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afnanamdeen's review against another edition
5.0
Fascinating, splendid, and with a terribly frustrating ending. All my homies HATE the Copenhagen interpretation.
sbenzell's review against another edition
3.0
I am ambivalent about this book.
On the one hand, I nearly put the book down a few chapters in. The early material about the initial development of quantum theory was all old news to me, covered (better) in books like ``Thirty Years Which Shook Physics." The actual mechanics of quantum theory are not covered in depth. The only part of this book I felt was novel was the details of how central Bohr was to how QM is thought about.
The book's novelty for me starts about halfway in, after WWII. The discussion of how alternatives to the Copenhagen Interpretation arose and were suppressed is compelling and provocative. The discussion of why the 'Measurement Problem' is indeed a problem is very well articulated.
The social science in the background-- which posits that government funding (which favored 'shut up and calculate' pragmatism), path dependence, Bohr's network centrality -- are all interesting hypotheses that point to both the 'incommensurablity' of different paradigms as well as the role of the political and social in the development of science. I wish the author had speculated on how lessons we learn from this history might help us to do better science in the future.
The book also has very good, if perhaps too extreme, takedowns of logical positivism and verificationism. I agree that they are inadequate (logical positivism is on its face an oxymoron, and 'the decisive experiment'-- as pointed out by 'Two Dogmas'-- can always be dodged by the modification of ancillary hypotheses), but do think they have something to say. One difference between science and non-science is testable prediction (if not the only difference), if not the only one. The example used in the book -- of heliocentrism being observationally equivalent to ptolemyic astronomy -- was only true temporarily. Foundations of Physics, then, might be thought of as proto- or pre- science, until it is able to generate predictions different from Copenhagen.
As an alternative to LP and verificationism, the author proposes a very vague demarcation principle -- one so broad (i.e. science 'tries to integrate distinct knowledges into a unified theory') that I think astrology or theology fit snugly. His more practical demarcation, that e.g. religious groups 'aren't really interested in scientific truth' is inadequate philosophically, because as he points out normal science is often motivated by things outside real science. The author just seems to assume Scientific Realism as true (claiming that this is the consensus of philosophers of science, and painting all continental philosophers' opinions as being prima facie not relevant for some reason; dissing Kuhn for not being sufficiently realist). This is a position I lean towards as well, but needs to be actually argued against a idealist stance (although I think he does well arguing against the instrumentalist stance -- does that term appear? -- in his takedown of positivism).
Finally the book's actually descriptions of quantum riddles -- such as Bell's Thm -- were adequate but still left me with lots of questions. His first appendix -- explaining the 'delayed choice' experiment through 4 different QM interpretations -- also left me looking for clarification. I would also have appreciated more discussion of actual attempts to test different interpretations -- doesn't Deutch have one for many worlds he pushes?
Overall recommended to someone interested in philosophy of science. "Beginning of Infinity" I would recommend first though.
On the one hand, I nearly put the book down a few chapters in. The early material about the initial development of quantum theory was all old news to me, covered (better) in books like ``Thirty Years Which Shook Physics." The actual mechanics of quantum theory are not covered in depth. The only part of this book I felt was novel was the details of how central Bohr was to how QM is thought about.
The book's novelty for me starts about halfway in, after WWII. The discussion of how alternatives to the Copenhagen Interpretation arose and were suppressed is compelling and provocative. The discussion of why the 'Measurement Problem' is indeed a problem is very well articulated.
The social science in the background-- which posits that government funding (which favored 'shut up and calculate' pragmatism), path dependence, Bohr's network centrality -- are all interesting hypotheses that point to both the 'incommensurablity' of different paradigms as well as the role of the political and social in the development of science. I wish the author had speculated on how lessons we learn from this history might help us to do better science in the future.
The book also has very good, if perhaps too extreme, takedowns of logical positivism and verificationism. I agree that they are inadequate (logical positivism is on its face an oxymoron, and 'the decisive experiment'-- as pointed out by 'Two Dogmas'-- can always be dodged by the modification of ancillary hypotheses), but do think they have something to say. One difference between science and non-science is testable prediction (if not the only difference), if not the only one. The example used in the book -- of heliocentrism being observationally equivalent to ptolemyic astronomy -- was only true temporarily. Foundations of Physics, then, might be thought of as proto- or pre- science, until it is able to generate predictions different from Copenhagen.
As an alternative to LP and verificationism, the author proposes a very vague demarcation principle -- one so broad (i.e. science 'tries to integrate distinct knowledges into a unified theory') that I think astrology or theology fit snugly. His more practical demarcation, that e.g. religious groups 'aren't really interested in scientific truth' is inadequate philosophically, because as he points out normal science is often motivated by things outside real science. The author just seems to assume Scientific Realism as true (claiming that this is the consensus of philosophers of science, and painting all continental philosophers' opinions as being prima facie not relevant for some reason; dissing Kuhn for not being sufficiently realist). This is a position I lean towards as well, but needs to be actually argued against a idealist stance (although I think he does well arguing against the instrumentalist stance -- does that term appear? -- in his takedown of positivism).
Finally the book's actually descriptions of quantum riddles -- such as Bell's Thm -- were adequate but still left me with lots of questions. His first appendix -- explaining the 'delayed choice' experiment through 4 different QM interpretations -- also left me looking for clarification. I would also have appreciated more discussion of actual attempts to test different interpretations -- doesn't Deutch have one for many worlds he pushes?
Overall recommended to someone interested in philosophy of science. "Beginning of Infinity" I would recommend first though.
7anooch's review against another edition
5.0
Great historical account of the philosophy of quantum mechanics and quantum interpretations. I just with there was more on the current state of affairs. Great book nonetheless.
topquark19's review against another edition
challenging
funny
informative
inspiring
reflective
medium-paced
5.0
withanf's review against another edition
2.0
This book is so redundant. Could relate all the details in half the pages if things were not repeated so many times.
dachristie's review against another edition
3.0
The book is not what I expected. I was expecting the book will cover a detailed explanation of quantum interpretation. I mean, it did, but only 20% of the book, the rest is about politics, more specifically, politics which shaped the understanding of the quantum phenomenon.
Don't get me wrong. It is very interesting to learn about scientist's view and their background, which ultimately shaped their formalisation on quantum theory. But, the portion of this particular part is too much compared to the quantum physics interpretation explanation.
Maybe this arrangement of the book will be interesting for some people, but it is not working for me.
Don't get me wrong. It is very interesting to learn about scientist's view and their background, which ultimately shaped their formalisation on quantum theory. But, the portion of this particular part is too much compared to the quantum physics interpretation explanation.
Maybe this arrangement of the book will be interesting for some people, but it is not working for me.
kahawa's review against another edition
3.0
I'm not really qualified to critique a book on quantum physics, but I suspect that the author hasn't properly grasped the Copenhagen Interpretation, and neither have most physicists who are against it. Again, I'm not a physicist, but what I've gathered from much physics reading and pondering is that the CI doesn't say that reality IS such and such, but that we can't meaningfully speak about reality. This is probably related to the problem in epistemology of establishing assumptions, ie, you can't do it without using your assumptions, which is circular. In quantum physics, you can't properly measure a property while using the property itself in the measurement. This isn't a small problem. We can't just approximate our way around this somehow and get at the Truth that way. We're stuck. I don't like it, but I think it's, ahem, the truth.
The history of the development of physics was interesting, but Becker didn't explain key concepts very well, so it made it hard for non physicists to track.
The history of the development of physics was interesting, but Becker didn't explain key concepts very well, so it made it hard for non physicists to track.