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fredcthulhu's review
4.0
An in depth look at how Russia's foreign and domestic policy led to its entrance into World War I. Russia's Slavic support of the Balkans was a key factor into their entrance into World War 1. These policies and Russia's handling of World War 1 laid the groundwork for revolution and the rise of the Bolsheviks.
fourtriplezed's review against another edition
4.0
Dominic Lieven has produced a very deep analysis of the actions and opinions of the (so called) elites in Tsarist Russia in the decades leading up to and including The Great War. Lieven interspersing of his opinions also makes fascinating reading.
I base the following opinion on my own recent research into general Russian history, along with Lieven’s analysis and opinions in Towards The Flame. Lieven’s commentary on the opinion makers in Russian newspapers of the day, of the thoughts of the aristocratic classes and the actions of the various governments under Tsar Nicolaus I, what has stood out to me can be defined by Tsar Nicolaus II’s doctrine, that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy.
Lieven uses different terminology than that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy. Security, Interest and Identity is his maxim. In my opinion, both are one and the same thing. They are intertwined and still are the values today, seemingly. The Russian people will accept autocracy on the condition it is stable, that the majority of people are generally safe and fed, but if not? The autocracy changes hands. Interest/ Nationality added to Orthodoxy/Identity are a heady mix that has seems very ingrained in Russian DNA, DNA that sees non Slavs as possible enemies to the point of paranoia, with the people themselves seeing their leader as a bulwark against those not of their identity. In a recent review on another Russian history book I received a very good comment by a GR friend who stated “Russian society more bends toward community values like Asian societies than Western individualism. Family ties are very important to Russians. Traditions go deep into history when two-three generations of peasants lived under one roof. In the Western world, you choose a president as one of yours. In Russia, the tsar or ruler was always somebody above ordinary people; a fatherly figure, and fathers, like in many patriarchal societies, have always extracted great power over family, they could grant privileges or punish without mercy. Tsars were called Tsar-Father. The more strict 'father,' the more people believe in his power.” Therefore, Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is a top to bottom doctrine.
From all strata of Russian society Lieven gives a compelling discussion on Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy / Security, Interest and Identity, being the essence of Russia. Even when he reaches the breakdown of Aristocratic control late into The Great War, this ingrained doctrine replaced the vacuum, examples being the Communist Revolution. Later regimes such as that of Stalin and even as of now, Putin can be considered to be filling the vacuum.
This may seem a long way from the mention in the subheading of Empire, but from the early days of the Rus the growth of the Empire came from the autocracy of the rulers/Tsars and even after their demise just about all leaders since the end of the civil wars of the 1920s. The need to protect the people from outside influence against non-Slav nationalities and non-Orthodox Christianity has played heavily in Russian history. What Towards The Flame discusses is that as multi-ethnic empires of Europe became dysfunctional, Nationalism took root. In terms of a catalyst that started The Great War, due to Russian instincts towards Nationality and Orthodoxy / Interest and Identity there could be no other outcome than defence of Serbia, a bastion of Serb Orthodoxy, at the start of the Great War. Naturally, fear of other events such as the rise of Germany was very much in the mind of the elites. Add to that the fact that the home of Slavic Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople, was held by the Ottoman Empire and that empire also controlled the Straits of Bosphorus led to much angst. Lieven makes the point that we can hardly accuse Russia of those times of being particularly expansionist in terms of the straits, they were more than aware of historical colonial expansion by Europe and beyond and were very aware of then “imperial” control that assisted various ”empires” trade such as the Suez Canal under the British and the Panama under the US. There was a belief in “balance of power” and hardly an unusual trait viz a viz great powers.
There is obviously a lot more to this book than my thoughts mooted above. It is very deeply researched, with a useful set of maps, the many pictures in the general text finely placed, has outstanding footnotes that make the lack of a bibliography a nothing for any reader to concern themselves with. This is not an easy read in terms of narrative. The names and events, along with the various debates, are dense and very easy to get lost in. I found I had to reread various passages.
Lieven is also very gentle in his criticism of Tsar Nicolaus II, but even he had to admit to his shortcomings late into the book as the situation got out of control.
The Balkans and Ukraine are a presence. The Afterword makes interesting reading and shows how fast a history such as this can make a point that seems relevant at the time but could soon become redundant, and I quote the following; “Unlike Nicolaus II Vladimir Putin does not rule over a vast multinational empire inhabited by semi-literate peasants. Ukraine was, is, and always will be important to Russia, but extrapolating from 1914 and imagining that Russia will once again be a great empire if it reabsorbs the east Ukraine rust belt is moonshine. Ukraine is no longer at the heart of European geopolitics, and Europe is no longer at the centre of the world” I am not sure that I think that the Russian people from top-down think this as present circumstances indicate Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is very much to the forefront even if subconsciously. Leading up to The Great War the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in the fore when it came to Ukrainian nationalism, the Russians were aware of that then, and they see NATO/EU as just another replacement of a previous rival empire.
If I have a criticism it is that Lieven tends to use the “it was not inevitable” opinion on events that do in fact happen, the fall into chaos in Ukraine at the end of the Great War, for example. I tend to not like saying that a historical event was “not inevitable” when in fact it actually happened.
Recommended to only those with a genuine interest in the subject.
I base the following opinion on my own recent research into general Russian history, along with Lieven’s analysis and opinions in Towards The Flame. Lieven’s commentary on the opinion makers in Russian newspapers of the day, of the thoughts of the aristocratic classes and the actions of the various governments under Tsar Nicolaus I, what has stood out to me can be defined by Tsar Nicolaus II’s doctrine, that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy.
Lieven uses different terminology than that of Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy. Security, Interest and Identity is his maxim. In my opinion, both are one and the same thing. They are intertwined and still are the values today, seemingly. The Russian people will accept autocracy on the condition it is stable, that the majority of people are generally safe and fed, but if not? The autocracy changes hands. Interest/ Nationality added to Orthodoxy/Identity are a heady mix that has seems very ingrained in Russian DNA, DNA that sees non Slavs as possible enemies to the point of paranoia, with the people themselves seeing their leader as a bulwark against those not of their identity. In a recent review on another Russian history book I received a very good comment by a GR friend who stated “Russian society more bends toward community values like Asian societies than Western individualism. Family ties are very important to Russians. Traditions go deep into history when two-three generations of peasants lived under one roof. In the Western world, you choose a president as one of yours. In Russia, the tsar or ruler was always somebody above ordinary people; a fatherly figure, and fathers, like in many patriarchal societies, have always extracted great power over family, they could grant privileges or punish without mercy. Tsars were called Tsar-Father. The more strict 'father,' the more people believe in his power.” Therefore, Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is a top to bottom doctrine.
From all strata of Russian society Lieven gives a compelling discussion on Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy / Security, Interest and Identity, being the essence of Russia. Even when he reaches the breakdown of Aristocratic control late into The Great War, this ingrained doctrine replaced the vacuum, examples being the Communist Revolution. Later regimes such as that of Stalin and even as of now, Putin can be considered to be filling the vacuum.
This may seem a long way from the mention in the subheading of Empire, but from the early days of the Rus the growth of the Empire came from the autocracy of the rulers/Tsars and even after their demise just about all leaders since the end of the civil wars of the 1920s. The need to protect the people from outside influence against non-Slav nationalities and non-Orthodox Christianity has played heavily in Russian history. What Towards The Flame discusses is that as multi-ethnic empires of Europe became dysfunctional, Nationalism took root. In terms of a catalyst that started The Great War, due to Russian instincts towards Nationality and Orthodoxy / Interest and Identity there could be no other outcome than defence of Serbia, a bastion of Serb Orthodoxy, at the start of the Great War. Naturally, fear of other events such as the rise of Germany was very much in the mind of the elites. Add to that the fact that the home of Slavic Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople, was held by the Ottoman Empire and that empire also controlled the Straits of Bosphorus led to much angst. Lieven makes the point that we can hardly accuse Russia of those times of being particularly expansionist in terms of the straits, they were more than aware of historical colonial expansion by Europe and beyond and were very aware of then “imperial” control that assisted various ”empires” trade such as the Suez Canal under the British and the Panama under the US. There was a belief in “balance of power” and hardly an unusual trait viz a viz great powers.
There is obviously a lot more to this book than my thoughts mooted above. It is very deeply researched, with a useful set of maps, the many pictures in the general text finely placed, has outstanding footnotes that make the lack of a bibliography a nothing for any reader to concern themselves with. This is not an easy read in terms of narrative. The names and events, along with the various debates, are dense and very easy to get lost in. I found I had to reread various passages.
Lieven is also very gentle in his criticism of Tsar Nicolaus II, but even he had to admit to his shortcomings late into the book as the situation got out of control.
The Balkans and Ukraine are a presence. The Afterword makes interesting reading and shows how fast a history such as this can make a point that seems relevant at the time but could soon become redundant, and I quote the following; “Unlike Nicolaus II Vladimir Putin does not rule over a vast multinational empire inhabited by semi-literate peasants. Ukraine was, is, and always will be important to Russia, but extrapolating from 1914 and imagining that Russia will once again be a great empire if it reabsorbs the east Ukraine rust belt is moonshine. Ukraine is no longer at the heart of European geopolitics, and Europe is no longer at the centre of the world” I am not sure that I think that the Russian people from top-down think this as present circumstances indicate Autocracy, Nationality and Orthodoxy is very much to the forefront even if subconsciously. Leading up to The Great War the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in the fore when it came to Ukrainian nationalism, the Russians were aware of that then, and they see NATO/EU as just another replacement of a previous rival empire.
If I have a criticism it is that Lieven tends to use the “it was not inevitable” opinion on events that do in fact happen, the fall into chaos in Ukraine at the end of the Great War, for example. I tend to not like saying that a historical event was “not inevitable” when in fact it actually happened.
Recommended to only those with a genuine interest in the subject.
socraticgadfly's review
medium-paced
1.75
This book is a tough one to rate, and, since coming across The Storygraph and fractional star ratings being reality, it's the biggest hate I have for Goodreads and the Amazonoids behind it not having at least half-star ratings, even after the overhaul.
Specific to this book, it's right on 2.5 stars, and I hate being associated with people low-rating the book because they think it's boring. Anything but. But, I just can't give it 3 stars.
Let's dig in. And, this one is going to be long.
The End of Tsarist Russia
Having read some of his brother’s essays following the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, and always on the lookout for new WWI reading, I glommed this.
Interesting.
First off, as many other reviewers note, it isn’t about the end of Tsarist Russia at all. That said, the original edition, I think, and I know the original British one, had a different title.
Nonetheless, we do judge books by their covers, and that might be a quarter-star ding right there.
Now, the meat?
This is an interesting book in many ways. It’s in-depth in many ways. The flip side of that is that, when Lieven’s grinding an ax, that means you know it’s very deliberate.
And, yes, he does grind one big one.
First, in the very early pages, rather than Fritz Fischer’s “German war guilt” theory, or a “Serbian war guilt” idea, he seems to plump hard for an “Austrian war guilt” theory. Tosh. I know plenty about the 1903 coup that swapped dynasties in Serbia, Apis’ direct involvement in it, Pasic’s likely knowledge of the 1914 assassination plot and more. Even allowing for Conrad’s “Serbia delenda est” bellows, the idea of Austria war guilt as a primary cause of the war is rot.
This plays out at the end of Chapter 4, on the Austrian demarche related to annexation of Bosnia. He notes that Russia made clear in 1912-13 in the Balkan Wars that it wouldn’t accept having its back against the wall again, and that Berlin and Vienna listened, but did not in 1914. This too, at least in implications, is rot as an assassination (even given how little Vienna apparently actually knew about Serbian official and semi-official connections) is not the same as third-party warfare.
Second puzzler? A definitional one, around page 130. What is a “liberal conservative”? I assume Lieven is using “liberal” in its European sense, but still, there’s no definition. Such and such a person, whether in the Foreign Ministry, other government service, or outside, is described as such without explanation.
That said, it seems functionally semi-clear from context. These are the people who would have been in the Kadets party after 1905. (Although I am not sure about that.)
There’s lots of good in this book. A biggee is that not nearly all the professionals in Russian government, or formerly in it, were pan-Slavists or Slavophiles in the run-up to 1914. (Lieven says the two are different, and even distinguishes pan-Slavists from pan-slavists no capital, but says this book is not technical enough to dive into that.) These people distrusted “informed” modern Russian opinion, and in turn, they split into two. One branch wanted to focus on the Straits while setting aside the Balkans; the other wanted to focus on Asia while setting aside both.
In other words, we’re getting into a more nuanced, better backgrounded version of Sean McMeekin.
Later reading between the lines indicate that Slavophile stances would include the idea of “fair play” for Poles while pan-Slavism was more of the Russian Slavism is right, period.
Another issue rises up from Lieven later. All Russians have their names rendered in Russian spelling, ie, “Aleksandr” and not “Alexander.” But, “Wilhelm” is “William”? Given what I’ve noted above one could cite this as an example of historian’s bias and I think that’s plausible. I know that other British historians do it, too. Stop it.
Also of note in similar vein? The author doesn’t note the degree of family relationship to Vice Admiral Lieven, nor whether any family memoirs were used in this book.
Finally, a claim that Rasputin had no major influence on foreign policy before the start of war might be acceptable. (That said, Rasputin DID strongly urge Nicholas NOT to go to war; the fact that this argument failed could be, I guess, considered as proof of “no major influence.”) But making that claim after the war started? Tosh. Even before the war, his power to extract bribes argues for some influence. Also, the fact that Lieven makes this claim as an offhand statement further undercuts its likelihood of truth to me. Using military strategy knowledge to help bribers engage in inside trading on the Bourse is another argument against Lieven. And, above all, Rasputin encouraging Alexandra to encourage Nicholas in his neoabsolutism had its influence on Nicholas’ rule in general, and in the war, above all in Nicholas deciding to take direct command of the armed forces.
This cost Lieven a star by itself.
He also only mentions Apis and the Black Hand in passing. Worse, he does not mention at all Narodna Odbrana. He doesn’t mention Pasiç having likely foreknowledge of plot. He then claims that even had Serbia fully accepted the Austrian ultimatum, Vienna would have found an excuse for war anyway, a doubtful at best conjecture.
That’s another half-star, if not moe.
Other issues add up. And, we’re at 2 stars here. (May get 2.5 at StoryGraph. And, yes, I’m going to continue pushing it.)
It’s funny that Lievan calls MacMeekin “polemical.” He is himself, in his own way.
That’s as this book gets WORSE as it stumbles toward the finish line. Claiming the Ludendorff-Hindenburg dictatorship caused Germany to lose a war it “would probably have won” without them in charge is one of the most asinine comments I’ve ever seen in World War I historiography. But he makes it, on page 346. Pushing the renewal of submarine warfare, over Bethmann-Hollweg’s head, was a gamble, ’tis true. But, at this time, Nicholas hadn’t yet been toppled from the throne, let alone Kerensky replaced by Lenin. And, it wasn’t just the H-L duo who invested high potential power in sub warfare. As for the 1918 Kaiserschlacht? Necessary with the growing US presence; necessary to be won quickly, per how fast it was growing. As for the Hindenberg Program of a command economy? Tis true that the amount of horses removed from farms may have contributed to food scarcity in 1918, but this was a damned if you do, damned if you don’t moment and in no way lost the war.
And, the 2-3 pages before that show that Lieven should never write a word about military history.
He concludes by not only stressing Austrian war guilt, but shades of Fischer, throwing Germany in there as well.
The TL/DR summary? Everything here about Russian internal affairs is good. Everything outside of that is at best an unrevealing "meh" (with an exception or two) when purely Russian, but outside the Imperial bounds. Everything not Russian in this book is bad, often mendacious by omission, in my opinion.
Specific to this book, it's right on 2.5 stars, and I hate being associated with people low-rating the book because they think it's boring. Anything but. But, I just can't give it 3 stars.
Let's dig in. And, this one is going to be long.
The End of Tsarist Russia
Having read some of his brother’s essays following the start of the Russia-Ukraine War, and always on the lookout for new WWI reading, I glommed this.
Interesting.
First off, as many other reviewers note, it isn’t about the end of Tsarist Russia at all. That said, the original edition, I think, and I know the original British one, had a different title.
Nonetheless, we do judge books by their covers, and that might be a quarter-star ding right there.
Now, the meat?
This is an interesting book in many ways. It’s in-depth in many ways. The flip side of that is that, when Lieven’s grinding an ax, that means you know it’s very deliberate.
And, yes, he does grind one big one.
First, in the very early pages, rather than Fritz Fischer’s “German war guilt” theory, or a “Serbian war guilt” idea, he seems to plump hard for an “Austrian war guilt” theory. Tosh. I know plenty about the 1903 coup that swapped dynasties in Serbia, Apis’ direct involvement in it, Pasic’s likely knowledge of the 1914 assassination plot and more. Even allowing for Conrad’s “Serbia delenda est” bellows, the idea of Austria war guilt as a primary cause of the war is rot.
This plays out at the end of Chapter 4, on the Austrian demarche related to annexation of Bosnia. He notes that Russia made clear in 1912-13 in the Balkan Wars that it wouldn’t accept having its back against the wall again, and that Berlin and Vienna listened, but did not in 1914. This too, at least in implications, is rot as an assassination (even given how little Vienna apparently actually knew about Serbian official and semi-official connections) is not the same as third-party warfare.
Second puzzler? A definitional one, around page 130. What is a “liberal conservative”? I assume Lieven is using “liberal” in its European sense, but still, there’s no definition. Such and such a person, whether in the Foreign Ministry, other government service, or outside, is described as such without explanation.
That said, it seems functionally semi-clear from context. These are the people who would have been in the Kadets party after 1905. (Although I am not sure about that.)
There’s lots of good in this book. A biggee is that not nearly all the professionals in Russian government, or formerly in it, were pan-Slavists or Slavophiles in the run-up to 1914. (Lieven says the two are different, and even distinguishes pan-Slavists from pan-slavists no capital, but says this book is not technical enough to dive into that.) These people distrusted “informed” modern Russian opinion, and in turn, they split into two. One branch wanted to focus on the Straits while setting aside the Balkans; the other wanted to focus on Asia while setting aside both.
In other words, we’re getting into a more nuanced, better backgrounded version of Sean McMeekin.
Later reading between the lines indicate that Slavophile stances would include the idea of “fair play” for Poles while pan-Slavism was more of the Russian Slavism is right, period.
Another issue rises up from Lieven later. All Russians have their names rendered in Russian spelling, ie, “Aleksandr” and not “Alexander.” But, “Wilhelm” is “William”? Given what I’ve noted above one could cite this as an example of historian’s bias and I think that’s plausible. I know that other British historians do it, too. Stop it.
Also of note in similar vein? The author doesn’t note the degree of family relationship to Vice Admiral Lieven, nor whether any family memoirs were used in this book.
Finally, a claim that Rasputin had no major influence on foreign policy before the start of war might be acceptable. (That said, Rasputin DID strongly urge Nicholas NOT to go to war; the fact that this argument failed could be, I guess, considered as proof of “no major influence.”) But making that claim after the war started? Tosh. Even before the war, his power to extract bribes argues for some influence. Also, the fact that Lieven makes this claim as an offhand statement further undercuts its likelihood of truth to me. Using military strategy knowledge to help bribers engage in inside trading on the Bourse is another argument against Lieven. And, above all, Rasputin encouraging Alexandra to encourage Nicholas in his neoabsolutism had its influence on Nicholas’ rule in general, and in the war, above all in Nicholas deciding to take direct command of the armed forces.
This cost Lieven a star by itself.
He also only mentions Apis and the Black Hand in passing. Worse, he does not mention at all Narodna Odbrana. He doesn’t mention Pasiç having likely foreknowledge of plot. He then claims that even had Serbia fully accepted the Austrian ultimatum, Vienna would have found an excuse for war anyway, a doubtful at best conjecture.
That’s another half-star, if not moe.
Other issues add up. And, we’re at 2 stars here. (May get 2.5 at StoryGraph. And, yes, I’m going to continue pushing it.)
It’s funny that Lievan calls MacMeekin “polemical.” He is himself, in his own way.
That’s as this book gets WORSE as it stumbles toward the finish line. Claiming the Ludendorff-Hindenburg dictatorship caused Germany to lose a war it “would probably have won” without them in charge is one of the most asinine comments I’ve ever seen in World War I historiography. But he makes it, on page 346. Pushing the renewal of submarine warfare, over Bethmann-Hollweg’s head, was a gamble, ’tis true. But, at this time, Nicholas hadn’t yet been toppled from the throne, let alone Kerensky replaced by Lenin. And, it wasn’t just the H-L duo who invested high potential power in sub warfare. As for the 1918 Kaiserschlacht? Necessary with the growing US presence; necessary to be won quickly, per how fast it was growing. As for the Hindenberg Program of a command economy? Tis true that the amount of horses removed from farms may have contributed to food scarcity in 1918, but this was a damned if you do, damned if you don’t moment and in no way lost the war.
And, the 2-3 pages before that show that Lieven should never write a word about military history.
He concludes by not only stressing Austrian war guilt, but shades of Fischer, throwing Germany in there as well.
The TL/DR summary? Everything here about Russian internal affairs is good. Everything outside of that is at best an unrevealing "meh" (with an exception or two) when purely Russian, but outside the Imperial bounds. Everything not Russian in this book is bad, often mendacious by omission, in my opinion.
pierreikonnikov's review against another edition
3.0
Better to dip in and out than tackle all at once. A little too much depth at times, a bit too little at others.
abeanbg's review against another edition
2.0
Can't say it wasn't well-researched, but this "worm's eye" account of intragovernmental and diplomatic minutia was endlessly dull. I kept waiting for the narrative to kick in, but this was just a 300 page Wikipedia article.
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