit and cross-saccadic continuity, which indicate that to a certain extent, we "reconstruct" time, duration or temporal order in our minds.
Chapter 3 "Time and spacetime" first describes the features of a Newtonian conception of time (and space) as an absolute thing in of itself, which replaced the relationist view of Aristotle and his physics, which considered time as essentially a device for tracking change. Subsequently, it contrasts it first with Leibniz's view of time as a relation between events, then with Einstein's relativity, where realism about time is replaced by realism about spacetime.
Chapter 4 "Does time pass?" Is divided into "reasons to think not" and "why it seems it does". The first part gives an accessible account of McTaggart's argument against the passage of time (though I don't follow why the problem with his A-theory isn't already in the set-up, by taking a future contingent to be true. "P will happen" in a sense can never be true: before it has happened, it is not a fact yet, and once it happens and thereafter, it has already happened. I see his infinite regress as merely confirming that we cannot take a future contingent to be true, not an argument against the passage of time).
Then it gives a reason against passing time from special relativity, but stumbles. It says "as strange as it sounds, if relativity is right then the dynamic theory of time is wrong". No! Only any *global* dynamic theory of time is wrong. But then, already the relativity of simultaneity tells us that time in relativity cannot be global. The insistence on "globalizing" time in relativity is what leads to the block universe view.
The second part does a good job of showing the drastic consequences of a static view, which unfortunately too few of its proponents seem to be aware of, e.g. rendering reality unknowable beyond our immediate sense impressions by annihilating causality, laws, probabilities etc. Everything becomes just one grand set of conjunctions e.g. each time you drop an object, it cannot be that the law of gravity "causes" it to fall, since a "cause" would presuppose a dynamic "before" and "after", which in a static universe do not exist. There is no law, only a conjunction of an object falling with an object being dropped.
The author then gives his own theory that the passage of time is mind-dependent: a psychological projection, the ascription of objective status to something inherently subjective, like color or virtue. The final passage in the chapter in my opinion throws the towel too soon on the prospect of science ever becoming reconcilable with our experience of time.
Chapter 5 "The arrow of time" briefly discusses the psychological, thermodynamic and causal arrows. It then brings in quantum physics and makes the claim that quantum entanglement "fundamentally conflicts with standard relativistic physics".
The issue is a very subtle one, and until we understand the mechanism for the enforcement of the quantum correlations, we cannot be absolutely certain, but under the standard textbook interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the assumption that nothing is being superluminally trasmitted(very likely), the claim is false. I have explained this in some detail here:
https://www.quora.com/Does-quantum-entanglement-violate-special-relativity/answer/Armin-Nikkhah-Shirazi
Retrocausation is considered favorably by viewing causation as a human projection enabled by the thermodynamic arrow of time against a fundamentally time-symmetric universe.
Chapter 6"Is time travel possible?" considers the question first from a logical perspective, discussing the grandfather paradox and concluding that it does not logically prohibit travel into one's past but only inconsistent stories about how the world is through time. It then considers time travel from the perspective of physical possibility, briefly discussing the Gödel Universe, wormholes and the twin paradox before concluding that, in the sense portrayed in science fiction, it is practically impossible to travel into one's past. It concludes with the question of why in a static universe travel into the future ("aging") is so much easier than travel into the past. I personally interpret this as evidence that the universe is not static.
Chapter 7 "Time and Freedom" begins by discussing forms of fatalism, which involves the absence of alternative possibilities: logical fatalism is discussed as a consequence of the application of two logical principles to future events: the principle of bivalence (also called law of excluded middle) and the principle of non-contradiction and implies that we are not free. In my view, the problem here is that non-modal logic is applied to an inherently modal situation, so I see logical fatalism as the result of misapplying logic. Metaphysical fatalism is discussed in relation to the static universe, and a way to escape absence of freedom due to Oaklander is proposed which I had trouble understanding as such.
Causal determinism is contrasted with fatalism (determinism: causal chain necessitates a particular future, fatalism: if statements about the future are timelessly true or false, then everything necessarily occurs as it does occur) and is then linked to scientific naturalism.
Compatibilism is offered as a response to both determinism and fatalism and some its implications are considered.
Chapter 8 " Could the Universe have no beginning or end in time?" expands the scope of inquiry to the entire universe, contrasting the views of Aristotle, Kant and Leibniz with modern cosmological findings, giving a brief review of modern physics as well as speculative extrapolations of it, and also delving into some theological questions. It concludes by wondering whether certain questions are simply unanswerable.
The epilogue considers this in more depth for the question "what is time?", coming down on the side that time may be more of an answer, namely to the question of how we organize our experiences as well as events all around the world. It concludes with a brief review of the many issues touched in the book.
Overall, this is a mostly good and accessible introduction to the philosophy of time. There are a few mistakes here and there (Leibniz was German, not Austrian; an infinitesimal distance is not zero etc.) but not enough to drag the work down significantly, except for a couple physics mistakes: 1) the author's failure to recognize that special relativity does allow for a local dynamic description of time, 2) the almost certainly false claim that Quantum Entanglement "fundamentally conflicts" with special relativity.
As the author's sympathies for a fundamentally static universe seem to spring in part from these misapprehensions, they should be taken with a grain of salt.
Chapter 1 "Time and Change" contrasts the Eleatic (Parmenides, Zeno) idealist view of a timeless world with Aristotle's relationist response, which only partly addresses their objections to the existence of time, then moves on to the idealism of St. Augustine, pointing out the flaw in his view as well (where do temporal concepts or "ideas" come from in a timeless universe?)
Chapter 2 "Idealism and Experience" Discusses Locke's realist empiricist view on time and a mistake in it. I learned that Locke, primarily known as a political philosopher, developed empiricism ("All we learn is through experience and reflection upon it") as a direct reaction to the then prevailing claim that political and religious authorities had special insights to The Truth hidden from common folks, thus justifying their exalted status.
Then Kant's idealism is explained, but other than that his view also has problems, it was difficult to understand. (personal note:I think Kant is overrated simply because his ideas are apparently so difficult to understand or unclear that different philosophers come to different, and at times mutually contradictory conclusions about what he meant. That, to me, is not the mark of good philosophy, which is above all characterized by clarity). Finally, more modern philosophical approaches are discussed and compared to the results of psychology experiments like the phi phenomenon, Flash lag effect, the cutaneous rabbit and cross-saccadic continuity, which indicate that to a certain extent, we "reconstruct" time, duration or temporal order in our minds.
Chapter 3 "Time and spacetime" first describes the features of a Newtonian conception of time (and space) as an absolute thing in of itself, which replaced the relationist view of Aristotle and his physics, which considered time as essentially a device for tracking change. Subsequently, it contrasts it first with Leibniz's view of time as a relation between events, then with Einstein's relativity, where realism about time is replaced by realism about spacetime.
Chapter 4 "Does time pass?" Is divided into "reasons to think not" and "why it seems it does". The first part gives an accessible account of McTaggart's argument against the passage of time (though I don't follow why the problem with his A-theory isn't already in the set-up, by taking a future contingent to be true. "P will happen" in a sense can never be true: before it has happened, it is not a fact yet, and once it happens and thereafter, it has already happened. I see his infinite regress as merely confirming that we cannot take a future contingent to be true, not an argument against the passage of time).
Then it gives a reason against passing time from special relativity, but stumbles. It says "as strange as it sounds, if relativity is right then the dynamic theory of time is wrong". No! Only any *global* dynamic theory of time is wrong. But then, already the relativity of simultaneity tells us that time in relativity cannot be global. The insistence on "globalizing" time in relativity is what leads to the block universe view.
The second part does a good job of showing the drastic consequences of a static view, which unfortunately too few of its proponents seem to be aware of, e.g. rendering reality unknowable beyond our immediate sense impressions by annihilating causality, laws, probabilities etc. Everything becomes just one grand set of conjunctions e.g. each time you drop an object, it cannot be that the law of gravity "causes" it to fall, since a "cause" would presuppose a dynamic "before" and "after", which in a static universe do not exist. There is no law, only a conjunction of an object falling with an object being dropped.
The author then gives his own theory that the passage of time is mind-dependent: a psychological projection, the ascription of objective status to something inherently subjective, like color or virtue. The final passage in the chapter in my opinion throws the towel too soon on the prospect of science ever becoming reconcilable with our experience of time.
Chapter 5 "The arrow of time" briefly discusses the psychological, thermodynamic and causal arrows. It then brings in quantum physics and makes the claim that quantum entanglement "fundamentally conflicts with standard relativistic physics".
The issue is a very subtle one, and until we understand the mechanism for the enforcement of the quantum correlations, we cannot be absolutely certain, but under the standard textbook interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and the assumption that nothing is being superluminally trasmitted(very likely), the claim is false. I have explained this in some detail here:
https://www.quora.com/Does-quantum-entanglement-violate-special-relativity/answer/Armin-Nikkhah-Shirazi
Retrocausation is considered favorably by viewing causation as a human projection enabled by the thermodynamic arrow of time against a fundamentally time-symmetric universe.
Chapter 6"Is time travel possible?" considers the question first from a logical perspective, discussing the grandfather paradox and concluding that it does not logically prohibit travel into one's past but only inconsistent stories about how the world is through time. It then considers time travel from the perspective of physical possibility, briefly discussing the Gödel Universe, wormholes and the twin paradox before concluding that, in the sense portrayed in science fiction, it is practically impossible to travel into one's past. It concludes with the question of why in a static universe travel into the future ("aging") is so much easier than travel into the past. I personally interpret this as evidence that the universe is not static.
Chapter 7 "Time and Freedom" begins by discussing forms of fatalism, which involves the absence of alternative possibilities: logical fatalism is discussed as a consequence of the application of two logical principles to future events: the principle of bivalence (also called law of excluded middle) and the principle of non-contradiction and implies that we are not free. In my view, the problem here is that non-modal logic is applied to an inherently modal situation, so I see logical fatalism as the result of misapplying logic. Metaphysical fatalism is discussed in relation to the static universe, and a way to escape absence of freedom due to Oaklander is proposed which I had trouble understanding as such.
Causal determinism is contrasted with fatalism (determinism: causal chain necessitates a particular future, fatalism: if statements about the future are timelessly true or false, then everything necessarily occurs as it does occur) and is then linked to scientific naturalism.
Compatibilism is offered as a response to both determinism and fatalism and some its implications are considered.
Chapter 8 " Could the Universe have no beginning or end in time?" expands the scope of inquiry to the entire universe, contrasting the views of Aristotle, Kant and Leibniz with modern cosmological findings, giving a brief review of modern physics as well as speculative extrapolations of it, and also delving into some theological questions. It concludes by wondering whether certain questions are simply unanswerable.
The epilogue considers this in more depth for the question "what is time?", coming down on the side that time may be more of an answer, namely to the question of how we organize our experiences as well as events all around the world. It concludes with a brief review of the many issues touched in the book.
Overall, this is a mostly good and accessible introduction to the philosophy of time. There are a few mistakes here and there (Leibniz was German, not Austrian; an infinitesimal distance is not zero etc.) but not enough to drag the work down significantly, except for a couple physics mistakes: 1) the author's failure to recognize that special relativity does allow for a local dynamic description of time, 2) the almost certainly false claim that Quantum Entanglement "fundamentally conflicts" with special relativity.
As the author's sympathies for a fundamentally static universe seem to spring in part from these misapprehensions, they should be taken with a grain of salt.