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3.48 AVERAGE
3.48 AVERAGE
reflective
slow-paced
Interessante Ansätze zum Nachdenken über die eigenen Entscheidungen. Nur sehr auf ein Thema fokussiert, was dabei aber auch nicht in Gänze durchdacht wurde. Hätte meiner Meinung nach deutlich kürzer gefasst werden können.
This book takes on a really interesting topic, but in my opinion, the author's treatment falls short of satisfying. The basic premise is to discuss how people ought to behave when facing decisions that are likely to have dramatic and transformative effects, such that it is difficult to imagine what the outcomes will "be like" for us, or even such that we believe the experience itself will transform our preferences in unpredictable ways. Paul introduces the topic with the slightly silly example of whether to become a vampire, but she also gives extensive discussions of the decisions of whether a hearing-impaired person should get a cochlear implant and whether a childless person should have a child. These are certainly rare decisions, but also very important ones, so it makes sense to have a focused philosophical discussion of them.
Fundamentally, she says that this class of decision causes problems for classical rational choice theory. There is no way for us to assign valid utilities to the various possible outcomes, and therefore no way to choose based on maximization of expected value, or even weaker criteria such as maximin or maximax. (She also discusses time-inconsistency in cases of preference transformation, but I don't really see that as a necessary component of the problem.) She sets off to rescue rational choice, and discusses two alternative approaches.
One, which she rejects, is to make the decision from a neutral third-person perspective, based on whatever aggregate evidence is available. For example, one could decide whether or not to have a child based on surveys of reported satisfaction by parents and non-parents, controlling for relevant characteristics. Paul rejects this approach for a couple of reasons. The less-deep reason is that there is always variation even when controlling for observable characteristics, and we don't know which unobservable group we fall into. The deeper reason is simply that she sees it as important that major life decisions be made from a first-person perspective, because it is important for us to have agency in our own lives. This is pretty much an axiomatic assumption, but one that I wouldn't necessarily argue with.
The second, which she advocates, is to evaluate the decision not based on the (unknowable) subjective values of the outcomes, but rather on the (presumed knowable) subjective value of the "revelation" itself. She says that we may place some value on the very experience of *learning* what it is like to be a parent, a vampire, etc.--regardless of how much we like the actual consequences--and that we can make a rational first-person choice based on assessing this value.
This argument is interesting, but ultimately strikes me as something of a Procrustean bed. First, it is not obvious to me why rational choice theory deserves rehabilitating in this context. Paul seems to take this as self evident. I would ask why we see rational choice as a normative standard in the first place. I think the answer to that question would have to have some kind of utilitarian flavor, e.g., we think that human preference satisfaction is good, and rational choice is a framework that leads to the highest possible level of preference satisfaction. In the context of transformative choice, however, this justification is invalid. If we can't know the subjective values we will place on the possible outcomes, then ipso facto there is no decision-making framework that will consistently perform better than any other in terms of achieving preference satisfaction (i.e., whether a given decision-making framework leads to a bad or good outcome will be purely coincidental). If a first-person utilitarian perspective doesn't provide us with a decision rule of any value, we might consider other frameworks such as deontology or virtue ethics that could help us make a decision without regard to the (unknowable) utility consequences.
Actually, it seems to me that rational choice theory is in general not necessarily a good guide for making life-altering decisions, even when the consequences are more or less comprehensible. We know from psychological research that there are two broad classes of happiness: pleasure and flourishing, more or less. Utilitarian rational choice seems pretty well-suited to choices that primarily bear on the former. An example that Paul uses in the book is whether to eat pineapple or durian for breakfast. This will have consequences in terms of our pleasure or pain, but will not really have any bearing on our life flourishing. It is generally pretty easy for us to "mentally simulate" the different alternatives, and choose the one that we think will provide the highest expected level of pleasure. However, it is difficult or impossible to "mentally simulate" the pleasure consequences of life-altering events. First of all, we can't really imagine a life-long stream of outcomes in the same way that we can imagine a discrete outcome, and second of all, it is well-known that people strongly adapt to both positive and negative events such that long-term effects on happiness are generally muted or even nonmeasurable. So I am not sure what utilitarian rational choice has to say about choices that bear on the flourishing type of happiness. By contrast, deontological or virtue frameworks seem to have a lot to say about those types of decisions. For example, it might be difficult for us to tell what the utility consequences of becoming a soldier would be, but considerations of duty and virtue would be extremely relevant.
Paul's concept of "the value of revelation" seems to fall more into the "flourishing" category than the "pleasure" category. Presumably, she doesn't think we get some direct pleasure or pain from the experience of revelation; rather, she means that the revelation has some bearing on our flourishing. For example, one might think that it is important and valuable to explore as many aspects of the human experience as possible, and include parenthood in that list of aspects (regardless of whether or not it was pleasurable on net). It seems to me to stretch credibility a bit to characterize a decision made on such a basis as a utilitarian rational choice. It seems much more related to virtue ethics ("I want to be the kind of person who..."). So, I think Paul does the reader and the topic a disservice by not discussing the different classes of happiness and not discussing non-utility-based frameworks (except for a couple of offhanded remarks).
Fundamentally, she says that this class of decision causes problems for classical rational choice theory. There is no way for us to assign valid utilities to the various possible outcomes, and therefore no way to choose based on maximization of expected value, or even weaker criteria such as maximin or maximax. (She also discusses time-inconsistency in cases of preference transformation, but I don't really see that as a necessary component of the problem.) She sets off to rescue rational choice, and discusses two alternative approaches.
One, which she rejects, is to make the decision from a neutral third-person perspective, based on whatever aggregate evidence is available. For example, one could decide whether or not to have a child based on surveys of reported satisfaction by parents and non-parents, controlling for relevant characteristics. Paul rejects this approach for a couple of reasons. The less-deep reason is that there is always variation even when controlling for observable characteristics, and we don't know which unobservable group we fall into. The deeper reason is simply that she sees it as important that major life decisions be made from a first-person perspective, because it is important for us to have agency in our own lives. This is pretty much an axiomatic assumption, but one that I wouldn't necessarily argue with.
The second, which she advocates, is to evaluate the decision not based on the (unknowable) subjective values of the outcomes, but rather on the (presumed knowable) subjective value of the "revelation" itself. She says that we may place some value on the very experience of *learning* what it is like to be a parent, a vampire, etc.--regardless of how much we like the actual consequences--and that we can make a rational first-person choice based on assessing this value.
This argument is interesting, but ultimately strikes me as something of a Procrustean bed. First, it is not obvious to me why rational choice theory deserves rehabilitating in this context. Paul seems to take this as self evident. I would ask why we see rational choice as a normative standard in the first place. I think the answer to that question would have to have some kind of utilitarian flavor, e.g., we think that human preference satisfaction is good, and rational choice is a framework that leads to the highest possible level of preference satisfaction. In the context of transformative choice, however, this justification is invalid. If we can't know the subjective values we will place on the possible outcomes, then ipso facto there is no decision-making framework that will consistently perform better than any other in terms of achieving preference satisfaction (i.e., whether a given decision-making framework leads to a bad or good outcome will be purely coincidental). If a first-person utilitarian perspective doesn't provide us with a decision rule of any value, we might consider other frameworks such as deontology or virtue ethics that could help us make a decision without regard to the (unknowable) utility consequences.
Actually, it seems to me that rational choice theory is in general not necessarily a good guide for making life-altering decisions, even when the consequences are more or less comprehensible. We know from psychological research that there are two broad classes of happiness: pleasure and flourishing, more or less. Utilitarian rational choice seems pretty well-suited to choices that primarily bear on the former. An example that Paul uses in the book is whether to eat pineapple or durian for breakfast. This will have consequences in terms of our pleasure or pain, but will not really have any bearing on our life flourishing. It is generally pretty easy for us to "mentally simulate" the different alternatives, and choose the one that we think will provide the highest expected level of pleasure. However, it is difficult or impossible to "mentally simulate" the pleasure consequences of life-altering events. First of all, we can't really imagine a life-long stream of outcomes in the same way that we can imagine a discrete outcome, and second of all, it is well-known that people strongly adapt to both positive and negative events such that long-term effects on happiness are generally muted or even nonmeasurable. So I am not sure what utilitarian rational choice has to say about choices that bear on the flourishing type of happiness. By contrast, deontological or virtue frameworks seem to have a lot to say about those types of decisions. For example, it might be difficult for us to tell what the utility consequences of becoming a soldier would be, but considerations of duty and virtue would be extremely relevant.
Paul's concept of "the value of revelation" seems to fall more into the "flourishing" category than the "pleasure" category. Presumably, she doesn't think we get some direct pleasure or pain from the experience of revelation; rather, she means that the revelation has some bearing on our flourishing. For example, one might think that it is important and valuable to explore as many aspects of the human experience as possible, and include parenthood in that list of aspects (regardless of whether or not it was pleasurable on net). It seems to me to stretch credibility a bit to characterize a decision made on such a basis as a utilitarian rational choice. It seems much more related to virtue ethics ("I want to be the kind of person who..."). So, I think Paul does the reader and the topic a disservice by not discussing the different classes of happiness and not discussing non-utility-based frameworks (except for a couple of offhanded remarks).
This book was a relatively interesting read on the failure of rational choice theory to allow someone to choose / evaluate choosing to undertake transformative experiences, in terms of both the epistemic distance and transformative process itself changing the metrics by which we would view this decision. Pretty interesting read, but a little repetitive. Nonetheless, relatively engaging.
hopeful
informative
inspiring
reflective
medium-paced
Is This An Overview?
There are many choices in life in which it would be best to consider as much information about them before making a decision. Choices of what to experience, or not experience. The problem is that informed decisions can be impossible. As life presents many choices without being able to understand the different options, how they would impact the future of the individual. These are transformative experiences, that fundamentally change the individual. Changing what it would be like to live. There is no way of knowing how the change would affect the individual, until the individual has the experience. An experience in which the individual has an epistemic transformation given the new information. An experience that changes how the individual understands and processes information.
Information limitations prevents knowing what to expect and make an informed choice. Lived experiences cannot inform what it would be like to undergo the change because the change would alter values attached to previous and new information. Different individuals have different reactions to the same change, therefore testimonies of others about their experience cannot be relied upon, especially because their experiences transformed the way they think. The only source of information about the experience, is the experience itself. The choice needs to be based on what the individual wants to discover. To discover how the change will affect them, or a life without the change.
Caveats?
The book is a systematic analysis of transformative experiences, providing various theoretic and practical examples. The examples and explanations tend to be self-similar and repeated.
it got kinda repetitive and parts seemed dubious but also there were some interesting bits including the introduction of the term superbaby
"And claims like 'I can't imagine life without my child' are not evidence that having a child has high subjective value; they are merely evidence that having a child impairs a parent's psychological ability to envision certain counterfactual scenarios"
"And claims like 'I can't imagine life without my child' are not evidence that having a child has high subjective value; they are merely evidence that having a child impairs a parent's psychological ability to envision certain counterfactual scenarios"
L.A. Paul has a great insight that is overwhelmed tedious exposition. She belabors her points; constantly, repeatedly, and excessively. So much so that it seriously reduces the enjoyment of the book. The entirety, I mean the entirety of chapter 3 can be skipped. And it is the longest chapter in the book! It is just her repeatedly coming up with examples of "transformative experiences" and then trying to convince you in agonizing detail that it is, in fact, a transformative experience under her criteria. When, in fact, no normal reader is going to disagree.
If you go from being deaf to being able to hear -- via a Cochlear implant -- is that a transformative experience? I haven't even told you what a "transformative experience" is and you're already agreeing, "Yep, that sure sounds like a big experience!" Paul spends 14 pages(!!), pages 56-70, on this. The book is only 123 pages long, so this is 11% of the entire book.
Not satisfied, she then immediately spends 23 pages(!!), pages 71-94 (18% of the entire book!), trying to convince you that becoming a parent is also a transformative experience. Like, duh. No kidding. Seriously, skip the entire 3rd chapter. It is terrible and adds nothing to her point.
It is a shame because her key insight is a very good one: there is a wide-spread normative standard that our choices should be "rational", which means some kind of utility-maximizing by picking "the best" choice from the options in front of us. We know that people don't always live up to this standard but even those who say we don't live up to it, don't really argue that we shouldn't even try to live up to it.
But there are some experiences in our lives that are "transformative experiences". They are simultaneously personal transformations and epistemic transformations. Because both change simultaneously, we don't know what our future set of preferences will be, so we can't make a "rational choice". There are some things that we can't know whether we enjoy until we try them. And maybe the me-before doesn't like it but the me-after does like it? Which version of you has the preferences that matter?
Becoming a parent is a classic, obvious example. Trauma is another one (think of the common "you can't possibly understand how I feel" reply from many grieving people). Paul's insight seems intuitively obvious once it is pointed out, which makes her later tedious explanations seem all the more pointless.
All of this seems to undermine, or at least call into question, the ideal of "rational choice" as a normative sense. Much of Paul's book is taken up trying to "rescue" rational choice. This part was also underwhelming. She doesn't provide an especially compelling case for why rational choice should be rescued. And her solution in the end is, in her own words, deeply unsatisfying.
When we are faced with a transformative experience we run the risk that (because it is personal and transformative and because we cannot predict the outcome) the most core of our values will change, undermining our own sense of self. Given that, is it any wonder that people are as conservative as they are? Why would anyone choose a transformative experience in Paul's model? You can't measure the potential positives but your entire sense of self is at risk. Why would you make the choice to have a transformative experience?
It is hard to imagine how unsatisfied you must be with your current self to "plunge into the unknown jungle of a new self" with (in Paul's model) no real idea what that future self might be.
Paul's book ends on that note, fairly abruptly. It felt under-explored. I wish the author had spent less time convincing me that her examples were transformative experiences and more page count exploring the consequences.
If you go from being deaf to being able to hear -- via a Cochlear implant -- is that a transformative experience? I haven't even told you what a "transformative experience" is and you're already agreeing, "Yep, that sure sounds like a big experience!" Paul spends 14 pages(!!), pages 56-70, on this. The book is only 123 pages long, so this is 11% of the entire book.
Not satisfied, she then immediately spends 23 pages(!!), pages 71-94 (18% of the entire book!), trying to convince you that becoming a parent is also a transformative experience. Like, duh. No kidding. Seriously, skip the entire 3rd chapter. It is terrible and adds nothing to her point.
It is a shame because her key insight is a very good one: there is a wide-spread normative standard that our choices should be "rational", which means some kind of utility-maximizing by picking "the best" choice from the options in front of us. We know that people don't always live up to this standard but even those who say we don't live up to it, don't really argue that we shouldn't even try to live up to it.
But there are some experiences in our lives that are "transformative experiences". They are simultaneously personal transformations and epistemic transformations. Because both change simultaneously, we don't know what our future set of preferences will be, so we can't make a "rational choice". There are some things that we can't know whether we enjoy until we try them. And maybe the me-before doesn't like it but the me-after does like it? Which version of you has the preferences that matter?
Becoming a parent is a classic, obvious example. Trauma is another one (think of the common "you can't possibly understand how I feel" reply from many grieving people). Paul's insight seems intuitively obvious once it is pointed out, which makes her later tedious explanations seem all the more pointless.
All of this seems to undermine, or at least call into question, the ideal of "rational choice" as a normative sense. Much of Paul's book is taken up trying to "rescue" rational choice. This part was also underwhelming. She doesn't provide an especially compelling case for why rational choice should be rescued. And her solution in the end is, in her own words, deeply unsatisfying.
We must embrace the epistemic fact that, in real-life cases of making major life decisions in transformative contexts, we have very little to go on. To the extent that our choice depends on our subjective preferences, we choose between the alternatives of discovering what it is like to have the new preferences and experiences involved, or keeping the status quo
When we are faced with a transformative experience we run the risk that (because it is personal and transformative and because we cannot predict the outcome) the most core of our values will change, undermining our own sense of self. Given that, is it any wonder that people are as conservative as they are? Why would anyone choose a transformative experience in Paul's model? You can't measure the potential positives but your entire sense of self is at risk. Why would you make the choice to have a transformative experience?
that is, we choose to become the kind of person—without knowing what that will be like—that these experiences will make us into. [...]
When faced with each of life’s transformative choices, you must ask yourself: do I plunge into the unknown jungle of a new self? Or do I stay on the ship?
It is hard to imagine how unsatisfied you must be with your current self to "plunge into the unknown jungle of a new self" with (in Paul's model) no real idea what that future self might be.
Paul's book ends on that note, fairly abruptly. It felt under-explored. I wish the author had spent less time convincing me that her examples were transformative experiences and more page count exploring the consequences.