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yates9's review
4.0
A historical review of fossil fuel economics and politics, which for the most part presents a complex system of relationships and stakeholders (not to mention exploitative mechanics).
For me, the interesting core of the book is near the end where considerations that look at how post carbon economy may not be as compatible with democratic governance as is commonly thought. Also the relationship between authority in religion and globalisation and how this may come to crisis.
Curious reframing of many commonly held perspectives.
In a nutshell the exploitation of “inexpensive” energy drived a bubble around the western economies and a global democratic system and environmental damage. Now we may have to pay a price for this which will drive different politics.
For me, the interesting core of the book is near the end where considerations that look at how post carbon economy may not be as compatible with democratic governance as is commonly thought. Also the relationship between authority in religion and globalisation and how this may come to crisis.
Curious reframing of many commonly held perspectives.
In a nutshell the exploitation of “inexpensive” energy drived a bubble around the western economies and a global democratic system and environmental damage. Now we may have to pay a price for this which will drive different politics.
wtheriac's review
informative
reflective
medium-paced
5.0
I rate this book so highly because I found that it revolutionized the way I think about the relationships between militarism, violence, democracy, oil and coal, and even the way in which the production of energy defines the nature of human civilization. This book is well written, fascinating, and I felt it to be pulling back the curtain on a series of relationships that define my life as an American in the 21st century that had otherwise been obscured.
catii's review
3.5
fucking difficult why is it structured like that ... quite interesting tho i learnt a lot of stuff
utopologist's review against another edition
4.0
from first read in 2014:
This book took me a month, at least. Part of that was just how busy I am, but certainly also because of the book’s density. There is a lot of data, and Timothy Mitchell provides a lot of information, context, history, and statistics for his argument. At times it feels like sticking your head into a waterfall of information and trying to take it all in (or sometimes even trying to retain anything). But despite all of that, reading it was definitely a profound experience, and it’s changed how I think about politics and economics in a way that few other individual works have done. I’m going to summarize the book as best I can, but if you care at all about politics, the economy, or twentieth century history, you should read this book because I’m not going to do it justice.
The first part of the book lays out Mitchell’s thesis: energy, and specifically carbon, has been responsible for the political structure of the world since at least the Industrial Revolution. The invention of methods to extract and transport coal in large quantities allowed for urbanization (since huge groups of populations no longer had to live nearby their food sources) and the underpinnings of democracy, namely labor rights. This, Mitchell says, is due to the very nature of coal extraction: because managers and bosses are so far removed from the actual work that takes place within the mine, workers translate their autonomy into strikes and work stoppages. The same principle applies to transportation of this energy, since railways and other lines through which energy travels are susceptible to interruption by the workers at any point on the narrow, linear path of transportation. Coal emerged in part because of and as the cause of workers’ ability to bring society to a halt. “Democracy,” such as it was, emerged to give miners and workers enough of a say in their lives to not cause that halt.
Oil changed this. Coal moves in “dendritic networks,” with a main channel that can be blocked. Oil, Mitchell explains, moves in something more like an electrical grid: if one channel is blocked, it can still make it to the other side through another part of the grid. Thus, strikes and stoppages become much less effective. Naturally, once governments and corporations figured this out, oil became the preferred carbon energy source. Mitchell’s argument perhaps overlooks a lot of other factors, especially considering the history of labor, but it makes sense that the methods of production like he talks about played at least a moderate part in the rise (and fall) of labor power.
Next, Mitchell moves into the late nineteenth to twentieth centuries, where he spends most of the book’s time. He lays out the colonial history of the Middle East and the oil discoveries there. Apparently the popular narrative (I can’t confirm or deny because I haven’t read a ton about early oil discoveries there) was that of brave entrepreneurs taking risks to find a rare and powerful form of energy with which to build the Western world. That isn’t what happened. Oil wasn’t scarce; there were incredible, seemingly unimaginable quantities of it all over the world. The problem for governments and oil corporations wasn’t dealing with scarcity; it was manufacturing the scarcity. Companies worked with imperial powers to ensure a monopoly on oil, often exploiting ethnic tensions to ensure control over oil production.
So after Western governments and corporations secured access to oil in the Middle East (more on that in a bit), they had to first create the demand for oil, then make sure they controlled the supply and could make a profit. For instance, the Marshall Plan after WWII was specifically designed to build an oil infrastructure in Europe, like the one being built in the US. (The US specifically used up its post-war prosperity to build suburbs and force people to make commuting an inescapable part of daily life.) Oil companies financed the development of car engines that used gasoline, up until then a waste product from the synthesis of kerosene from crude oil, then made US life impossible without one. Once everyone was used to oil in their daily lives, the companies played games with the price in order to ensure huge profits. What’s more, the abundance of cheap American-controlled oil cemented the US dollar as the backbone of the global economy.
Then Mitchell goes into some more contextual history of how the entire idea of “the economy” emerged. The first instances in the West of governments collecting economic data was to quantify coal reserves, and since that point, the economy has come to refer to a realm somehow “separate” from daily life and especially politics. The economy quickly shifted, however, to the idea of infinite growth, even while ostensibly managing “scarcity.”
The last third or so of the book lays out specifically what’s happened in the Middle East and South Asia in the last fifty or sixty years, attributing most of the political strife and turnover to the machinations of oil companies and the governments that love them. Between the CIA, oil companies’ own operatives, and blatant political maneuvering from the West, the constant lack of stable, democratic government is a natural consequence. The sale of arms and munitions is a perfect way to dispose of excess oil wealth (since there’s no “maximum” number of arms a group or state can accumulate), and various coups, revolutions, and assassinations were often planned and carried out in the interests of oil. It’s sobering and difficult to argue with, considering all of the evidence Mitchell brings to the table. This part specifically is what I’m doing the least amount of justice to, because he starts at the beginning and goes all the way up to 2013, and it is staggering to see it all laid out.
"Three numbers shape this calculus [of energy dependence]," Mitchell writes in the afterword:
Reading this after the entire rest of the book wasn’t the most encouraging thing I’ve ever experienced. With how much of the 20th century has been shaped by the quest for profit from oil, how can we suddenly expect this to change? Mitchell has a few suggestions, which largely center on collective action. I agree that if anything is going to help, it has to be that. I’m just feeling particularly cynical, in part because of Mitchell’s masterful argument throughout the entire book.
This book took me a month, at least. Part of that was just how busy I am, but certainly also because of the book’s density. There is a lot of data, and Timothy Mitchell provides a lot of information, context, history, and statistics for his argument. At times it feels like sticking your head into a waterfall of information and trying to take it all in (or sometimes even trying to retain anything). But despite all of that, reading it was definitely a profound experience, and it’s changed how I think about politics and economics in a way that few other individual works have done. I’m going to summarize the book as best I can, but if you care at all about politics, the economy, or twentieth century history, you should read this book because I’m not going to do it justice.
The first part of the book lays out Mitchell’s thesis: energy, and specifically carbon, has been responsible for the political structure of the world since at least the Industrial Revolution. The invention of methods to extract and transport coal in large quantities allowed for urbanization (since huge groups of populations no longer had to live nearby their food sources) and the underpinnings of democracy, namely labor rights. This, Mitchell says, is due to the very nature of coal extraction: because managers and bosses are so far removed from the actual work that takes place within the mine, workers translate their autonomy into strikes and work stoppages. The same principle applies to transportation of this energy, since railways and other lines through which energy travels are susceptible to interruption by the workers at any point on the narrow, linear path of transportation. Coal emerged in part because of and as the cause of workers’ ability to bring society to a halt. “Democracy,” such as it was, emerged to give miners and workers enough of a say in their lives to not cause that halt.
Oil changed this. Coal moves in “dendritic networks,” with a main channel that can be blocked. Oil, Mitchell explains, moves in something more like an electrical grid: if one channel is blocked, it can still make it to the other side through another part of the grid. Thus, strikes and stoppages become much less effective. Naturally, once governments and corporations figured this out, oil became the preferred carbon energy source. Mitchell’s argument perhaps overlooks a lot of other factors, especially considering the history of labor, but it makes sense that the methods of production like he talks about played at least a moderate part in the rise (and fall) of labor power.
Next, Mitchell moves into the late nineteenth to twentieth centuries, where he spends most of the book’s time. He lays out the colonial history of the Middle East and the oil discoveries there. Apparently the popular narrative (I can’t confirm or deny because I haven’t read a ton about early oil discoveries there) was that of brave entrepreneurs taking risks to find a rare and powerful form of energy with which to build the Western world. That isn’t what happened. Oil wasn’t scarce; there were incredible, seemingly unimaginable quantities of it all over the world. The problem for governments and oil corporations wasn’t dealing with scarcity; it was manufacturing the scarcity. Companies worked with imperial powers to ensure a monopoly on oil, often exploiting ethnic tensions to ensure control over oil production.
So after Western governments and corporations secured access to oil in the Middle East (more on that in a bit), they had to first create the demand for oil, then make sure they controlled the supply and could make a profit. For instance, the Marshall Plan after WWII was specifically designed to build an oil infrastructure in Europe, like the one being built in the US. (The US specifically used up its post-war prosperity to build suburbs and force people to make commuting an inescapable part of daily life.) Oil companies financed the development of car engines that used gasoline, up until then a waste product from the synthesis of kerosene from crude oil, then made US life impossible without one. Once everyone was used to oil in their daily lives, the companies played games with the price in order to ensure huge profits. What’s more, the abundance of cheap American-controlled oil cemented the US dollar as the backbone of the global economy.
Then Mitchell goes into some more contextual history of how the entire idea of “the economy” emerged. The first instances in the West of governments collecting economic data was to quantify coal reserves, and since that point, the economy has come to refer to a realm somehow “separate” from daily life and especially politics. The economy quickly shifted, however, to the idea of infinite growth, even while ostensibly managing “scarcity.”
The last third or so of the book lays out specifically what’s happened in the Middle East and South Asia in the last fifty or sixty years, attributing most of the political strife and turnover to the machinations of oil companies and the governments that love them. Between the CIA, oil companies’ own operatives, and blatant political maneuvering from the West, the constant lack of stable, democratic government is a natural consequence. The sale of arms and munitions is a perfect way to dispose of excess oil wealth (since there’s no “maximum” number of arms a group or state can accumulate), and various coups, revolutions, and assassinations were often planned and carried out in the interests of oil. It’s sobering and difficult to argue with, considering all of the evidence Mitchell brings to the table. This part specifically is what I’m doing the least amount of justice to, because he starts at the beginning and goes all the way up to 2013, and it is staggering to see it all laid out.
"Three numbers shape this calculus [of energy dependence]," Mitchell writes in the afterword:
two degrees Celsius - the target accepted in the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Accord as the mean global temperature rise below which the most dangerous effects of anthropogenic climate change might be avoided; 886 gigatons - the quantity of carbon dioxide humankind can place in the atmosphere between the year 2000 and mid-century and still have some chance of keeping below the two-degree target, a budget of which more than one third was used up in the first decade of the century, leaving just 565 gigatons to spend by 2050; and 2,795 gigatons - the carbon potential of the proven coal, oil and gas reserves owned by the world’s private and public companies and governments. This last figure is five times the size of the remaining carbon budget. Energy firms, which dominate the lists of the world’s largest corporations, suffer from a deepening dependency. They depend upon counting as a financial asset a reserve of fossil fuels of which four-fifths must stay buried and uncounted in the ground if we are serious about keeping the planet habitable.
Reading this after the entire rest of the book wasn’t the most encouraging thing I’ve ever experienced. With how much of the 20th century has been shaped by the quest for profit from oil, how can we suddenly expect this to change? Mitchell has a few suggestions, which largely center on collective action. I agree that if anything is going to help, it has to be that. I’m just feeling particularly cynical, in part because of Mitchell’s masterful argument throughout the entire book.
canamac's review against another edition
5.0
really love this book for its clear and consistent argument. equal parts creative and a tight condensing of so much earlier scholarship in energy/oil history. also provides helpful behind the scenes info about oil politics and economics globally.
eilidhmack's review
3.75
Interesting theory that I had never heard or really thought of. Closeness to the carbon source in the production/transportation chain determines the extent of democracy.
vita_s_west's review
4.0
An interesting alternate history to the twentieth century, centring on fossil fuels as its main actor.
lissielove's review against another edition
2.0
Timothy Mitchell’s book attempted to deconstruct the idea of democracy as it applied to the world in the twentieth century, specifically how countries that depended on carbon as an essential resource (coal, then oil) used the idea and concept of democracy to control that resource. He began his argument with the nineteenth century in Britain and the importance of coal to the rise of working-class demands for political rights before moving to an analysis of the development of the oil industry in the Middle East and the uncertain future the industry faces today. Mitchell argued that the fight to dominate this resource did more to shape the twentieth century than almost any other factor, and that the United States, as well as other Western countries, twisted the idea of democracy to fit their demands for oil.
This book takes on way too many topics over too long a period to be succinctly and well argued in two hundred and sixty-seven pages. Mitchell took on not only the rise of the working class demands of the nineteenth century, but two world wars, the creation of the post-war order, and the crisis (conjured or not) of the 1970. The relationship between either coal and oil in any of these topics could have constituted a volume of research of their own. Because Mitchell attempted all of them, none of these topics are given any space to breathe. As a result, his analysis is superficial at best, and often, skewed to make his point.
There is no doubt that coal and steam engines fundamentally changed the British world, creating conditions for the first Industrial Revolution, but to suggest that it is this development that accounts for the rise of the working class ignores all the foundation laid by earlier generations. Great Britain’s evolution in the area of representation is unique in the developed world—over a long period of three hundred years, they reformed their own government and relocated power from aristocracy to the common people without a civil war, without organized violence. It had taken those things to wrest control from the monarchy (half a century of turmoil in the English Civil War, the Restoration of 1660, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688). After 1688, however, Parliament fought an internal battle to keep the power for themselves. They fought against the idea of representation, against the idea that the power in the country flowed from the people who put them into office (at least in the commons). For Parliament, sovereignty was theirs. It was not given to them. By the end of the eighteenth century, common men who lacked the right to vote were vociferously arguing that the power came from them, and they deserved parliamentary reform.
When studying British history, it is incredibly reductive to simply point to the Industrial Revolution as the pivotal turning point that led to the demand for political rights and mass politics in the nineteenth century. Yes, steam engines created the conditions for factories and increased the rate of urbanization that been happening more slowly over time, but it is a mistake to give so much of the credit of the working-class consciousness to industrial capacity because all that did was create low-paying jobs and poverty on a larger scale. A more influential development was the trading revolution a century earlier. By the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain had become a trading power, and it was merchants who benefited first. Rich merchants and traders acquired a new way of life with new paths to education and new opportunities. Some merchants married into the aristocracy, some were given titles of their own, and still others stayed common and agitated for something they did not yet have—representation in Parliaments. The boroughs of Parliament had not kept up with increase and many larger cities went unrepresented while uninhabited places had two representatives. This was the key to demanding political rights because once merchants began demanding their share, those who worked for them began to think of themselves as deserving as well. In Mitchell’s own words, the importance of coal was not felt until the end of the eighteenth century, but political conscious already existed. The French Revolution did not just happen in France—it transformed the Western world, and Britain had already been thrust into ideas of representation and equality thanks to writings of the American War for Independence.
It would be easy to for many to say that Mitchell was talking about the Western world, and Britain’s unique position makes it the exception, not the rule. But that doesn’t hold up either. The political consciousness he pointed still begins in the eighteenth century with merchants in France and members of the Third Estate. The Industrial Revolution didn’t come to France for another century, but by 1789, the Third Estate was already demanding political power. Those ideas traveled throughout the Western world, laying the crucial foundation for the transformation of class and power that happened in the period Mitchel analyzed. The Industrial Revolution increased the rate and amplified those demands, but I think it’s a mistake to simply say that it “enabled new forms of mass politics” without talking about those mass politics in more depth. (14)
That was the major weakness of this book—it began with a flawed premise of the importance of coal and then carried that thread throughout his analysis of modern history. Coal and oil have an important relationship to democracy, one that deserves to be studied and analyzed, but to divorce those commodities from the world in which they were traded, mined, and developed left this book without any depth or lasting value.
This book takes on way too many topics over too long a period to be succinctly and well argued in two hundred and sixty-seven pages. Mitchell took on not only the rise of the working class demands of the nineteenth century, but two world wars, the creation of the post-war order, and the crisis (conjured or not) of the 1970. The relationship between either coal and oil in any of these topics could have constituted a volume of research of their own. Because Mitchell attempted all of them, none of these topics are given any space to breathe. As a result, his analysis is superficial at best, and often, skewed to make his point.
There is no doubt that coal and steam engines fundamentally changed the British world, creating conditions for the first Industrial Revolution, but to suggest that it is this development that accounts for the rise of the working class ignores all the foundation laid by earlier generations. Great Britain’s evolution in the area of representation is unique in the developed world—over a long period of three hundred years, they reformed their own government and relocated power from aristocracy to the common people without a civil war, without organized violence. It had taken those things to wrest control from the monarchy (half a century of turmoil in the English Civil War, the Restoration of 1660, and the Glorious Revolution of 1688). After 1688, however, Parliament fought an internal battle to keep the power for themselves. They fought against the idea of representation, against the idea that the power in the country flowed from the people who put them into office (at least in the commons). For Parliament, sovereignty was theirs. It was not given to them. By the end of the eighteenth century, common men who lacked the right to vote were vociferously arguing that the power came from them, and they deserved parliamentary reform.
When studying British history, it is incredibly reductive to simply point to the Industrial Revolution as the pivotal turning point that led to the demand for political rights and mass politics in the nineteenth century. Yes, steam engines created the conditions for factories and increased the rate of urbanization that been happening more slowly over time, but it is a mistake to give so much of the credit of the working-class consciousness to industrial capacity because all that did was create low-paying jobs and poverty on a larger scale. A more influential development was the trading revolution a century earlier. By the mid-eighteenth century, Great Britain had become a trading power, and it was merchants who benefited first. Rich merchants and traders acquired a new way of life with new paths to education and new opportunities. Some merchants married into the aristocracy, some were given titles of their own, and still others stayed common and agitated for something they did not yet have—representation in Parliaments. The boroughs of Parliament had not kept up with increase and many larger cities went unrepresented while uninhabited places had two representatives. This was the key to demanding political rights because once merchants began demanding their share, those who worked for them began to think of themselves as deserving as well. In Mitchell’s own words, the importance of coal was not felt until the end of the eighteenth century, but political conscious already existed. The French Revolution did not just happen in France—it transformed the Western world, and Britain had already been thrust into ideas of representation and equality thanks to writings of the American War for Independence.
It would be easy to for many to say that Mitchell was talking about the Western world, and Britain’s unique position makes it the exception, not the rule. But that doesn’t hold up either. The political consciousness he pointed still begins in the eighteenth century with merchants in France and members of the Third Estate. The Industrial Revolution didn’t come to France for another century, but by 1789, the Third Estate was already demanding political power. Those ideas traveled throughout the Western world, laying the crucial foundation for the transformation of class and power that happened in the period Mitchel analyzed. The Industrial Revolution increased the rate and amplified those demands, but I think it’s a mistake to simply say that it “enabled new forms of mass politics” without talking about those mass politics in more depth. (14)
That was the major weakness of this book—it began with a flawed premise of the importance of coal and then carried that thread throughout his analysis of modern history. Coal and oil have an important relationship to democracy, one that deserves to be studied and analyzed, but to divorce those commodities from the world in which they were traded, mined, and developed left this book without any depth or lasting value.
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